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Lectures 
LAW AND THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN 
COLONIAL VIRGINIA  
William E. Nelson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For most of England’s North American empire, the restoration of 
Charles II to the nation’s throne in 1660 quickly led to a sharp break in 
the continuity of the legal system.  In New England, the crown began to 
interfere with local legal ordering in ways unprecedented since 
Plymouth had been founded in 1620.  In the Middle Atlantic, the 
Restoration led to a new imperialism that replaced Dutch rule and Dutch 
law with English rule and English common law.  In the Carolinas, 
Charles II’s new policies led to the founding of two new colonies. 
Such was not the case in Virginia.  With the restoration of Charles II 
to the English throne, the king also restored Sir William Berkeley, a 
former royal governor, to his post in Virginia, and the law continued to 
develop largely in directions it had already been moving.  A potentially 
transforming event occurred a decade and a half later, when Nathaniel 
Bacon, a newcomer from England who had settled on the Virginia 
frontier, led a rebellion that resulted in a civil war that nearly toppled the 
colonial regime.  Ultimately Bacon’s Rebellion was suppressed, and its 
suppression resulted not in change, but in reinforcement of legal 
developments that were already occurring. 
This Article proceeds in four main parts.  Part II focuses on the 
decade and a half between the Restoration and Bacon’s Rebellion and 
examines Virginia’s unstable and somewhat weak legal order in the 
1660s and early 1670s.1  Rapid immigration by whites lay at the root of 
the instability; Virginia’s planters needed laborers—mainly in the form 
of young, mostly male, indentured servants—for the economy to grow 
and prosper.  However, the colony proved unable to absorb those 
newcomers into the governing elite after they completed their period of 
servitude.  Instead, the freed laborers grew into a landless, sullen, and 
                                                 
* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law and Professor of History, New York University.  A 
condensed version of this article was delivered as the Martin Luther King Lecture at 
Valparaiso University School of Law on January 23, 2014.  The author is indebted to the 
Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York University 
School of Law for research support and to the members of the Legal History Colloquium at 
New York University for their comments and criticisms. 
1 See infra Part II (examining the weak nature of Post-Restoration law in Virginia). 
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unruly lot that eventually turned to open rebellion.  As noted above, 
however, their rebellion failed. 
In the aftermath of rebellion, Virginia’s governing elite solidified its 
power.  In the short term, rebels were punished, compelled to give peace 
bonds promising obedience, or otherwise coerced into quiescence.  In the 
longer run, except in connection with the somewhat later settlement of 
the Shenandoah Valley, Virginia became increasingly unwelcoming to 
white immigrants, at least in comparison with other colonies like 
Pennsylvania that had been founded in the Post-Restoration era.  After 
the 1670s, whites tended to immigrate to those other colonies, and 
Virginia was forced to replace its white, indentured servants with black 
African slaves, who became victims of severe forms of repression that 
never could have been imposed on voluntary immigrants from Europe.  
As a result, elites had an easier task of governance in the eighteenth 
century than they had had in the seventeenth—they only had to control a 
smaller, stable class of whites positioned midway between themselves 
and their slaves rather than a growing underclass of whites striving for 
upward mobility.  Part III will examine how the structure and 
procedures of the legal system enabled elites to exert that control.2 
Meanwhile, Virginia’s substantive law continued to develop in the 
directions it had taken since the 1620s.  In an effort to attract settlers and 
capital, Virginia continued to champion private property and facilitate 
the collection of debts.  The law also strove to encourage immigration 
from Europe by improving the well-being of indentured servants, in part 
by conferring real rights on those servants but also by distinguishing 
white servants from black slaves through degradation of the latter.  
Taken together, the degradation of Africans and their descendants and 
the replacement of white with black labor, together with the protection 
of creditors and property owners, set in motion chains of causation that 
would result in the inhumanity and injustice of nineteenth-century 
slavery.  Part IV will examine these developments.3 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, Virginia’s provincial elites 
together with crown officials could look with some satisfaction on the 
legal order they had created.  They governed the colony effectively, with 
no outward signs of resistance to the powers in authority.  Virginians 
were among the most docile and supportive subjects in Great Britain’s 
colonial American empire.  Nonetheless, some fragility remained.  In 
analyzing developments in Virginia law after 1750, Part V will examine 
                                                 
2 See infra Part III (explaining how Virginia elites strengthened their legal power 
throughout the 1600s). 
3 See infra Part IV (examining various substantive law areas in colonial Virginia). 
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how that fragility was gradually exposed.  Ultimately its exposure led to 
the collapse of Virginia’s colonial legal order in 1776.4 
In addition to providing the first general history of colonial Virginia 
law, this Article seeks to intervene in two respects in ongoing scholarly 
debates.  First, in respect to the subject of slavery.  For almost three-
quarters of a century, historians have rightly assumed that colonial 
Virginia slavery was thoroughly unjust and inhumane, but few have 
inquired in a systematic fashion about what made it so.  This Article 
urges that historians have used the concept of slavery to describe a wide 
variety of vastly different socio-economic systems of subordination and 
also urges that various conditions and circumstances on the ground have 
made those different systems more and less evil.  The Article then offers 
a specific theory, together with some tentative but by no means full 
evidentiary support, to suggest what made Virginia slavery more 
inhumane and unjust than most other systems of servitude. 
Second, in respect to the subject of the causes of the American 
Revolution.  For the past half century, most historians have searched for 
causation in the realm of political and legal ideology.  This Article finds 
that search misguided in Virginia’s case.  Although Virginia lawyers 
undoubtedly employed familiar political, constitutional, and legal ideas 
in challenging Parliamentary policies, this Article suggests that economic 
considerations combined with ideological and constitutional ones to 
motivate Virginia planters as they ceased being some of the most docile 
and supportive of Britain’s colonials and instead became almost 
unanimous defenders of American rights and ultimately of American 
independence. 
II.  THE WEAKNESS OF POST-RESTORATION LAW 
Historians generally agree that in the 1660s and 1670s the legal 
system of Virginia—consisting of a colony-wide General Court and local 
county courts—suffered from instability and weakness despite the broad 
civil, criminal, equitable, and regulatory jurisdiction that both the 
General Court and the county courts possessed.  The root problem lay in 
the large number of landless, difficult-to-govern, former indentured 
servants whom the colony’s small governing class lacked sufficient 
power to coerce.  The system had to govern by consent since it was too 
weak to do otherwise.5 
                                                 
4 See infra Part V (examining the weakening of the Virginia legal order throughout the 
1700s). 
5 See JOHN RUSTON PAGAN, ANNE ORTHWOOD’S BASTARD:  SEX AND LAW IN EARLY VIRGINIA 
51 (2003) (providing the most recent monograph on the legal system of seventeenth century 
Virginia).  The jurisdiction of the courts is outlined in more detail below.  See infra Part III.E.1. 
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A good deal of evidence of the weakness of post-1660 legal 
institutions exists.  A persistent sign was the difficulty of obtaining the 
attendance of witnesses,6 jurors,7 and even justices in court.8  There was 
also “the long & tedious”9 nature of sometimes “frivolous”10 litigation 
that parties could pursue until they were either satisfied with the result 
or totally exhausted.  If a litigant did not approve of a result in a county 
court, he could appeal to the General Court,11 even from a second 
decision in “a vexatious turbulent cause already judged,”12 and from the 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., R v. Goodrich (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 22, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND 
GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 1622−1632, 1670−1676 WITH NOTES AND EXCERPTS FROM 
ORIGINAL COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT RECORDS, INTO 1683, NOW LOST 376 (H.R. McIlwaine 
ed., 1924) [hereinafter MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL] (noting that a witness failed to appear); R v. 
Walker (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY VIRIGINA DEEDS, ORDERS WILLS & C. 
1657–1662, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) [hereinafter 3 YORK 1657–
1662]; see also R v. Dangerfield (Va. Gen. Ct., Nov. 20, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra, 
at 397 (explaining that a fine was remitted since the witness “was made incapable by 
sickness”). 
7 See, e.g., R v. Bryan (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 4, 1674/1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 403 (stating the government fined Charles Bryan for failing to appear as a juror); R v. 
Davis (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 25, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 379 (fining 
jurors for failing to appear); see also R v. Lang (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 24, 1668), in 9 
NORTHAMPTON RECORD BOOK, 1664−1674, at 176, 178 (Howard Mackey & Marlene A. Groves 
eds., 2003) [hereinafter 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674] (requiring jurors show why they failed to 
appear). 
8 See, e.g., R v. Wright (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1662), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1661−1665, at 26 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665] (fining justices 
499 lb. of tobacco for missing court); cf Order That Court Be Adjourned (Northumberland Cnty. 
Ct., May 20, 1661), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOKS NORTHUMBERLAND 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1657–1661, at 101 (Sam Sparacio & Ruth Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter 
VIRGINIA 1657–1661] (cancelling a court session  since only two justices attended). 
9 Gilbert v. Smith (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 25, 1675), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical 
Soc’y of Utah); accord Bu[s]hrod v. Dixon (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 4, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE 
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 314; see also Bridger v. Pitt (Va. Gen. Ct., May 23, 1673), in MINUTES OF 
THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 336–37 (describing the proceeding as a “long dispute”). 
10 R v. Spencer & Goodale (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1664), in 3 VIRGINIA COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS 303–04 (Beverley Fleet ed., 1988) [hereinafter 3 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS]. 
11 See, e.g., Madeson v. Flowers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 20, 1667), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1665–1669, at 49 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1665–1669] (stating 
that Bennet Madeson appealed the decision); Williams v. Christmas (Northumberland Cnty. 
Ct., Sept. 6, 1664), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 85–86 (granting Thomas 
Williams’ request for appeal to the General Court); Hubard v. Wheeler (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 26, 
1657), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical 
Soc’y of Utah). 
12 Salter v. Stinson (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1658), in 3 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS, 
supra note 10, at 199. 
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General Court to the House of Burgesses13 or the Privy Council.14  Courts 
also reversed their own judgments without appeals when parties 
brought new matters to their attention.15  It seems that judges were 
unwilling or unable to enforce their judgments as final, but were instead 
engaged in a negotiating process in which the court and the litigants 
responded to each other’s contentions, slowly narrowed their 
differences, and ultimately came to a result with which all could live. 
The case of John Gibson is illustrative.16  Like many other 
seventeenth-century Virginians, he decided one day to use someone 
else’s boat, for which he was convicted of theft of the boat.  The court 
levied a stiff fine of 6000 lbs. of tobacco.  However, as the court 
undoubtedly knew, collecting a fine was quite different from imposing 
one.  John Gibson, in fact, did not pay his 6000 lb. fine, and soon the 
court offered a bargain:  it agreed to remit half the fine if Gibson would 
agree to pay the other half—that is, 3000 lbs. tobacco—within the next 
two years.17  He agreed, although it is unclear how much, if anything, he 
ultimately paid. 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Carter v. Hatcher (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 383 (referring the decision to the Assembly); West v. Wilson (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 28, 
1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 382 (allowing Wilson to appeal the decision 
to the Assembly); West v. White (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 22, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 375–76 (referring the entire cause of action to the Assembly); Lawrence v. Lloyd 
(Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 25, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 295, 297 (stating that 
the case would next move to the Assembly). 
14 See, e.g., Ludwell v. Bland (Va. Gen. Ct., Nov. 21, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 398−99 (moving the case from the Assembly to the Council). 
15 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Ford (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 16, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 441−43 (voiding its own previous proceedings because a mistake was made); 
Taberer v. Hunt (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 277 
(reversing its previous disposition); R v. Anderson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 25, 1670), in MINUTES OF 
THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 238–39 (reversing the jury decision); Page v. Estate of Dixon 
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1661/1662), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1656−1661, at 100 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter LANCASTER 1656−1661] (reversing its previous order issued against the estate of 
Miles Dixon); R v. Thomas (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 24, 1669), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1665−1669, supra note 11, at 93–94 (remitting the amount the court original decreed William 
Thomas to pay).  Compare Madeson v. Flowers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1667), 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 46 (allowing the case be presented again to the 
jury because the original information presented to the jury was imperfect), with Madeson v. 
Flowers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 20, 1667), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 
11, at 49 (granting the request to review the court’s previous decision regarding which party 
owned the servant). 
16 See Remission of Gibson’s Fine (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1668), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 67 (bargaining with John Gibson to reduce his 
fine if he paid what else he owed within the next two years). 
17 Id. 
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A series of matters involving Richard Cole, a justice of the 
Northumberland County Court in the late 1650s, provides another 
example of the legal system’s weakness.  Cole’s difficulties began when 
his colleagues filed a petition in February 1658/1659 with the governor 
requesting that Cole “for his misdemeanor . . . be expelled” from the 
court.18  His expulsion, however, marked only the beginning.  Thereafter, 
Cole was a frequent litigant in,19 among other cases, one in which a 
female servant accused him of “abus[ing] her by very unlawful & 
careless beatings.”20  At one point, the court put him under a bond for 
good behavior, from which it released him in October 1662, “he 
promising conformity for the future in all things touching his civil 
comportment.”21  Of course, he did not keep his bargain; and in 
December 1663, another female servant accused him of beating her 
cruelly.22  The court, however, either would not or could not coerce Cole 
into good behavior; all it did was require him to give another bond, from 
which it released him in March 1663/1664 on his promise “to comport & 
demean himself civilly toward all people.”23  At its next session, the 
court directed the sheriff to impanel a jury to inquire into the death of a 
woman servant belonging to Cole,24 but it did not indict him.  Another 
case highlighted the court’s impotence six months later when a fourth 
female servant complained of Cole’s cruelty, Cole failed to appear in 
response to her complaint, and thus the court adjudged her to have 
“ma[d]e good her complaint.”25  As a result of her success, the man with 
whom she lived while her suit against Cole was pending received a 
judgment of 100 lb. of tobacco compensation from Cole; apparently he 
                                                 
18 Petition to Governor (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 24, 1658/1659), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1657−1661, supra note 8, at 39. 
19 E.g., Cole v. Smith (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 25. 
20 Earle v. Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 21, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, 
supra note 8, at 28–29. 
21 Application of Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 34−36. 
22 Newman v. Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1663), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 64–65. 
23 Application of Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 8, 1663/1664), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 78; see also Lewis v. Rothram (Northumberland 
Cnty. Ct., July 20, 1670), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1669−1673, at 20–21 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669−1673] (releasing the defendant from punishment on an identical 
promise). 
24 Order to Impanel Jury (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1664), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 80–81. 
25 Knight v. Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 20, 1664), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 91. 
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also received the right to bargain with Cole to purchase her future 
service.26  However Cole, who was a man of some wealth, could not be 
coerced. 
Ludwell v. Scarborough27 can be understood as yet more of the same.  
This October 1670 case between Thomas Ludwell, the secretary of the 
colony who was representing a deceased London merchant, and 
Edmund Scarborough, the wealthiest man on the eastern shore, arose out 
of Scarborough’s bond for £1500.28  Scarborough “in his defense having 
exhibited a bill in equity laying down sundry reasons wherefore the said 
bond and interest thereupon should not be adjudged against him” 
offered to pay £743 and 13 shillings immediately and £130 and 13 
shillings in two years, and the court did “unanimously adjudge nemine 
contra dicente that it [was] a satisfactory payment.”29  Ludwell promptly 
appealed to the next session of the House of Burgesses, but then in the 
afternoon withdrew his appeal and interposed a new motion in the form 
of a demurrer to Scarborough’s defense.30  The court then ruled that the 
“demurrer to the bill exhibited by the said Scarborough is undeniable in 
regard that many things in the said bill cannot be answered but by” the 
deceased London merchant himself.31 
With the case now in an uncertain posture, Ludwell offered to settle 
for £840, to be paid in two equal installments on March 1, 1671, and 
March 1, 1672.32  The next morning, Scarborough counteroffered with a 
proposal to pay £300 immediately, £300 on March 31, 1672, and £240 on 
March 31, 1673; on this basis, the suit was settled.33 
The legal system also behaved less harshly toward crime in the Post-
Restoration Era than it had in the past or would again in the future, 
thereby implying its weakness.  Not surprisingly the criminal law 
continued to punish murder with death,34 and theft—especially hog 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 239−41. 
28 Id. at 239. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 239–40. 
31 Id. at 240. 
32 Id.at 240–41. 
33 See Ludwell v. Scarborough (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 27, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 241 (dropping the appeal once they reached an agreement). 
34 See, e.g., Indian Condemned (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 25, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 379–80 (ordering death for murder by stabbing); Sentence of Death (Va. Gen. 
Ct., Oct. 24, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 352–53 (ordering death by 
hanging); Sentence of Death (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 15, 1672/1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 329 (mentioning Thomas was sentenced to death for murdering Morrice); Shaw 
Arraignment (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 7, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 252 
(reporting that the governor consented to Shaw’s death penalty sentence for murder); see also 
Judgment for Murder (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 23, 1669), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
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stealing—with whippings and heavy fines.35  Perjury was another 
serious offense for which a convict might be whipped as well as barred 
from giving any future testimony.36  Other noteworthy cases included 
prosecutions for sexual assault,37 forgery,38 piracy,39 witchcraft,40 
drunkenness,41 unlawful sale of liquor,42 not tending corn,43 “making 
unreasonable hogsheads,”44 and trading with servants.45 
                                                                                                             
513 (failing to state the penalty for murder); Judgment of Death for Stabbing (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 
29, 1666), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 510 (failing to state the penalty for 
murder); Indictment Against a Man and Woman for Murdering Child (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 17, 
1665), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 509 (describing an indictment for the 
murder of a child where the penalty was unclear); R v. Woollford (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 
29, 1661/1662), in 8 NORTHAMPTON COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK COURT CASES 1657−1664, 
at 215 [hereinafter 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664] (discussing an infanticide defendant held for 
trial).  However, death setences could still be commuted before the King carried out the capital 
punishment.  See, e.g., Shaw to Be Free (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 26, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE 
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 297–98 (showing Shaw’s pardon for a death sentence from the King). 
35 See, e.g., R v. Phillis (Va. Gen. Ct., June 22, 1670), in MINUTES OF GENERAL COURT, supra 
note 6, at 223–24 (describing the penalty for felony larceny, benefit of clergy, was to burn it in 
the criminal’s hand); R v. Richards (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1665/1666), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1662−1666, at 94 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1662−1666] (describing the penalty 
for killing a hog as a fine of 2000 lb. of tobacco); R v. Hayes (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 31, 
1664/1665), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 370−73 (punishing petty larceny 
with thirty-nine lashes); see also R v. Droigt (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1662), in LANCASTER 
1662−1666, supra, at 5 (explaining that breaking into a house and stealing corn is an offense 
properly held before the General Court). 
36 See, e.g., R v. Stansby (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra 
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
37 E.g., R v. Wiltshire (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1669), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 207−09.  The defendant sat at a door “showing in a beastly manner 
his members . . . [a]nd Sarah Gilbert seeing his members flung water out of a porringer at them 
saying hide your Arse you nasty rogue” and ran into the woods.  Id. at 208–09.  Wiltshire 
followed her, “took up her coats, & in a most barbarous manner plucked off a tuft of her hair 
presupposed of her privities.”  Id. at 209.  He received a penalty of thirty-nine lashes.  Id. 
38 See, e.g., R v. Burrell (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 20, 1671), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1669−1673, supra note 23, at 46 (convicting Burrell of forging a deed of sale); R v. Michaelson 
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1669), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674, supra note 7, at 227 
(convicting Michaelson for using another's name). 
39 See, e.g., Case of Piracy (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 19, 1665), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 509 (sending the pirate to England for trial and setting his ship’s captives free). 
40 See, e.g., Commwealth v. Stephens (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 16, 1665), in MINUTES OF THE 
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 509 (reporting the witch accusation against Stephens). 
41 See, e.g., R v. Betts (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, 
supra note 34, at 310 (fining the defendant for drunkenness). 
42 E.g., R v. Allen (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1661/1662), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 216, 219. 
43 E.g., R v. Robins (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 28, 1665), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674, 
supra note 7, at 63. 
44 Complaint of Wraxall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1669/1670), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 224. 
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Three other broad categories of offenses—violation of sexual norms, 
contempt of authority, and sins against the religious establishment—
require more extended discussion.  The most common offense against 
sexual morality was bastardy.  Prosecutions against parents of 
illegitimate children, however, were not about morality but rather about 
the costs of raising the children,46 and hence courts dismissed such cases 
if it became clear that no parish would be chargeable with support of the 
bastard child.47  Almost uniformly, those prosecuted were servant girls 
whose penalty—in addition to twenty lashes48 or payment of a fine49—
was to serve extra time to compensate their masters for the 
inconvenience of their pregnancy.50  These young female servants, of 
                                                                                                             
45 See, e.g., R v. Ashwign (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1673), in 3 VA. COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 353 (forcing Ashwign to pay back the value of the coat plus 
fourfold its value); R v. Naylor (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 1668/1669), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1666−1669, at 69 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1666−1669] (forcing a trader to pay back 
fourfold the value of traded tobacco plus costs); Kirton v. Richardson (Northumberland Cnty. 
Ct., Dec. 18, 1672), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669−1673, supra note 23, at 76 (stating that bartering 
with servants is illegal); Meriweather v. Sorsby (Surry Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1672), microformed on 
1000469889 (Library of Va.). 
46 But see, e.g., R v. Watson (Northampton Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1669), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 203–04 (discussing a possible exception where a couple was 
prosecuted for premarital intercourse).  Since the marriage of a couple made the father liable 
for support of their children, the usual economic basis for prosecution—the potential liability of 
the public to support a child—disappeared.  However, another economic basis—the loss by 
masters of their servants’ labor—may have existed and may have motivated prosecutions like 
that in the Watson case.  In any event, however, cases such as Watson were overruled by R v. 
Blackston.  (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 25, 1671), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of 
Utah) (holding that a couple could not be prosecuted for premarital intercourse if they married 
before return of an indictment). 
47 See, e.g., R v. Hughes (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 24, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra 
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
48 See, e.g., R v. Tyer (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, 
supra note 34, at 305–06, 308 (sentencing a servant to a fine and twenty lashes); R v. Emery 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1668), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 
67 (requiring the woman receive twenty lashes until blood comes out); R v. Jones 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1667), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 
47 (ordering that young servant woman receive twenty lashes for delivering the “bastard 
child”); R v. Miles (York Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1661/1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra 
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).  On very rare occasions, men 
were also whipped.  See, e.g., R v. Maynard (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 26, 1670), microformed on 
1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
49 See, e.g., R v. Poore (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 8, 1665), in LANCASTER 1662−1666, supra note 
35, at 88 (fining the master 500 lb. of tobacco); R v. Connor (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1675) 
microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.); R v. Driggs (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1663), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 320 (requiring the master to pay 500 lb. of tobacco). 
50 See, e.g., R v. Poore (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 8, 1665), in LANCASTER 1662−1666, supra note 
35, at 88 (extending the servant woman’s service time by two and a half years); R v. Bell (York 
Cnty. Ct., May 25, 1674), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).  Another form 
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course, had no capacity to resist, but in contrast their boyfriends did.  
Thus, if their boyfriends were prosecuted at all, they would merely have 
to pay a fine51 and/or give a bond to compensate the parish for child-
rearing costs.52  They would suffer no penalty at all if they could prove 
that they did not have intercourse with the child’s mother.53  The father 
                                                                                                             
of compensation was to bind the bastard to the master’s service until the age of twenty-one.  
See, e.g., R v. Ameny (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 20, 1669), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1669−1673, supra note 23, at 4–5 (ordering the servant’s child serve the master until the child 
turns twenty-one); Petition of Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1661), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 7–8 (forcing the servant’s child be the master’s 
apprentice until the child turns twenty-one).  A pregnant female servant was simply worth less 
than a female without child.  See Waters v. Bishopp (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1664), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 348–49 (allowing for recission of a contract for sale 
of a female servant when the servant turned out to be pregnant).  For a book about the servant 
in question in Waters v. Bishopp and her child, see generally PAGAN, supra note 5. 
51 See, e.g., R v. Osborne (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 9, 1663), in LANCASTER 1662−1666, supra 
note 35, at 25 (fining the man 500 lb. of tobacco for the fornication); R v. Powell (Norfolk Cnty. 
Ct., Aug. 17, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.); R v. Wills (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 
29, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 317, 320 (fining the man 500 lb. of 
tobacco for the fornication). 
52 See, e.g., R v. Mongon (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 310–11 (fining the man 500 lb. of tobacco and keeping him in 
custody until he creates a bond arrangement to pay for child care); R v. Jones (Northumberland 
Cnty. Ct., Dec. 20, 1666), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 30–31 (forcing the 
child’s father to post a bond to pay for the parish’s child-rearing).  Note that a bond would be 
cancelled if the bastard died.  See, e.g., R v. Bryan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1674), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1674−1677, at 15 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 
1674−1677] (returning the bond to the deceased child’s father less costs).  Occasionally, a 
woman also might be asked to give a support bond.  See, e.g., R v. Rane (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., 
Mar. 11, 1673/1674), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1670−1674, at 93 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 
1670−1674] (requiring a woman give 500 lb. of tobacco to the parish as a security for her child’s 
care). 
53 See, e.g., R v. Baker (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Nov. 29, 1666), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 90, 95, 98 (requiring the sheriff forbear collecting a fine from an 
alleged father who plead “mistake of some of the Jurors by calling common fame certain 
knowledge”); R v. Kendall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1664), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 353−54 (stating that the court found John Kendall innocent upon 
the computation of time and regarding his “future reputation,” the court put its “calculation 
upon record”); R v. James (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 1661/1662), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 17 (aquitting an alleged father who was out of 
the county nine months before birth); R v. Dicker (York Cnty. Ct., Feb. 20, 1670/1671), 
microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (holding that a man cannot be held a 
father if he is not accused by a woman during labor); R v. Heyricke (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 
1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical 
Soc’y of Utah) (finding that the charge against Heyricke was not supported “by any good 
evidence”).  At least one court adjudged a man the father on conflicting evidence by a divided 
court.  See Pinkethman v. Reason (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 25, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, 
supra note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
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of a bastard child also had the choice of keeping the child and putting it 
to work,54 even if the father’s female servant was the child’s mother.55  A 
master who impregnated his female servant would nonetheless still be 
fined,56 and the servant also would be found guilty of fornication,57 
unless she could prove that intercourse had occurred against her will.58 
Further evidence of the law’s inability to act with vigor to protect 
Virginians’ sexual morality lay in its treatment of adultery.  Thus, when 
Susan Powell delivered a bastard child after having “for a long time 
entertained in her house one John Powell[,] her . . . husband’s brother,” 
she received, not the usual twenty lashes, but only a 500 lb. tobacco fine 
plus a warning that she would receive a further fine if she continued to 
entertain her brother-in-law.59  When June Beadle was accused of 
adultery, her case was postponed,60 it “not appearing to the Court by 
positive proof . . . that she has a husband that lay claim to her.”61  Even 
when adultery became scandalous, the law did little about it.  The 
Northumberland County Court did punish as libelous a bogus document 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Reader v. Whittaker (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 21, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 265 (requiring the father keep the child and pay only those costs already 
disbursed); R v. Arnold (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1670), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1669−1673, supra note 23, at 15 (ordering the father keep and take care of the child).  The court 
also could order the child be apprenticed.  See, e.g., R v. Parker (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., 
Nov. 18, 1675), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra note 52, at 41–42 (requiring the child 
serve the mother’s master until the child reaches age eighteen). 
55 See Muirhall v. Clarke (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 24, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra 
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (discussing a master 
impregnanting his servant).  For a discussion regarding the issue of masters impregnating their 
servants and legislative efforts to prevent such issues, see PAGAN, supra note 5, at 84−85. 
56 Compare Donnell v. Green (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1690), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1689−1692, at 15–16 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692] (requiring 
that Green appear before the court for fathering a bastard child), with R v. Green 
(Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, supra, at 23 (fining 
Green 500 lb. of tobacco for the fornication). 
57 See Commwealth v. Bennett (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 24, 1658), in LANCASTER 1656−1661, 
supra note 15, at 40 (issuing corporal punishment for the servant mother for her fornication). 
58 See, e.g., Langworth v. Calloway (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1660), in 3 VA. COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 232 (finding a servant not liable for fornication against her will 
while failing to charge the master with any crime).  Of course, another option was to deny 
pregnancy.  If this were done, midwives were assembled to inspect the woman.  See, e.g., 
Petition of Banton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 8, 1671), in LANCASTER 1670–1674, supra note 52, at 
41 (mandating two skillful and honest citizens search the accused woman). 
59 R v. Powell (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.). 
60 See R v. Beadle (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, 
supra note 34, at 319–21 (discussing how the defendant was given two months to prove that she 
had no husband or she would be forced to leave the county). 
61 R v. Beadle (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra 
note 34, at 293–94. 
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in the form of a false “contract of marriage . . .  between Charles Ashton 
and the wife of David Lindsay,”62 a local minister, and did respond to 
complaints that Lindsay’s wife was poisoning him63 and that he had 
“clandestinely (unknown to the clerk) tak[en] away a petition” he had 
filed, perhaps in connection with his marital difficulties.64  However, 
when, in the end, the court concluded there had “been unlawful 
familiarity & meetings between” Ashton and Mrs. Lindsay, it only 
required Ashton give bond to remain away from his lady love.65  The 
court found him, like other adulterers, guilty only of the offense of 
“disorderly walking.”66 
The legal order displayed even greater weakness in addressing 
contempts against authority.  On occasion, the General Court strove to 
be effective, as in a prosecution for “opprobrious words” against “the 
Queen;”67 the records fail to indicate, however, whether the case went to 
judgment.  In another case, the court ordered a man whipped for 
“irreverent and undecent words” about the king.68  Courts also were 
effective against their own officials, as when Edmund Scarborough was 
suspended from all offices after being convicted of misdemeanors 
“touching the complaint of the Indians,”69 or when the sheriff of James 
                                                 
62 R v. Thompson (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1665), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665–
1669, supra note 11, at 2. 
63 See id. (referring to the appointment of a committee to investigate the poisoning claim). 
64 R v. Lindsay (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1665), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665–1669, 
supra note 11, at 3. 
65 Id. at 4–5. 
66 See, e.g., Hare v. Kindrod (Surry Cnty. Ct., Mar. 3, 1673), microformed on 1000469889 
(Library of Va.) (discussing the bond required of a man “not to come into” a woman’s 
“company, unless at . . . church or some other meeting”).  Some men’s sentences were 
eliminated if they promised to not keep company with the women.  See, e.g., R v. Stott 
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 8, 1661), in LANCASTER 1656–1661, supra note 15, at 87–88 (ordering 
the sheriff to take security of Stott “for the good behaviours [sic] and promises not to keep 
company with the said woman”); Genesis v. Lewis (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 20, 1670), 
in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 20–21 (allowing the man to be freed on bond 
if he avoided the woman’s company and behaved civilly in the future); Complaint of 
Thompson (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1674) microformed on 1000469889 (Library of Va.).  Compare 
Groton v. Henricks (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1664), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, 
supra note 34, at 361–62 (releasing Hendricks on bond with the condition he shun the company 
of Groton’s wife), with Groton v. Groton (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1664), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 361–62 (ordering Groton’s wife receive fifteen 
lashes because she refused to return to her husband and stated “she would be hanged before 
she would live with him”). 
67 (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 19, 1661), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 507. 
68 R v. Mill (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1662), in 8 NORTHAMPON 1657–1664, supra note 
34, at 221, 223. 
69 R v. Scarborough (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 25, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
238. 
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City County was fined for arresting a member of the General Court.70  
Moreover, they tried to protect their officials, as when one entered a 
“severe judgment for taking a prisoner out of [a] sheriff's custody.”71  
Courts also succeeded in enforcing Parliament’s Navigation Acts.72 
Judges were far less effective, though, in the ordinary run of 
contempt cases, where they could not compel the general population to 
show them respect and, where, when disrespect occurred, they could not 
impose severe penalties but could only ask defendants to acknowledge 
their wrongdoing and humbly seek forgiveness.  The records are filled 
with entries about Virginians who were guilty of “uncivil language & 
deportment to judges”73 and other officials.74  Elizabeth Fielding, for one, 
                                                 
70 (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 30, 1664), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 508. 
71 (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1665), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 509; cf. (Va. Gen. 
Ct., Nov. 25, 1668), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 513 (discussing a party who 
broke away from prison and was banished to Barbados); R v. Mill (Northampton Cnty. Ct., 
April 28, 1662), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 221, 223 (discussing the 
abusing of a constable); R v. Allford (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Nov. 29, 1661), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 203 (referring to the striking of a sheriff); R v. 
Napier (York Cnty. Ct., June 24, 1668), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) 
(retaking property attached by an undersheriff). 
72 See, e.g., Bland v. Hansford (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE 
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 448–49 (discussing the punishment for failure to pay thirty-five 
hoggheads of tobacco to the King for the transport); Condemnation of Ship Phoenix (Va. Gen. 
Ct., Mar. 17, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 443–45 (requiring 
forfeiture of all goods on ship for violating the act of Parliament); Order Against New England 
Vessels (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 10, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 434–35 
(holding the ship until payment of sufficient security); Condemnation of Ship St. George of 
Galloway (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 16, 1669/1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 242–
43 (condemning the ship for failure to follow the act of Parliament). 
73 R v. Hale (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 1668/1669), in LANCASTER 1666–1669, supra note 45, 
at 69; accord R v. Roads (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Sept. 15, 1662) microformed on 30144006669329 
(Library of Va.); R v. Shappell (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 8, 1671), in LANCASTER 1670–1674, 
supra note 52, at 41 (referring to a man sitting in a pew in the church reserved for justices “to the 
dishonour [sic] of God Almighty [and] the contempt of his Majesty's justices”); Commonwealth 
v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, 
at 110, 114 (discussing Warren’s misbehavior before the court when it pronounced its 
judgment); R v. Moulton (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 8, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1661–1665, supra note 8, at 31 (discussing Moulton’s failure to appear before the court); 
Commonwealth v. Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1660), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1657–1661, supra note 8, at 68 (committing Warren to the sherriff’s custody for uncivil and 
unbefitting language before the court); R v. Lee (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1674), microformed on 
1000469889 (Library of Va.) (discharging Lee from the sherriff’s custody for acknowledging his 
offense). 
74 See R v. Bushrod (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1661), in 3 YORK 1657–1662, supra note 6, 
microformed on 1000445991 (Library of Va.); cf. Order Regarding Sheriff (Northampton Cnty. Ct., 
Dec. 13, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 16571664, supra note 34, at 143 (discussing the authorization 
for arrest of persons who “disturbed the Sheriff in [the execution] of his office”).  Compare R v. 
Allford (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Nov. 29, 1661), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, 
at 203 (discussing a couple who refused to obey a sherriff’s arrest), with R v. Allford 
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“openly did declare that she would not yield obedience to their [the 
judges’] order,”75 while William Hatton committed a “contempt . . . of 
dangerous consequence,” when, on receiving a summons for his 
appearance, he announced that “he was not then at leisure but when he 
was at leisure he would come.”76  Philip Mongom, a “Negro,” when 
accused of stealing hogs, threw “hogs’ ears on the . . . court table.”77  A 
year later Thomas Cheney was accused of “speaking dangerous and 
unlawful words of the King’s Most Excellent Majesty and his 
Government” and of refusing to take the oaths of allegiance and 
supremacy.  The court did not punish Cheney because it found him 
“disturbed in his brain talking wildly and distractedly of such things as 
are put to him.”78 
In most other contempt cases, the court merely imposed a slap on the 
wrist—it threatened severe punishment but then remitted that 
punishment as long as the defendant acknowledged his wrongdoing and 
humbly submitted to the court’s authority.79  Robert Warren, for 
example, while drunk, “came into the faces of the Court . . . rudely 
intruding & . . . interrupting & upbraiding the Commissioners in their 
Pronouncing of Judgment.”80  He was left at “liberty in hopes he would 
better his behavior,” but he nonetheless confronted one of the 
Commissioners “in the open yard & hearing of many persons, there 
affronting & upbraiding him concerning Justice[,] telling him he cared 
not for him, nor the Court with other words of defiance.”81  The court 
then committed him to the sheriff82 and fined him 350 lb. tobacco at the 
next sitting court.83 
                                                                                                             
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 30, 1661), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 208–09 
(discussing the couple’s “dangerous assa[u]lt” on the sherriff). 
75 R v. Fielding (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1671), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, 
supra note 23, at 43–44; see also Beale v. Wardley (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 23, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE 
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 267 (discussing Wardly’s refusal to obey the court judgment). 
76 R v. Hatton (York Cnty. Ct., Feb. 26, 1660/1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 
6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
77 Commonwealth v. Mongom, (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657–1664, supra note 34, at 110, 113. 
78 R v. Cheney (York Cnty. Ct., June 24, 1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 6, 
microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
79 See, e.g., Price v. Ball (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 26, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 
6, at 299 (discussing the form of punishment used in contempt cases). 
80 Commonwealth v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657–1664, supra note 34, at 114. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Commonwealth v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 29, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657–1664, supra note 34, at 115–17. 
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The courts were equally powerless in dealing with offenses against 
religion.  The most common such offense was missing church or 
otherwise profaning the Sabbath, which could be prosecuted with some 
success because punishments were mild.84  Sometimes the judiciary also 
was able to prosecute individuals who defamed clergymen and church 
leaders.  Thomas Bushrod, for one, used “slanderous, rude, 
contemptible, and mutinous language against the Reverend Clergy” and 
was held for the General Court; because “the charge against him [was] of 
so high & dangerous a nature & concernment,” the court found him “no 
way bailable.”85  Another man received thirty lashes “for swearing and 
using profane words in the pulpit of [the] parish church.”86  Similarly, a 
court fined John Williams for his contempt of “the solemnity of the true 
orthodox established religion of the Church of England” and his efforts 
to “stir . . . up the hearts & minds of the people to a hatred & dislike of 
God’s word preached by the pious & learned ministers of the Gospel” as 
he sought to convert them “to the . . . proud, vain, formal hypocrisy of 
the Quaker.”87 
However, most challenges to religious authority received the same 
weak response courts gave to contempt against civil power.  Thus, when 
John Stockly, “in a turbulent manner disturbed and abused” a vestry by 
calling it “an illegal vestry,” the court required only that he “make his 
public recantation in the church” and give a good behavior bond.88  
                                                 
84 See, e.g., R v. Wolmsey (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 25, 1663), in 3 VA. COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 276 (presenting Wolmsey before the grand jury for failing to 
attend church for nine months); R v. London (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 29, 1663/1664), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 335–37 (fining London for not baptizing his 
children or coming to church); R v. Marriott (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1672), microformed on 
1000469889 (Library of Va.); R v. Wade (York Cnty. Ct., Jan. 25, 1666/1667), microformed on 
1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (“using uncivil language” on the Sabbath); R v. Tailor 
(York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1665), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (coming 
to divine service drunk). 
85 R v. Bushrod (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26–27, 1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 
6, microformed on 000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
86 R v. Stanford (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1673), microformed on 1000457503 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
87 King v. Williams (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1694), in 3 COLONIAL FAMILIES OF SURRY 
AND ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTIES, VIRGINIA:  THE COURT ORDERS OF ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA OCTOBER 1693–MAY 1695, at 42–43 (John Anderson Brayton ed., 1999) [hereinafter 3 
SURRY & ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695]; see also King v. Williams (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., 
Dec. 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra, at 44 (fining Williams for his 
contempt). 
88 R v. Stockly (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra 
note 34, at 295. 
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Another court likewise ordered that a man merely give a good behavior 
bond for his “blasphemous words.”89 
Another offense connected with religion occurred when a minister, 
without a license, married two servants.90  Perhaps because punishment 
was severe, few prosecutions were brought.  Another lone prosecution, 
for which the punishment was a severe fine of 1000 lb. of tobacco, was 
brought against a father for failing to baptize his children.91  Perhaps the 
father did not believe in infant baptism, but if so he was not alone, and 
there is no evidence that co-religionists were prosecuted. 
Individual contempts against either lay or religious authority were 
only a small part of the problem, however; crowds were much more 
dangerous.  On one occasion, “threatening words . . . in contempt of this 
Court,” uttered by an assemblage of people, led to “so great a confusion” 
that the “Court thought it not safe to sit any longer, being . . . forced to 
adjourn.”92  On another occasion, three men committed an assault in 
open court,93 while yet another county court had to deal with an 
unlawful assembly of malcontents.94  Even women created problems:  
the wives of George Spencer and David Goodale engaged in “scurrilous 
brawls” and provoked their husbands to file “reciprocal, frivolous[,] 
                                                 
89 R v. Rice (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 19, 1674), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, 
supra note 52, at 7–8. 
90 See, e.g., (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 24, 1668), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 513 
(issuing a judgment against the minister for marrying a servant).  Compare Lee v. Lindsay 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 1661/1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661–1665, supra note 8, 
at 13 (fining a minister 10,000 lb. tobacco for “his transgression”), with R v. Lindsay 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661–1665, supra note 8, at 38 
(remitting the fine since the minister “did not act the same in contempt against the law and 
being ignorant what the laws provided”).  For a suit against a minister who charged an 
excessive fee for officiating at a marriage, see Woodson v. Marye (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 
1734[1735]), in 3 GOOCHLAND COUNTY VIRGINIA COURT ORDER BOOK 1731–1735, at 385 (Ann K. 
Blomquist ed., 2006) [hereinafter 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735] (discussing an action against 
Marye for marrying two individuals for a certain fee). 
91 On remand, the Norfolk County Court upheld the fine.  Edwards v. Biggs (Va. Gen. Ct., 
June 16, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 410, on remand, (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., 
Aug. 18, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.). 
92 R v. East (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., March 14, 1665/1666), in LANCASTER 1662–1666, supra note 
35, at 95. 
93 See R v. Wheeler (Charles City Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1673), in 13 VIRGINIA COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS CHARLES CITY COUNTY COURT ORDERS 1664–1665 FRAGMENTS 1650–1696, at 87 
(Beverly Fleet ed., 1961) [hereinafter 13 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS] (discussing a ringleader who 
was fined 1000 lb. of tobacco; a second man upon his humble submission who was required to 
give bond; and a third man acquitted since he “only endeavored to part the affrayers”). 
94 See R v. Swann (Surry Cnty. Ct., Jan. 4, 1673/1674), microformed on 1000469889 (Library of 
Va.), aff'd., (Va. Gen. Ct., April 6, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 366–67 
(affirming the Surry Court order that the ringleader be fined 2000 lb. of tobacco). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9
2014] Law and the Structure of Power 773 
litigious suits.”95  Ultimately, these disorders culminated in Bacon’s 
Rebellion and in colony-wide civil strife.96 
In sum, the resulting weakness of the legal order forced those who 
administered it to select carefully targets for serious prosecution.  The 
law could harshly punish the powerless—female servants who became 
pregnant, for example—by whipping them and compelling them to 
serve extra time to compensate their masters.  It could also impose severe 
punishments on heinous criminals, such as murderers and even thieves, 
whom no one else in society would defend.  Perhaps there is a similar 
explanation for the few harsh penalties meted out for challenges to 
religious authority.  However, the many offenses committed by free 
men—contempt of authority, religious dissent, bastardy, adultery—met 
with a feeble judicial response. 
This weak legal system had to deal with a colony whose inhabitants 
during the 1660s and early 1670s, in large part, failed to prosper.  By the 
1660s most of the best land had already fallen into the hands of great 
landowners and speculators, with the result that, as servants completed 
their terms of labor, they found themselves landless or exiled to small 
tracts on the colony’s margins.  Taxes were high, and discontent was rife.  
People began to confederate in “seditious” meetings declaring “they 
would not pay their public taxes,”97 and only a spark was needed to set 
the colony ablaze.98 
Accordingly, when a handful of Native Americans commenced 
random raids along the frontier, it was easy for a wealthy newcomer 
from England, Nathaniel Bacon, to assume leadership of discontented 
frontiersmen eager to take revenge on the Indians.  In the spring of 1676, 
Bacon sought the blessing of Governor Sir William Berkeley, but 
Berkeley, after promising to give Bacon a commission to lead an 
expedition against the Indians, refused to honor his promise.  When 
Bacon showed up in Jamestown in June at the head of his army of 
malcontents, Berkeley fled to the eastern shore and Bacon’s men began 
plundering the plantations of Berkeley’s supporters.  Open rebellion had 
                                                 
95 King v. Spencer & Goodale (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1664), in 13 VA. COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 1–2. 
96 See infra notes 393–451 (discussing the status of criminal proceedings following Bacon’s 
Rebellion). 
97 Decision of Law (Surry Cnty. Ct., Jan. 3, 1673/1674), in SURRY COUNTY RECORDS SURRY 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1652–1684, at 87 (Eliza Timberlake Davis ed., 1980) [hereinafter SURRY 1652–
1684]; see King v. Chissett (Surry Cnty. Ct., Jan. 3, 1673/1674), in SURREY 1652–1684, supra, at 88 
(summoning fourteen individuals to account for their “riotous assembling” regarding 
unreasonable taxes). 
98 See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM:  THE ORDEAL 
OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 215–49 (1975) (discussing the political climate of colonial Virginia 
during this time). 
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begun, but it petered out when Bacon died suddenly at the end of 
October, probably from some form of dysentery.99 
Once Berkeley recovered power, he began to exact revenge and tried 
to insure against future rebellions.  A few rebel leaders were executed100 
and a few who fled had their property forfeited,101 although most were 
pardoned after they paid the money that Berkeley charged for a 
pardon.102  Many rebels, like Dominick Rice, were required to give bond 
in the amount of £100 sterling and, on their knees, to “humbly and 
heartily penitently confess and acknowledge [their] horrid villainious 
[sic] rebellious and unreasonable practice” and their “horrid treasons 
and rebellion” and “absolutely resolve . . . never more to commit 
perpetrate contemptuously or by any . . . means to be assisting or 
adhering to the like.”103  Many cases also were brought to recover 
properties that had been plundered during the rebellion.104  Finally, 
courts made it procedurally easier for magistrates to discipline anyone 
speaking contemptuous words against them.105 
Order, however, was not easily restored.  Six years after Bacon’s 
Rebellion, malcontents seeking to raise the price of tobacco by reducing 
its supply began moving around the colony from plantation to 
plantation and cutting down tobacco plants growing in planters’ fields.  
A newly arrived governor had to put down this minor rebellion.106 
                                                 
99 For an in-depth discussion of Bacon’s Rebellion, see id. at 250–70. 
100 Id. at 273. 
101 E.g., King v. Lawrence (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1685/1686), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOKS (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1685–1687, at 35 
(Lydia Bontempo & Ruth Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687]. 
102 MORGAN, supra note 98, at 272–73. 
103 Comm’rs v. Rice (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 18, 1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–
1677, supra note 52, at 89–90; accord King v. Thompson (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 19, 
1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 95–96. 
104 See, e.g., Lewis v. Bentley (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1677/1678), in VIRIGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1673–1678, at 89–90 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1673–1678] (bringing an action 
after the destruction of Lewis’s hogs and sheep); Codd v. Browne (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., 
July 18, 1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 88 (bringing an action for the 
recovery of a horse). 
105 See Stith v. Reeve (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1690), in CHARLES CITY COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA COURT ORDERS 1687–1695 WITH A FRAGMENT OF A COURT ORDER BOOK FOR THE YEAR 
1680, at 76–77 (Benjamin B. Weisiger III ed., 1980) [hereinafter CHARLES CITY 1687–1695] 
(referring to a defendant who was not allowed “customary liberty” in a slander case since the 
plaintiff was a magistrate). 
106 See, MORGAN, supra note 98, at 286–87 (explaining Governor Chichely’s attempts at 
extinguishing the rebellion); see also infra Part III (discussing how Virginia elites later 
strengthened the colony’s legal order). 
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III.  STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL ORDER 
Order ultimately was restored only as a consequence of more long-
term changes in Virginia law that are about to be examined.  These 
changes—some of which had begun before and all of which continued 
over the course of decades in the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion—
transformed Virginia, by the mid-eighteenth century, into the most 
stable of Britain’s North American colonies as well as the colony most 
willing to serve imperial interests. 
No royal or other official intentionally orchestrated the changes.  
They simply occurred for widely disparate reasons unrelated to each 
other or to any clear goal of strengthening the legal powers of the 
regime.  Collectively, however, they had that effect. 
First, this section discusses the change in Virginia from a 
predominately white labor force to African slavery.107  Second, the 
section explains the role of patronage in controlling lower classes in 
colonial Virginia.108  Third, it examines the relationship between law and 
religion.109  Fourth, it explains the roles and relationships of both judges 
and jurors in the legal landscape of Virginia.110  Finally, it discusses the 
relation of the colony’s central government to local county elites.111 
A. The Switch from White to Black Labor 
If Bacon and his followers had prevailed in their rebellion against 
Governor Berkeley, perhaps Virginia’s land distribution policies would 
have changed.  Maybe land would have been distributed to recently 
freed indentured servants rather than to established elites that already 
owned most of the good land.  Bacon, however, lost, and existing 
policies of distributing new land to already established landholders 
continued and even broadened.112  The result was that colonies other 
than Virginia, where land was available to indentured servants who 
completed their term of servitude, became more attractive destinations 
                                                 
107 See infra Part III.A (examining how the move to black slave labor strengthened the 
power of Virginia’s elites). 
108 See infra Part III.B (discussing the duties the poor owed the wealthy and the generosity 
the wealthy owed the poor). 
109 See infra Part III.C (examining the role played by religion in Virginia’s legal system). 
110 See infra Part III.D (discussing the powers of judges compared to juries in Virginia’s 
legal system). 
111 See infra Part III.E (examining various facets of Virginia law that added to the strength 
of the controlling elites). 
112 See generally WARREN M. BILLINGS ET AL., COLONIAL VIRGINIA:  A HISTORY 134, 139, 147, 
160–161, 171–72, 209–11 (1986) (explaining political tensions surrounding the Virginia 
plantation elite following Bacon’s Rebellion). 
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than Virginia for young people emigrating from England to America.  
This slowed the pace of white immigration to Virginia. 
Virginia’s planters nonetheless needed workers.  They took two 
steps to obtain them.  One was to import black slaves to replace white 
immigrants they could not obtain.  Another was to make additional 
efforts, apart from offering land to freed servants, to make Virginia 
attractive to white immigrants. 
Slavery was economically and culturally unimportant in Virginia 
before the late seventeenth century.  Existing scholarship agrees that 
Africans and descendants of Africans constituted only some three 
percent of the population in 1660—fewer than 1000 blacks out of a total 
population of at least 25,000.113  Indentured servants, who were mainly 
young men and teenage boys from the British Isles, performed most 
drudge work.  Although the few blacks present in the mid-seventeenth 
century on average served longer terms of servitude than whites, 
including terms for life, many blacks ultimately did become free, and no 
clear distinctions separated black servants from white ones during the 
periods of time during which they served.  African servants lived with 
European servants, performed the same work as Europeans, and were 
subject to the same disciplinary rules and punishments as Europeans.  
Finally, if they became free, Africans and their descendants could buy 
and own land, indentured servants, and slaves just as Europeans 
could.114 
Slavery developed as a clear legal category in the decades following 
1660.  The key to its development was a series of statutes during the 
1660s that first differentiated slaves from non-slaves along racial lines.  
The first, in March 1660/1661, recognized that runaway “Negroes” who 
already served for life were “incapable of making satisfaction by 
addition of time” and accordingly required white servants who ran away 
with them to serve their time.115  Several years later the recognition also 
led to another act allowing masters to inflict “moderate corporal 
                                                 
113 See MORGAN, supra note 98, at 154, 404 tbl.1; KENNETH MORGAN, SLAVERY AND SERVITUDE 
IN COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA:  A SHORT HISTORY 30 tbl.2.1 (2000). 
114 See MORGAN, supra note 98, at 154–57 (explaining the property rights of freed African 
slaves); T.H. Breen, A Changing Labor Force and Race Relations in Virginia, 1660–1710, 7 J. SOC. 
HIST. 6, 7(1973) (referring to the status of black men in the mid-seventeenth century).  See 
generally James H. Brewer, Negro Property Owners in Seventeenth Century Virginia, 12 WM. & 
MARY Q. 575 (1955) (discussing freed African slave property owners in seventeenth-century 
Virginia).  But see Russell R. Menard, From Servants to Slaves:  The Transformation of the Chesapeake 
Labor System, 16 S. STUDS. 355 (1977) (explaining the rise in black slavery in the Chesapeake 
colonies during the 1700s). 
115 2 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 26 (Univ. 
Press of Va. 1969) (1823). 
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punishment,” on runaways.116  A year earlier, when doubts had arisen 
whether baptism made a person now described as a “slave” free, the 
legislature responded by declaring “the blessed sacrament” did “not 
alter the condition of [a] person as to his bondage or freedom.”117  The 
decline into slavery continued in 1669 when a statute provided that a 
master would not be guilty of murder if a “slave [who] resist[ed] his 
master . . . by the extremity of the correction should chance to die,” since 
it could “not be presumed” that anyone would “destroy his own 
estate.”118  The next year Virginia barred free blacks from “purchasing 
Christian servants,”119 and a decade later the first “act for preventing 
Negroes’ insurrections” prohibited blacks from carrying guns or other 
weapons and from meeting in “considerable numbers . . . under pretence 
of feasts and burials.”120 
Even by the 1680s, however, slavery had not replaced indentured 
servitude as the principal form of plantation labor; planters continued to 
rely mainly on indentured servants.  Only after 1690, for reasons much 
debated among historians, did Africans and their descendants become 
the primary providers of plantation labor in the colony of Virginia, 
although even then it was not clear that all black servants were slaves.121  
Further, as late as the 1740s, a runaway black was dealt with as a servant 
when he was required to serve extra time for running away—a penalty 
that made no sense if he was a slave already required to serve for life.122 
The evidence is ambiguous and conflicting, but the view of Russell 
Menard and others seems correct—that until the end of the seventeenth 
                                                 
116 Id. at 266. 
117 Id. at 260. 
118 Id. at 270. 
119 Id. at 280. 
120 Id. at 481.  For scholarly analysis of the statutory recognition of enslavement, see 
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:  AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–
1812, at 71–82 (1968); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 38–
45 (1996); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the Southern Labor System, 7 WM. & 
MARY Q. 199 (1955)  
121 See MORGAN, supra note 98, at 306 (discussing the importation of slavery in the later half 
of the seventeenth century); MORGAN, supra note 113, at 26 (explaining how indentured 
servants and slaves provided most of the labor in the seventeenth century); Menard, supra note 
114, at 360 (“Probate inventories and tax lists indicate that black slaves came to predominate 
about 1690.”). 
122 See Motion of Edwards (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1742), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1740–1742, at 63 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1740–1742] (punishing a runaway black 
servant by extending his service time); Corbin v. Dolphin (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1738), 
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1738–
1740, at 26 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740] 
(requiring a runaway black servant serve his master for an extra five months and two days). 
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century Virginia planters preferred to import white, English-speaking 
indentured servants as their main labor force rather than African slaves 
who spoke strange languages.123  Only when the availability of 
indentured servants declined—as newly founded colonies like 
Pennsylvania became more welcoming to immigrants than Virginia—
and whites, as a result, could no longer satisfy the colony’s labor needs, 
did the planters switch to a slave labor force.124 
Meanwhile, the colony’s leaders strove to make Virginia more 
attractive to potential white immigrants.  As a first step, it was essential 
to draw a sharp distinction between black slavery and white indentured 
servitude and thereby reassure whites that they would not be treated as 
badly as blacks.  Thus, one court held that a white man could not enter 
into an agreement to serve a master for life.125  In addition, courts took 
other steps that led, at least marginally, to the uplifting of whites. 
Virginia’s law of servitude had long combined rule-of-law features 
contrived to induce Europeans to immigrate with harsh mechanisms of 
coercion intended to insure that, once present in Virginia, indentured 
servants would work.  Over the course of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, however, the law became less harsh. 
Of course, much of the old harshness remained.  Thus, minors, 
typically orphans who were unable to support themselves, continued to 
be bound into servitude,126 and judges routinely determined the age of 
servants and thus the length of time they were required to serve.127  
                                                 
123 ALLAN KULIKOFF, TOBACCO AND SLAVES:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN CULTURES 
IN THE CHESAPEAKE, 1680–1800, at 40 (1986). 
124 See Menard, supra note 114, at 362 (explaining evidence shows that as supply of servants 
decreased the price of indentured labor and supply of slaves increased). 
125 See Groton v. Stringer (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1678), in 10 NORTHAMPTON 
COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK DEEDS, WILLS & C 1674–1678, at 297–98 (Howard Mackey & 
Candy McMahan Perry eds., 2003) [hereinafter 10 NORTHAMPTON 1674–1678] (invalidating an 
agreement to serve the master for life). 
126 See, e.g., Binding of Martin (King George Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1727), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK KING GEORGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1725–1728, at 74 (Ruth Sparacio 
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter KING GEORGE 1725–1728] (ordering a child serve until 
he reaches the age of majority); Binding of Bruce (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1729), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1729–1732, at 1 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1729–1732] (forcing the child 
remain a servant until he reaches age twenty-one). 
127 See, e.g., Matter of Gallion (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1665), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK STAFFORD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1664–1668, 1689–1690, at 13 (Ruth Sparacio 
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1987) [hereinafter STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690] (adjudging a servant 
to be fifteen years of age); see also Matter of Dianah (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1729), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1724–1730 
(PART III, at 105–06 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART III)] (determining the age of a “Negro girl . . . towards payment of levys”); cf. 
Certificate of Boyd (King George Cnty. Ct., Feb. 2, 1721/1722), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
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Courts also imposed punishment on runaway servants,128 with the 
standard penalty being extension of the period of service by twice the 
amount of time that a runaway had been absent.129  Another disability 
imposed on servants prohibited them from engaging in trade without 
their masters’ approval, although enforcement fell mainly on those who 
bought goods from or sold goods to servants rather than on the servants 
themselves.130 
                                                                                                             
RECORDS ORDER BOOK KING GEORGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1721–1723, at 30 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter KING GEORGE 1721–1723] (referring to the certificate of a ship 
captain specifying the amount of time some twenty-one English convicts were required to 
serve). 
128 See e.g., Williams v. Pooly (Stafford Cnty. Ct. Nov. 15, 1664), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 6 (ordering a runaway servant to serve extra time); see also Gill v. Willis 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1700), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1700–1702, at 18, 20–21 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 
1996) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1700–1702] (upholding, pursuant to a statute, a servant’s 
agreement made in open court to serve the master for additional time); cf. Order re Parsons 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 15, 1675/1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 
52, at 57–58 (ordering thirty lashes for runaways from Maryland plus return to provincial 
secretary of Maryland); Order re Wilson (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1729), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDERS 1727–1729, at 105 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1727–1729] (ordering placement of 
an iron collar on the neck of a persistent runaway); Order re Moore (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., 
Aug. 27, 1713), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1712–1714, at 66 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
WESTMORELAND 1712–1714] (ordering return of a runaway servant to his master).  Anyone 
entertaining a servant without the owner's consent was liable for statutory penalties.  See, e.g., 
Rice v. Adams (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 6, 1686/1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, 
supra note 101, at 68–69 (referring to a lawsuit by a servant owner against a man who 
entertained the servant without the owner’s consent). 
129 See, e.g., Clarke v. Wright (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1673), microformed on 1000457503 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (convicting a servant of running away and extending his service 
time as punishment); Order re Dew (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1675), microformed on 1000469889 
(Library of Va.) (extending a servant’s servive by 132 days for his sixty-six day absence); Order 
re George (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 27, 1672), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of 
Utah) (fining a runaway 5 lb. of tobacco and extending his service time).  But see Bridges v. 
Barnes (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 27, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 274 (holding 
that a servant who returns voluntarily must serve only the time he was absent). 
130 See  3 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 451–
52 (Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1823) (requiring anyone who trades with a slave be thrown in jail 
for one month and remain there until that person posts sufficient bond); see also Hobson v. 
Watkins (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 16, 1700), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1700–1702, at 14, 18–19 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 2003) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702] (imposing fourfold 
penalty on a person who bought corn from a servant); Vaughan v. Chisnall (Westmoreland 
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 27, 1709), VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1707–1709, at 85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
WESTMORELAND 1707–1709] (imposing one month imprisonment and fourfold damages on a 
person who sold a hat to a servant); cf. In re. Sheppard (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1676), in 
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Judges were especially harsh on servants who spread “scandalous[,] 
false[,] and abusive language against [their] master[s].”131  The General 
Court ordered one such servant to receive thirty-nine lashes and 
apologize in open court.132  Likewise, servants who behaved violently 
toward their masters faced a broad range of penalties, including 
whipping and extra years of service,133 as did servants who, after 
claiming that their masters abused them, failed to prove their claims.134  
For example, two female servants who accused their master of rape had 
to serve extra time when a grand jury refused to indict him.135  The same 
was true when parents sued on behalf of an indentured daughter; after 
they failed to prove their claim, the court would not permit them even to 
visit with their child.136  This was also true for at least some servants who 
claimed freedom but failed to establish it.  For example, the court 
required Christopher Charlton to make up time for his absence from his 
master during the course of his unsuccessful suit for freedom.137  People 
assisting servants in bringing wrongful complaints also might be 
                                                                                                             
MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 53 (holding attempt of a servant to assign the right of 
executorship void). 
131 Wormely v. Morris (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 17, 1672/1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 330. 
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., Ballard v. Servants (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 4, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 245 (ordering thirty-nine lashes to one servant and twenty to the another plus extra 
service for assaulting overseer and running away); In re. Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., 
Nov. 11, 1670), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 25 (requiring extra service for 
striking a master); In re. Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 9, 1670), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 16 (ordering twenty lashes plus one year extra 
service for rude demeanor); cf. Lewis v. Morris (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 21, 1679/1680), 
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1677–1679, at 95–96 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 
1677–1679] (providing that the servant was liable at end of term for injuries to a third party); 
Dodman v. Duke (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Oct. 12, 1664), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra 
note 127, at 5 (ordering two extra years of service for killing the horse of a third person).  But see 
Lucy v. Stamp (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1673), microformed on 1000457503 (Genealogical 
Soc’y of Utah) (holding punishment remitted at request of master). 
134 See, e.g., Cumberford v. Whitaker (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 1680), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1677–1680, at 94–95 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1677–1680] (ordering the servant 
whipped for failing to prove his claim against his master). 
135 Smith v. Servants (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 21, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, 
at 212. 
136 Medley v. Douglas (York Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1668/1669), microformed on 1000445991 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).  But see Complaint Against Stevens (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 
29, 1664), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 351 (holding a child restored to the 
parent who proved “harsh usage” by master). 
137 Pate v. Charlton (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 23, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
351–52. 
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summoned to appear in court to answer questions concerning their 
role.138 
On the other hand, the courts did deal fairly with servants who 
proved their claims.  In some cases they recognized the freedom of 
servants who were manumitted by will,139 who obtained freedom by 
marrying the widow of their master,140 or who entered into agreements 
with their masters to work as wage laborers rather than as servants141 or 
to shorten their terms if they did not run away.142  In other cases courts 
freed apprentices, the death of whose masters prevented their learning 
the trade for which they had been apprenticed.143  More often courts 
awarded freedom to servants when judges concluded that the servants 
had completed their term of service.144  In one case, for example, a 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., R v. Jones (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1716), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1714–1716, at 96–97 (Ruth Sparacio 
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1714–1716] (holding those who 
petitioned in slaves’ honor must appear in court on the slaves’ behalf). 
139 See, e.g., Hunt v. Monger (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 240 (holding servant set free by the owner’s will); see also Agreement of Eskridge 
(King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 28 
(providing that the master agreed to free the servant from a six-year term if the servant 
faithfully served him for three years). 
140 E.g., Clark v. Ashburne (Va. Gen. Ct., April 7, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 253. 
141 E.g., In re. Beverley (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART III), supra note 127, at 105–06. 
142 E.g., Agreement of Home & Patterson (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1736), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1735–1738, at 39 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738].  Legislation 
required agreements between masters and servants be made in open court.  6 WILLIAM 
WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF 
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 358 (Univ. Press of 
Va. 1969) (1819). 
143 E.g., Order re:  Venna (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1674–1677, supra note 52, at 75. 
144 See, e.g., Rayner v. Benford (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 22, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 349 (freeing a servant by court order); Mozingo v. Stone (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 5, 1672), in 
MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 315–16 (giving an African-American his freedom 
after his twenty-eight years of service); see also Flynt v. Towers (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 
17, 1682), microformed on 00327495162125 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (holding a master, who 
sells a servant for a longer term than the servant was required to serve, was liable in damages 
to buyer when the servant was freed before the time for which the buyer paid for him); cf. 
Roades v. Heale (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 14, 1680), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1678–1681, at 64 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1678–1681] (reporting a jury verdict that set a servant free).  
But see Latham v. Shumate (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 25, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1761–1762, at 65–66 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1761–1762] (holding a seller not liable if he or 
she warned a buyer at the time of sale of disputes regarding title to a servant or slave).  Of 
course, there were also numerous suits for fraudulent sales of physically unsound slaves.  See, 
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mother had bound her son to servitude until he was twenty-four years 
old.145  The son, when he attained the age of twenty-one, successfully 
appealed to the court that parents had no control over their children 
beyond age twenty-one and thereby obtained his freedom.146  Other 
courts freed servants who had been unlawfully bound.147  In one such 
case,148 the court explained its reasoning, noting that, even though a 
woman named Williams was on a list of indentured servants, “there 
appear[ed] no manner of consideration whatsoever” for her being 
there.149  It continued that “the said Williams or any other poor person 
might be forced into the list . . . by hard usage, good words, or the like 
dealings, for prevention of which . . . like wrongdoing for the future, this 
Court does declare the said Williams to be free from the said 
indenture.”150  In all, courts freed numerous indentured servants held 
unlawfully,151 and in some cases even ordered the payment of wages for 
                                                                                                             
e.g.,  Waddill v. Chamberlayne (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1735), in 2 JOHN RANDOLPH & EDWARD 
BARRADALL, VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS:  THE REPORTS OF DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL 
COURT OF VIRGINIA 1728–1741, at B45–46 (R.T. Barton ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (1909) 
(ruling for plaintiff when defendant sold a slave with an incurable disease); Hill v. Young 
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 11, 1698/1699), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1695–1699, at 85 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter LANCASTER 1695–1699] (proclaiming it fraudulent to sell a servant who is not of 
sound body); Beverley v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, 
supra note 128, at 18, 20 (discussing a suit brought against the seller of a slave claimed to be 
perfect when the slave was “full of pain”).  Suits for breaches of warranties in the sale of 
servants could be brought before the end of the period of servitude.  Compare Davis v. Carlyle 
(Loudoun Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1763), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762–1763, at 71–72 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter LOUDOUN 1762–1763] (awarding a special verdict of £15 for damages before the 
end of the servitude period), with Davis v. Carlyle (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Apr. 11, 1764), in 
LOUDOUN 1763–1764, supra, at 100 (enforcing the previous special verdict). 
145 In re. Bengee (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., May 2, 1688), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1687–1689, at 26 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689]. 
146 Id. 
147 See, e.g., Gowen v. Lucas (Va. Gen. Ct., June 16, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 409, 411 (ordering the servant free from unlawful service); Letherbury v. Carter (Va. 
Gen. Ct., Oct. 4, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 313–14 (freeing the child of 
a servant when the owner had unlawful ownership); cf. Chavis v. Barber (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 3, 
1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 312 (mandating that a boy unlawfully 
bound as an apprentice be returned to his mother). 




151 See, e.g., In re. Letty (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1728), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK 1727–1729, at 50 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 
2002) [hereinafter ESSEX 1727–1729] (reporting jury verdict that a Native American was “a free 
woman”); Roades v. Heale (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 14, 1680), in LANCASTER 1678–1681, supra 
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time worked following the end of the period of servitude.152  On 
occasion, the judiciary also had to protect servants who were bringing 
suits for freedom from intimidation and threats.153 
In other cases, judges required masters to treat servants properly 
during the course of their servitude.  Thus, in one case the General Court 
freed an apprentice when his master failed to perform his part of the 
agreement,154 while in another an apprentice was freed when his master 
assigned him to tasks other than those for which he had been 
apprenticed.155  The courts also strove to prevent masters from unduly 
disciplining servants,156 treating them “barbarously,” or “neglect[ing]” 
                                                                                                             
note 144, at 64 (reporting jury verdict that the servant was free); Indian Nan v. Holt (Louisa 
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 9, 1771), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1770–1772, at 42–43 (Lydia Sparacio Bontempo ed., 2001) [hereinafter LOUISA 1770–
1772] (reporting jury verdict freeing plaintiff); Cross v. Tarpley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 
1739), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1738–
1740, at 23–24 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1738–1740] 
(ordering the plaintiff be declared free after she was unlawfully detained as a servant); In re. 
Whickers (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, 
at 56 (holding an indentured servant released from service); cf. In re. Brown (Richmond Cnty. 
Ct., Aug. 6, 1718), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1718–1719, at 76–77 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
RICHMOND 1718–1719] (ordering a ship captain return a captive and his family to their home).  
But see In re. Bess (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1694), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1694–1697, at 12 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1694–1697] (requring a Native American captured in late 
war be a servant until age thirty). 
152 See, e.g., Moore v. Light (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 27, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 353–54 (holding a servant be paid corn, clothes, and 400 lb. tobacco for extra time 
worked after the end of the period of servitude); Marshall v. Baker (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr, 22, 1670), 
in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 213–14 (holding an owner to pay the servant corn, 
clothes, and tobacco for his extra time served). 
153 See, e.g., Mann v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1768), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1767–1768, at 81 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1767–1768] (ordering the servant freed even after 
she initially disclaimed suit for freedom out of fear for herself and her children). 
154 Hicelde v. Reade (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 31, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
358. 
155 Rawlins v. Cassinett (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 6, 1674/1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 406–07; see Sancebury v. Bayly (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1689), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 76–77 (holding the servant be freed after working 
on tasks not assigned throughout the length of service).  But see In re. Molton (Northumberland 
Cnty. Ct., Feb. 21, 1671/1672), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 56–57 (reading 
the indenture of a sailor and ruling that “when his master has no employment for him at that 
said trade, he [may] set him to work in any lawful & necessary work he thinks fit to employ 
him about”). 
156 See, e.g., Duggins v. Ward (Goochland Cnty. Ct., July 1732), in 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, 
supra note 90, at 103–04 (requiring the master pay the servant forty shillings for beating him); In 
re. Thomas (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 13, 1677/1678), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1674–1678, at 90 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
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their “education and trade.”157  One court, for example, ordered a man 
who had married a child’s mother to free the child from “very hard 
labor” and to permit him to choose a new guardian.158 
Judges also came to the aid of servants whose masters failed to 
provide adequate food or medical assistance.159  Servants such as these 
usually would not be freed, but their masters might be placed under 
court orders in regard to their treatment or they might be sold to new 
masters, who hopefully would treat them better.160  Finally, masters were 
required to give former servants their freedom dues upon the expiration 
                                                                                                             
eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1674–1678] (requiring bond not to correct servants except in 
presence of neighbors). 
157 Read v. James, (Prince William County. Ct., Sept. 7, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762, at 57–58 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter PRINCE WILLIAM 1762]. 
158 In re. Price (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 8, 1692/1693), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK STAFFORD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1692–1693, at 75 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1988) [hereinafter STAFFORD 1692–1693]. 
159 See, e.g., Grimes v. Wright (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1685), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1683–1685, at 92–93 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685] (requiring 
the master to allow his servants sufficient food in the amount typically given servants in the 
colony); Evins v. Morgan (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1723), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1722–1724, at 35 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1722–1724] (ordering the master to provide the 
servant with medical assistance). 
160 See, e.g., In re. Heap (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 8, 1708), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1707–1708, at 80 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1707–1708] (holding “barbarous usage” of a 
servant resulted in the servant being sold at an outcry); In re. Welch (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., 
Mar. 6, 1743/1744), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1742–1744, at 54–55 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744] (ordering a servant abused by the owner to receive a good diet and 
clothing and not be disciplined without court order); Spencer v. Thorn (Westmoreland Cnty. 
Ct., Nov. 25, 1714), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, supra note 138, at 23 (directing sale of a 
servant), rev’g Thorn v. Spencer (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 24, 1714), in WESTMORELAND 
1714–1716, supra note 138, at 22–23 (ordering freedom for the servant).  The servant in Thorn, 
however, also received money damages from her master who had stripped her naked before 
beating her.  Thorn v. Spencer, (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1714), in WESTMORELAND 
1714–1716, supra note 138, at 23–24, rev’g Spencer v. Thorn (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 24, 
1714), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, supra note 138, at 22–23.  But see In re. Flowers (Fauquier 
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 23, 1765), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1764–1766, at 43 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 
1764–1766] (ordering an apprentice bound to another master after complaining “of ill-usage”); 
In re. Byrn (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1733), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER 
BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1732–1734, at 96–97 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1991) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734] (freeing a servant who received insufficient 
lodging and clothing) . 
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of their terms.161  Other judges ordered masters to abide by the terms of 
the agreements by which they had obtained servants.162  
The legal system dealt even more generously with wage laborers.  
Unlike runaway servants, for example, wage laborers who did not work 
during part of the period of their contract lost wages only for the time 
they had missed without any additional penalty.163  Similarly, sailors 
were able to obtain special writs from the governor directing county 
courts to adjudicate their wage claims against their vessels.164  Wage 
laborers who failed to perform in accordance with the terms of their 
contracts might find their wages judicially reduced, however.165 
Efforts to uplift white servants and workers did not inopportunely 
have the desired effect of increasing white immigration.  After the 1670s, 
European immigrants continued to migrate mainly to destinations other 
than Virginia, with the result by the early eighteenth century that 
Virginia’s plantation labor force consisted mainly of Africans and their 
descendants rather than white indentured servants.166 
                                                 
161 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dromond (Va. Gen. Ct. Mar. 9, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE 
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 432 (requiring the owner pay his servant corn and clothing upon 
release); Hoskins v. Spratt (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of 
Va.) (order apparently not entered in local records until after affirmance by the General Court), 
aff'd (Va. Gen. Ct., June 17, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 411–12 (ordering 
the owner to pay his freed servant 500 lb. of tobacco and barrel). 
162 See e.g., In re. Read (Prince William Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1762), in PRINCE WILLIAM 1762, supra 
note 157, at 57–58 (placing the servant with a new master in light of mistreatment by existing 
one); Bankes v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 64 (ordering the master to teach his servant to read and write).  Courts 
almost invariably decided issues of servant status without the aid of juries, but occasionally 
juries were used.  See, e.g., Talbort v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 15, 1692), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1690–1694, at 65 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1690–1694] (confirming jury 
verdict that the servant be freed); cf. Webb v. Hughlett (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 19, 
1680), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1680–1683, at 4 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683] (addressing an issue of status that arose collaterally in a suit 
between non-servants). 
163 See, e.g., Turner v. Ashby (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1692/1693), in MIDDLESEX 1690–
1694, supra note 162, at 57 (holding a wage laborer lost his wages for work missed during part 
of his contract period); Banister v. Fielding's Estate (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 
1675/1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 55 (granting pervious years’ 
wages at the master’s death minus wages for one month of absence). 
164 See, e.g., Barrett v. Barque Mary of Carolina (Northumberland County Ct., Feb. 19, 
1679/1680), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1677–1679, supra note 133, at 98 (requiring payment of £20 
and 13 shillings). 
165 See, e.g., Grame v. Peirsey (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1727), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ABSTRACTS SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1724–1730 (PART 
II), at 60–61 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART II)] (reducing servant’s wages for failing to perform in accordance with the contract). 
166 KULIKOFF, supra note 123, at 38–41. 
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The change in the demographics of the labor force did, however, 
make Virginia easier to govern.  The first generation of Virginia slaves 
came from widely divergent African cultures and spoke different 
languages;167 and their diversity likely impeded their ability to organize 
resistance to planters’ impositions.168  In addition, planters could deal 
with black slaves more harshly than with white servants, who might 
report cruelty back to England and thereby discourage others from 
following in their footsteps.169  Thus, it was easier to govern blacks 
repressively than it had been to govern whites. 
The switch to black labor also changed the nature of the remaining 
white community.  Most significantly, the poor white community that 
elites had to govern was smaller, and therefore easier to control, than it 
would have been if indentured servants had continued to provide most 
of Virginia’s labor.  Over time the young, rowdy men who had followed 
Nathaniel Bacon into rebellion grew older, obtained families, and 
became more accepting of their position in life—and less willing to turn 
to violence and rebellion to better it.  Finally, the potential for black 
resistance arguably threatened poor whites as well as elite ones and 
thereby gave elites an argument for uniting the white underclass with 
them in their practices of repressing blacks.170 
B. Patronage and Noblesse Oblige 
Elites, however, needed more than a threat of black rebellion to 
persuade lower class whites to accept their leadership as part of a 
coherent, peaceful community.  They had to adopt the gentlemanly code 
                                                 
167 See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 205 (describing the incoming African slaves as an 
“array of tribal customs” with a “babel of langauges”). 
168 See WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS:  INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE MAKING OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA xvi (1999) (attributing the Virginia gentry’s success to 
slavery). 
169 See, e.g., In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. Oct. 5, 1736), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK ABSTRACT 1735–1737, at 82 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2002) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1735–1737] (giving a master leave 
to castrate a runaway slave); Robinson v. Duncum (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 8, 1707), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1707–1708, at 
23–24 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1707–1708] (ordering 
“a Negro slave” be castrated for “running away, lying out and destroying people's stocks”); 
King v. Sawney (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 1718), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1718–1721, at 19–20 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 2003) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1718–1721] (allowing a master to cut off a 
runaway’s “two great toes”). 
170 For a brief discussion of the dynamics of the white community in Virginia in the late 
1600s, see MORGAN, supra note 98, at 343–44 (explaining how there were fewer poorer whites 
and those who remained feared an insurrection). 
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of noblesse oblige and recognize their duty to care economically for whites 
who were poorer or otherwise less fortunate than themselves.  In 
particular, leading planters had to use their economic power to reward 
people beneath them who became upstanding, constructive contributors 
to their communities.171 
Individual planters, as owners of vast land estates, wielded 
considerable power over the lives and economic opportunities of 
everyone except the few other great planters with whom they typically 
sat in consensus on the county bench.  Small landowners needed the 
assistance of great planters in marketing tobacco and obtaining credit.  
Those who did not own land had to turn to great landowners to find 
land they could rent.  Others who did not own land might just want 
employment as overseers or field hands, or in service occupations such 
as blacksmiths, coopers, etc.; but again, wealthy landowners would 
prove key to providing those jobs.172 
In short, as a result of a continued policy of granting new land 
mainly to great planters, nearly everyone else became dependent on 
those planters.  In a world where behavior was publicly known and 
could not be hidden in the anonymity of large cities, planters became 
responsible for improving the well-being of their dependents; and 
dependents, in return, had little choice but to improve their lives and 
behave, whether as jurors, minor officials, or ordinary members of the 
community, as their betters expected them to behave.173  They could no 
                                                 
171 See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 101 (discussing large planters’ accommodations for 
small planters to avoid rebellion). 
172 See RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740–1790, at 133, 136–37 (1982) 
(discussing the relationship between wealthy landowners and the poorer classes).  Isaac notes, 
however, that the mid-eighteenth century of Glasgow merchant houses in tobacco marketing 
undermined the economic power of Virginia elites.  Id. at 137.  The most recent analysis of the 
Scottish merchants’ role is consistent with that of Isaac.  See ALBERT H. TILLSON, JR., 
ACCOMMODATING REVOLUTIONS:  VIRGINIA’S NORTHERN NECK IN AN ERA OF 
TRANSFORMATIONS, 1760–1810, at 154–55, 166–67 (2010). 
173 As Virginia developed toward the west, beyond the tobacco-producing Piedmont and 
into the Shenandoah Valley, patterns of governance changed only slightly.  ALBERT H. TILLSON, 
JR., GENTRY AND COMMON FOLK:  POLITICAL CULTURE ON A VIRGINIA FRONTIER 1740–1789, at 20 
(1991).   The Shenandoah was not settled by English stock from the east, as all of Virginia up to 
the Piedmont had been; instead, settlers came mainly from Pennsylvania or from Scottish 
sections of North Britain or Northern Ireland.  Id. at 8.  Thus, the population of the Shenandoah 
tended to be Presbyterian rather than Anglican, and leaders and other residents typically did 
not have kinship ties with Virginians from the east.  Id. at 20.  However, they did have close ties 
with each other and important political and economic ties with colonial leaders in 
Williamsburg.  Id at 20–22.  Those ties enabled a small group of leaders to dominate 
landholding and, hence, the economy.  For example, in the early years of settlement of Augusta 
County, which initially covered most of the Shenandoah Valley, thirteen men patented 86.6% 
of all patented land; and as late as 1769, a total of forty-one men still owned 52.1% of all 
freehold acreage under private control.  Turk McCleskey, Rich Land, Poor Prospects:  Real Estate 
Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
788 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
longer remain the rowdy, independent, potential rebels they once had 
been.  Only those who owned significant quantities of land could be 
independent, precisely because they could be relied upon to behave as 
gentlemen in a civilized community.174 
C. Law and Religion 
Many late seventeenth-century Virginians found Christianity an 
important force in creating a civilized community.  A main argument for 
enslaving blacks, especially in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century, was that whites were Christian and thus civilized, whereas 
almost all blacks before the Great Awakening were not and thus, it was 
said, had to be controlled by force.175 
In fact, many whites in the seventeenth century had not been 
practicing Christians.  Virginia then had only half the number of clergy it 
needed to fill its pulpits, and living conditions in many parishes were so 
bad that the ministers who served them were unsuitable.176  Before 
Bacon’s Rebellion, as shown above, religious norms were irregularly 
enforced.177  Transforming Virginians into true Christians thus required 
both that church institutions be created for them and that, once brought 
into churches, parishioners abide by the norms of those churches. 
Reverend James Blair, who arrived in Virginia in 1685 and was 
named the commissary or personal representative of the bishop of 
London in 1689, set about the task of reforming the church and thereby 
strengthening the legal order of the colony by persuading the Governor’s 
                                                                                                             
and the Formation of a Social Elite in Augusta County, Virginia, 1738–1770, 98 VA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 449, 466 (1990).  As in the east, the great landowners used their economic power to 
control local government.  As county courts were established, governors in Williamsburg 
appointed wealthy men to the bench, and those men then became a self-perpetuating oligarchy 
that recommended their own reappointment and nominated others to fill vacancies.  See 
TILLSON, supra, at 17, 22–23 (providing examples of specific positions filled by the wealthy).  
That oligarchy, in turn, used its control over the economic prospects of its underlings to secure 
their obedience.  See McCleskey, supra, at 459–60, 477–86 (explaining this concept and also 
providing examples).  The most recent book on the Shenandoah uses McCleskey’s and Tillson’s 
findings in its larger project of describing the Shenandoah Valley's early history.  See generally, 
WARREN R. HOFSTRA, THE PLANTING OF NEW VIRGINIA:  SETTLEMENT AND LANDSCAPE IN THE 
SHENANDOAH VALLEY (2004). 
174 See McCleskey, supra note 173, at 460 (describing how limited land ownership reduced 
democracy). 
175 See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 206 (describing the white interpretation of religion 
among slaves).  For legislation defining non-Christians brought into Virginia as slaves, see 3 
HENING, supra note 130, at 447–48. 
176  BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 140. 
177 See id. (explaining the religious setup in late seventeenth century England and how 
some hoped this religious experience would spread to Virginia). 
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Council in July 1690 to call for stricter enforcement of religious laws.178  
He remained a significant force in Virginia government into the 1730s, 
when he was still a member of the Council.179  By then, Blair’s efforts had 
led to the formation of a close alliance between local courts and local 
churches, with the same gentry families who controlled the county bench 
also controlling local vestries—vestries that possessed substantial 
governmental powers and typically levied the highest taxes that 
eighteenth-century Virginians paid.180 
Throughout the eighteenth century, church and state remained 
closely intertwined.  Thus, the General Court asserted its jurisdiction 
over religion, when, for example, it disciplined a minister “of evil fame 
and profligate manners . . . much addicted to drunkenness . . . [who] 
officiated in ridiculous apparel unbecoming a priest[,] . . . exposed his 
private parts to view in public companies, and solicited negro and other 
women to fornication and adultery with him.”181  Likewise at the county 
level, the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century witnessed a 
revival of prosecutions for morals offenses, which had largely 
disappeared from court dockets in the post-1660 era.  Indeed, by the 
early eighteenth century, grand juries had developed the habit of 
presenting and having prosecuted as criminal virtually any conduct on 
which local elites frowned. 
Thus, Virginia courts again began routinely to punish what one 
court described as “the several sins and offenses of swearing,182 cursing 
by profaning God’s Holy Name,183 Sabbath abusing,184 drunkenness,185 
                                                 
178 Id. at 140. 
179 Id. at 141, 234. 
180 JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRINGS OF LIBERTY:  HOW VIRGINIA’S RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS 
HELPED WIN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND SECURED RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 16–17, 37 (2010). 
181 Godwin v. Lunan (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1771), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730, TO 1740; AND FROM 1768, TO 1772, 
at 96 (Charlottesville, F. Carr and Co. 1829). 
182 See, e.g., King v. Clifton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 1665), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 9 (ordering Clifton pay a fine for “proclaiming [the] name of God”). 
183 Cf., e.g., King v. Dickins (Goochland Cnty. Ct., July 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND COUNTY 
VIRGINIA COURT ORDER BOOKS 1728–1731, at 358–59 (Ann K. Blomquist ed., 2007) [hereinafter 1 
& 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731] (presenting to the court a man who taught his slave “to profane 
the Lord’s Prayer”).  But see King v. Dickins (Goochland Cnty. Ct. July 1731), in 1 & 2 
GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra, at 392–93 (dismissing the complaint against Dickins). 
184 The most basic Sabbath violation was not attending church on Sunday.  See, e.g., King v. 
Gooding (Henrico Cnty. Ct., May 2, 1758), microformed on 00317735162121 (Genealogical Soc’y 
of Utah) (issuing criminal charges against someone “for not going to [c]hurch”); King v. 
Falkner (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1718), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1719, at 79–80 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) 
[hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1716–1719] (fining a woman for missing church for three years).  
Everyone, except those whose status as dissenters had been officially recognized, was deemed 
to be a member of the Church of England and required to attend services at least once every 
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fornication and adultery.”186  Other morals offenses, which had been 
largely ignored in the middle of the seventeenth century, included 
baptizing a child without authority,187 blasphemy,188 buggery,189 “living a 
                                                                                                             
four weeks.  ISAAC, supra note 172, at 58.  Other offenses included disturbing church services, 
e.g., King v. Thornbury (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1692), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1692–1694, at 34 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1692–1694]; “rude and disorderly behavior” in 
church, e.g, King v. Davis (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1724), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDERS 1724–1725, at 6–7 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1724–1725]; leaving church during service, see, e.g., 
Churchwardens v. Wooden (Lancaster County Ct., May 10, 1732), in LANCASTER 1729–1732, 
supra note 126, at 87–88 (fining a man five shillings or 50 lb. of tobacco for leaving church early); 
working on the Sabbath, see, e.g., King v. Rowland (Stafford County Ct., Mar. 9, 1691/1692), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK STAFFORD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1691–1692, at 96 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1987) [hereinafter STAFFORD 1691–1692] (fining a man for 
cutting tobacco on Sunday); travelling on the Sabbath, e.g., King v. Crosswell (Richmond Cnty. 
Ct., Dec. 6, 1704), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1704–1705, at 13 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter RICHMOND 
1704–1705]; driving a wagon on the Sabbath, see, e.g., King v. Lewis (Augusta County Ct., June 
22, 1764), microformed on 00303765162115 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (fining a man five 
shillings); hunting on the Sabbath, e.g., King v. Blackly (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1725), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ABSTRACTS SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1724–1730 (PART I), at 78 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 
1724–1730 (PART I)]; or putting slaves to work on the Sabbath, see, e.g., King v. Gibson 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1719), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra note 151, at 81 (summoning 
a man before a grand jury for forcing his slaves to work in the field on the Sabbath).  Cf. 
Beverley v. Beach (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1681), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1680–1686, at 12–13 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1994) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1680–1686] (voiding an attachment signed on a Sunday). 
185 See, e.g., Taverner v. Jacobus (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–
1697, supra note 151, at 31 (listing “drunkenness” as one of the “several sins and offences”). 
186 See, e.g., id. (ordering a fine of 2000 lb. of tobacco for fornicating on Sunday).  For examples 
of adultery prosecutions, see King v. Barras (Henrico Cnty. Ct., Feb. 8, 1757), microformed on 
00317735162121 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); King v. Davis (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1687), 
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1687–1691, at 
21 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1687–1691].  The nature 
of the crime of adultery is made somewhat unclear by the case of King v. Philips, in which a 
couple accused of “living in adultery” was found not guilty because they had recently 
married—an impossibility if one or both of them had been married already.  (Spotsylvania 
Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1730), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1724–1730 (PART IV), at 73–74 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) 
[hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART IV)].  Thus, living in adultery might have consisted 
of nothing more than a couple’s living together and engaging in sexual intercourse. 
187 See, e.g., King v. Thackston (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, 
supra note 104, at 74–75 (ordering the arrest of Richard Thackston for illegally performing a 
baptism). 
188 See, e.g., King v. Graham (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1766), microformed on 
00303775162116 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (reporting that Graham was the subject of a grand 
jury hearing regarding allegations of blasphemy); see also King v. Giles (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., 
Oct. 13, 1697), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra note 144, at 51 (ordering punishment of three 
days in pillory and twenty-five lashes for calling Christ “a Son of a Whore”); cf. King v. Furrill 
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lewd and vicious loose life,”190 allowing “unmarried persons to bed 
together,”191 “cohabiting with a Negro,”192 and selling liquor without a 
license.193 
Changes in prosecutions for fornication best revealed the emerging 
concern in the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion with prosecuting offenses 
against morality.  In the middle of the seventeenth century, the concern 
with fornication had been economic rather than moral—almost no 
prosecutions were brought for sexual activity unless it resulted in the 
birth of an illegitimate child with whose support the public might be 
charged. By the early eighteenth century, in contrast, couples were 
presented for “living in that notorious sin of fornication”194 or “for being 
reputed to live in fornication,”195 even when no evidence was brought 
forward of birth of an illegitimate child.  However, charges of fornication 
still would be dismissed if a couple married, even if they married after 
the charges had been presented,196 thereby suggesting that the 
                                                                                                             
(Middlesex County Ct., Oct. 1, 1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 79 (ordering 
punishment for “condemning . . .  the holy institutions & ceremonies of the Church of 
England”). 
189 See, e.g., King v. Blaney (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–
1687, supra note 101, at 91–92 (ordering a fine upon conviction for buggering a cow). 
190 King v. Fletcher (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, 
at 31; accord King v. Vanlandegham (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 17, 1700), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1699–1700, at 
104, 106 (Lydia Bontempo ed., 2003) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1699–1700] (reporting 
Vanlandegham was ordered to remain in sherriff’s custody for keeping another man’s wife in 
his custody). 
191 King v. Bell (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Sept. 26, 1763), microformed on 00303765162115 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
192 King v. Moore (Augusta Cnty. Ct., June 22, 1764), microformed on 00303765162115 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
193 See, e.g., King v. Wood (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1719), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra 
note 151, at 81 (ordering Wood answer for selling liquor without a license); cf. King v. Spiering 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 3, 1695/1696), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1694–1697, at 59–60 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1694–1697] (fining a man 1000 lb. tobacco for maintaining an 
unlicensed tipling house).  The usual penalty for liquor offenses was a fine, but one defendant 
who was jailed because he was unable to pay requested corporal punishment instead.  In re. 
Matthews (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 17, 1773), microformed on 00303785162117 (Genealogical 
Soc’y of Utah).  The court obliged with twenty-one lashes.  Id. 
194 Washington Parish v. Buss (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 24, 1713), in WESTMORELAND 
1712–1714, supra note 128, at 58. 
195 King v. Dye (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1728), in RICHMOND 1727–1729, supra note 128, at 
51. 
196 See, e.g., King v. Gressam (King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 
1721–1723, supra note 127, at 26 (dismissing a presentment for “living together in fornication” 
because the couple later married).  But see King v. Boy (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1740), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 93–94 (punishing a woman for having an 
illegitmate child even though she had since married). 
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immorality of a couple’s premarital sex still may not have been the law’s 
primary concern. 
The increase in prosecutions for immorality also can be observed 
statistically in two counties—Lancaster and Middlesex—for which court 
records are readily available throughout the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century.  In both counties, prosecutions for religious offenses 
such as missing church, profaning the Sabbath, swearing, and 
contemptuous behavior toward clergy rose significantly in the 
eighteenth century.  Between 1671 and 1675, there was one such 
prosecution in Lancaster County, while there were two in Middlesex 
between 1674 and 1678, both occurring after the suppression of Bacon’s 
Rebellion.  Lancaster witnessed four such prosecutions between 1701 
and 1705 and forty between 1731 and 1735.  There were twelve 
prosecutions in Middlesex between 1703 and 1707 and fifteen between 
1733 and 1737.197  Similarly, as Peter Hoffer has shown, prosecutions for 
sexual immorality peaked in Richmond County in the 1720s, while 
prosecutions for regulatory and other morals offenses in general were at 
their height in the 1710s, 1720s, and 1730s.198 
In other ways as well, the justices of the county courts became 
dedicated to maintaining the hegemony of the established Church of 
England.  According to the most recent scholar of religion in pre-
Revolutionary Virginia, “no British colony was more protective of its 
established church, nor more abusive of its religious dissenters, than 
Virginia.”199  As late as the 1740s, a main threat to that hegemony came 
from Roman Catholics rather than dissenting Protestants,200 and the 
defense of Anglicanism began with the oath taken by the justices, who 
swore their belief “that there is not any transubstantiation in the 
Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper or in the elements of bread and wine” 
and that “adoration of the Virgin Mary or any other saint and the 
sacrifice of the mass as . . . used in the Church of Rome are superstitious 
and idolatrous.”201  Catholics faced other forms of discrimination as well.  
                                                 
197 All figures referenced in this section were derived from court records from Lancaster and 
Middlesex counties published by the Antient Press. 
198 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA:  [RECORDS OF] FINES, EXAMINATION OF 
CRIMINALS, TRIALS OF SLAVES, ETC., FROM MARCH 1710 [1711] TO [1754] [RICHMOND COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA] xxviii fig.1, lvi tbl.5 (Peter Charles Hoffer &William B. Scott eds., 1984) [hereinafter 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA]. 
199 RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 3. 
200 See e.g., King v. Matthews (Frederick Cnty. Ct., Nov. 10 1744), FREDERICK COUNTY 
VIRGINIA MINUTES OF COURT RECORDS 1743–1745, at 110–11 (John David Davis ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter FREDERICK 1743–1745] (charging Matthews with “propagating the Romish 
Doctrine”). 
201 Oath of Spicer (King George Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra 
note 127, at 1. 
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In one case, for example, the Stafford County Court ordered a Roman 
Catholic who was caring for several orphans to deliver the children to 
specified Protestants to be bound as apprentices.202  Although the same 
court would not dismiss cases brought by a lawyer thought to be a 
Roman Catholic203—and thereby deny a litigant the right to be 
represented by a lawyer of his choice—the court, over the dissent of 
three justices, did order the lawyer to take oaths mandated by 
Parliament that were inconsistent with his Catholic beliefs, from which 
order he appealed to the General Court.204  Further, as late as 1756, 
legislation was enacted to disarm Catholics.205 
When it came to dissenting Protestants, the courts were required to 
dismiss charges of not attending church on Sunday if a defendant 
showed that he or she was a member of a dissenting Protestant 
communion.206  They were also under a duty to protect dissenting 
congregations from insult and abuse,207 although dissenters, in fact, 
frequently faced discrimination and even physical violence.208 
In any event, the courts did not make it easy for Protestant dissenters 
to establish separate congregations.  Dissenting congregations were not 
permitted to build places of worship without prior judicial authorization, 
                                                 
202  In re. Barton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra 
note 127, at 54–55. 
203  Gibson v. Richee (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, 
at 89–90; cf. Churchhill v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 7, 1702), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1702–1704, at 3 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1702–1704] (permitting a lawyer to plead even 
though he had not taken the oaths mandated by Parliament).  But see Brent v. Edmunds 
(Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 11, 1667), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 50 
(preventing an attorney from practicing before the court for failure to take the requisite oaths). 
204 Gibson v. Brent (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 18, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, 
at 95–97. 
205 See 7 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 
35–39 (Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1820) (reporting an “[a]ct for disarming [p]apists, and 
reputed [p]apists, refusing to take the oaths to the government”). 
206 E.g., King v. Reading (King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–
1723, supra note 127, at 25.  Charges also would be dismissed for defendants who attended 
Anglican services in a parish other than their own.  E.g., Regina v. Williams (Westmoreland 
Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1710), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1709–1712, at 23–24 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
WESTMORELAND 1709–1712]. 
207 See, e.g., King v. Moyer (Orange Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1735), in ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
ORDER BOOK ONE 1734–1739 PART ONE 1734–1736, at 38 (Barbara Vines Little ed., 1990) 
[hereinafter ORANGE 1734–1736] (presenting a man who “insulted and abused” an assembly of 
worshipers). 
208 See RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 28–36 (discussing the fate of religious dissenters in the 
eighteenth century just before the Revolutionary War). 
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which even at the end of the colonial period was not readily granted.209  
In addition, dissenting preachers could not preach without licenses,210 
which were difficult to obtain,211 and would be prosecuted if they did.212  
It appears, indeed, that no dissenting clergymen were licensed until the 
1730s and 1740s.213  Another obstacle to dissent was the requirement that 
county courts report to the governor on meetings of dissenters within 
their jurisdiction.214  Therefore, it is not surprising that the Middlesex 
County Court reported in 1703 that no dissenting congregations existed 
in the county.215 
At the same time that the courts created obstacles to dissenting 
congregations, they set up rules to further the effective functioning of 
Anglican parishes.  County officials under judicial supervision paid the 
salaries of the Anglican clergy.216  Judges specified the locations where 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., In re. Faulkner (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1771), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1771–1772, at 39 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1771–1772] (rejecting a petition to build a house for 
worship because “the court are of opinion they have not jurisdiction of the matter”); cf. In re:  
Holt (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1734), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1734–1735, at 51–52 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 
1991) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735] (granting petition for certificate of governor 
concerning raising money in Germany to build a church). 
210 See, e.g., Swearing of Dalgleish (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1729), in RICHMOND 1727–
1729, supra note 128, at 85 (swearing in a Presbyterian minister required to take oaths in open 
court); cf. Orders of Council (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 21, 1699), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1699–1701, at 20–21 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1699–1701] (requiring licensing of 
schoolmasters). 
211 See, e.g., In re. Magil (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1719), in WESTMORELAND 1718–
1721, supra note 169, at 67, 69 (rejecting a petition for license “to preach the Gospel” pursuant to 
acts of Parliament because it did “not properly l[i]e before” the court). 
212 See, e.g., R v. Organ (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1717), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1718, at 59 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1716–1718] (convicting defendants for 
“concerning themselves under the pretense of religious worship”); see also RAGOSTA, supra note 
180, at 18–19, 23 (discussing impediments to dissenting preachers). 
213 See RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 40–41 (discussing examples of such licensure). 
214 See Orders of Council (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 21, 1699), in LANCASTER 1699–1701, supra 
note 210, at 21 (requiring county courts to report on meetings of religious dissenters in their 
counties). 
215 Return of Court (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 
203, at 41.  For a fuller description of the discrimination and other obstacles faced by dissenters 
in colonial Virginia, see RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 15–42. 
216 See, e.g., Farnefold v. Mottrom (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 17, 1680), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 14 (reporting a minister’s complaint for two 
years salary not paid by the sheriff). 
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Anglican clergy were required to preach217 and supervised vestry 
elections to insure that the clergy had adequate lay support.218  In case 
such encouragement did not suffice, the courts prosecuted parishes that 
did not provide a minister or reader or failed to keep their church in 
repair.219 
In sum, by the early decades of the eighteenth century, Virginia's 
county courts were in the business of insuring that their people—lower 
as well as upper class—lived in moral communities, as judges intrusively 
regulated sexuality, religious belief, and ecclesiastical government and 
structure.  The most important matter of morality they regulated, 
however, was family life. 
Thus, the courts acted intrusively in protecting innocent wives from 
errant husbands.  For example, in one important case the Governor and 
Council directed a county court to hear the case of an eleven-year-old 
girl who claimed that she had been married at the age of nine without 
her consent.220  The court ordered the girl to state, on her twelfth 
birthday, whether she wished to affirm or disaffirm the marriage.221  
When she disaffirmed the marriage, the court declared it null and 
void.222  County courts also had power to grant wives separate 
maintenance when husbands did not adequately provide for them,223 
whereas courts required men who beat their wives to enter into peace 
bonds as well as to provide separate maintenance.224  Occasional cases 
even authorized spouses to live separately, with the husband providing 
for the wife according to his “estate, condition and quality.”225  One 
                                                 
217 See, e.g., Order re Location of Preaching (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1667), in STAFFORD 
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 43 (ordering a minister to preach in three particular 
places until further order). 
218 See, e.g., Vestry of North Farnham (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1684), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 53 (ordering that half of the lay persons for 
election be chosen from the upper parts of the parish and the other half from the lower part). 
219 E.g., King v. Parish of Sittenburne (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan., 7, 1690/1691), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, supra note 56, at 43–44. 
220 In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 
184, at 62–63. 
221 Id. at 63. 
222 In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 28, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, 
at 68–69. 
223 See, e.g, In re. Hanslip (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1683–1685, supra note 159, at 73 (ordering all of the husband’s estate as alimony towards the 
wife’s future support and maintenance).  But see James v. James (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 6, 
1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 13 (denying separate maintenance and 
granting a peace bond in lieu thereof). 
224 E.g., In re. Harwood (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–
1689, supra note 145, at 68–69. 
225 E.g., In re. Martin (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1688), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra note 
186, at 41; accord In re. Grey (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1665), in 13 VA. COLONIAL 
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court, in addition, ordered a husband not to cohabit with a specified 
woman who was not his wife.226 
The courts also supervised parental upbringing of children.  
Although courts recognized the right of parents to custody, even of 
illegitimate children,227 they were more concerned with issues of proper 
moral training and support.  Thus, James and Elizabeth Lee were 
summoned to appear in court to respond to accusations that they 
brought up their children to pilfer and steal,228 while another court 
required Adam Hubbard to show why he “[did] not . . . keep his children 
as he ought . . . or suffer them to be christened or brought to church.”229  
When Hubbard failed to appear, the court ordered the churchwardens to 
bind out his two eldest children.230  Other children were similarly bound 
out when courts found their parents too poor to support and educate 
them in a proper Christian manner.231  In a final case, the court granted a 
                                                                                                             
ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 42, 45 (allowing the wife to live separate from her abusive husband 
and ordering the husband to pay the wife’s accomodations); see also In re. Wardens of Hungers 
Parish (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 18, 1712/1713 & Mar. 17, 1712/1713), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 
COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK COURT CASES & C, 1710–1717, at 86, 90–91 (Howard Mackey & 
Marlene Groves eds., 2003) [hereinafter 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717] (releasing the husband 
from the sheriff’s custody for fulfilling a prior bond to indemnify the church for any charges 
incurred for maintaining his wife); Wharton v. Wharton (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 
1705), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1705–1707, at 4 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1988) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1705–
1707] (ordering equal division of the husband’s estate upon willingness to separate from his 
wife).  However, a wife who left her husband could not take any of her property without an 
order from the court.  See, e.g., Turner v. Thompson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in 
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 98 (requiring a wife who left her husband 
without a court order return all property taken from the house). 
226 King v. Grant (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 6, 1725), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
KING GEORGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK ABSTRACT 1723–1725, at 87–88 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter KING GEORGE 1723–1725].  A defendant accused of 
breaching a peace bond was entitled to a jury trial to determine whether a breach had, in fact, 
occurred.  E.g., King v. Monteith (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–
1725, supra, at 96–97. 
227 See In re. Hanks (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, 
supra note 56, at 38 (granting a mother’s request for custody of her natural son); see also Kirtley 
v. Hartley (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1705/1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra 
note 225, at 12–13 (recognizing a father's right to custody of his legitimate children following 
his wife's death). 
228 King v. Lee (King George Cnty. Ct., May 6, 1726), in KING GEORGE 1725–1728, supra note 
126, at 19–20. 
229 Summons of Hubbard (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738, 
supra note 142, at 6. 
230 Summons of Hubbard (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738, 
supra note 142, at 9. 
231 See, e.g., In re. Jackson (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1771), microformed on 00307225162119 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (reporting a complaint made against a father for “not educating 
his children in a Christian like manner”); In re. Rose (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1675), 
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mother’s second husband control of the children's estates following her 
death upon his promise to care for them until adulthood.232 
Both the power of county courts over families, and the limits on that 
power, emerged most clearly in a proceeding brought by a widow, 
Hanna Grey Jacob.233  When several of her slaves became infected with 
smallpox, she petitioned the county court to have her family inoculated 
against the disease.234  The court granted her petition but refused to 
allow inoculation of the county at large—something it deemed too 
dangerous.235  Accordingly, the court exercised its power to prohibit 
other inoculations, although it did declare that other families that 
wanted inoculations could seek permission to receive them.236 
In sum, the mid-eighteenth-century legal order of Virginia was 
substantially stronger than the legal system that Bacon’s Rebellion had 
challenged.  The mid-eighteenth-century labor force of African and 
African-American slaves was under far more repressive control than the 
older force of white indentured servants had been.  Meanwhile, the 
white underclass was no longer composed mainly of rowdy, single 
young men but of families.  Those families, in turn, had developed ties of 
dependency and deference to elites and, whether by coercion or 
conviction, had become part of well-regulated Christian communities 
adhering to high standards of morality.  The communities of mid-
eighteenth-century Virginia had been compelled to accept traditional 
norms and thus were far easier to govern than their seventeenth-century 
predecessors had been. 
D. Judge and Jury 
A further window through which to envision the relationship 
between elites and the middling and even lower classes is the jury 
system.  Juries, the most important institution of the common law, were 
central to the functioning of Virginia’s legal system in the seventeenth 
                                                                                                             
in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 42 (ordering an indigent’s child work under 
an apprentice until the age of eighteen); In re. Pickett (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 7, 1686), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra note 101, at 51 (ordering a neglected child to be placed in the 
care and custody of the petitioner); see also 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 32 (authorizing the 
binding out of such children). 
232 In re. Lyser (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1685), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1683–1686, at 79 (Ruth Sparacio 
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–1686]. 
233 In re. Jacob (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 14, 1774), microformed on 00327485162124 
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and eighteenth centuries.  Litigants had a right to trial by jury if they 
demanded it, and thousands of jury trials occurred in the decades after 
1660.237  Even after default judgments, juries of enquiry were used to 
determine damages not fixed by law.238  However, juries were not 
always used.  Courts, for example, typically tried actions to balance 
accounts,239 as well as suits commenced by petition rather than by writ240 
and suits in which one party demanded that the other prove his or her 
case by oath.241  Occasionally, other cases, even those involving rights in 
land,242 for no apparent reason were tried to the court as well.243  Of 
course, if both parties agreed, they could waive jury trial and submit a 
case for decision by the court244 or referees,245 especially in cases where 
                                                 
237 E.g., Walker v. Blaxly (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1665), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, 
supra note 127, at 10.  Compare Gubton v. McDannell (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1706), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1705–1706, at 
53–54 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1705–1706] (reporting 
defendant’s motion to overturn his conviction due to lack of jury trial), with Gubton v. 
McDannell (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 6, 1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra, at 64 (reversing 
the judgment against the defendant). 
238 E.g., Carter v. Hedgman (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 14, 1705), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1703–1706, at 85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1703–1706].  In Robinson v. Humphrys, a writ of 
enquiry was used in an action of debt.  (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 
1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 40–41.  However, the need for a jury of enquiry was 
obviated when the plaintiff produced the defendant’s obligation.  Robinson v. Humphrys 
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 
74–75; see also Ovi v. Ramsay (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1754), microformed on 00303755162114 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (summoning a jury of enquiry in a writ of debt to calculate the 
value of Virginia money into a certain sum of Pennsylvania money). 
239 E.g., Pratt v. Brock (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, 
supra note 127, at 10–11. 
240 See, e.g., Beven v. McCarty (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1705/1706), in 
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 12 (refusing to allow the parties to admit the 
petition to a jury). 
241 See, e.g., Grymes v. Wadding (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, 
supra note 128, at 18, 24 (granting judgment for the plaintiff upon his oath); cf. Thompson v. 
Smith (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 21, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 
162, at 29–30 (granting judgment for the plaintiff on contract unless the defendant takes an oath 
that he never promised to pay). 
242 See, e.g., Gwin v. Ridley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, 
supra note 151, at 24–25 (trying an action in which the plaintiff accused the defendant of 
trespassing and removing timber from land). 
243 See, e.g., Bankes v. Myers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1701), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 66–67 (rendering a verdict regarding a dispute 
over cattle). 
244 E.g., Maning v. Carroll (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 2, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, 
supra note 127, at 97–98; Collier v. Fabian (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 29, 1702), microformed 
on 00327505162126 (Library of Va.) (reporting an action in which a defendant refused his right 
to a jury trial and consented to leave the issue to the judgment of the court). 
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factual issues were “long & tedious”246 or in cases where the parties had 
submitted an agreed statement of facts.247 
                                                                                                             
245 See Davis v. Skrine (King George Cnty. Ct., Dec. 8, 1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra 
note 127, at 57 (referring an action to referees to audit, state, and settle all accounts between the 
plaintiff and the defendant).  Reports of referees were subject to challenge in a county court, 
however, and to appeal to the General Court.  See Taliaferro v. Grymes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., 
July 7, 1707), in MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, supra note 169, at 17 (reviewing referees’ decision and 
acknowledging the defendant’s appeal from the court’s judgment).  Compare Barbour v. Sandys 
(Orange Cnty. Ct., June 27 , 1755), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1755–1756, at 54 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
ORANGE 1755–1756] (awarding damages to both the plaintiff and defendant upon accounting 
by referees), with Barbour v. Sandys (Orange Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756, 
supra, at 82 (finding wholly for defendant after reviewing the final verdict). 
246 George v. Churchhill (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra 
note 184, at 32. 
247 E.g., Mitchell v. Lockart (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Feb. 22, 1762) microformed on 00303765162115 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).  In cases tried to the court, there were numerous rules about 
burden of proof, such as a rule that “one evidence [was] not sufficient to prove [an] assumpsit.”  
Beck v. Triplett (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra 
note 101, at 14; cf. Miller v. Kelly (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 1702/1703), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1701–1703, at 62–63 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1701–1703] (dismissing the 
information for killing a sow since proof was “by Commissioners only”).  Normally a litigant 
could not testify on his or her own behalf.  Compare Champe v. Russell (Orange Cnty. Ct., Mar. 
24, 1749/1750), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1749–1752, at 2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter ORANGE 1749–1752] 
(refusing to allow defendant to take an oath because “better proof” was available), with 
Champe v. Russell (Orange Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1750), in ORANGE 1749–1752, supra, at 19 
(rendering judgment for the plaintiff in light of the defendant’s plea being overruled).  But see 
Ward v. Bingley (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1735), in 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, supra note 90, 
at 466 (finding for the defendant based only on his motion); Hill v. Wilke (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., 
July 14, 1686), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1682–1687, at 87 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANCASTER 
1682–1687] (allowing the plaintiff who lost a bill to recover on his oath that no part of it was 
paid); Shropshire v. Pratt (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–
1712, supra note 206, at 18–19 (allowing a minister who preached a sermon at a funeral to 
recover on his oath that the defendant had agreed to pay him).  See generally Coats v. Rayburne 
(Botetourt Cnty. Ct., July 14, 1773), microformed on 00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) 
(permitting probate upon a witness’s oath); Revet v. Sertain (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 12, 
1691/1692), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 92 (allowing the plaintiff to recover on an 
account when two witnesses gave proof of the debt).  Compare Rostis and Watson v. Hopkins 
(Henrico County Ct., Feb. 7, 1757), microformed on 00317735162121 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) 
(admitting an account book into evidence), with Rostis and Watson v. Hopkins (Henrico Cnty. 
Ct., Mar. 7, 1757), microformed on 00317735162121 (holding the account book was properly 
admitted in evidence).  On the other hand, actions against estates could be proved by the 
plaintiff's oath to a debt if the debt was less than one year old and no other evidence was 
available.  E.g., Hill v. Meriwether (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 11, 1700), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRIGINIA 1699–1702, at 53 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSEX 1699–1702]; Belote v. Marshall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., 
Oct. 14, 1735), microformed on 0032751562127 (Library of Va.); Waters v. Wilton (Rappahannock 
Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 57–58; cf. McNeil v. 
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In cases tried to a jury, the plaintiff had the burden of proof.  Thus, 
when one jury returned a verdict that it could “find no matter of fact for 
want of evidence,” a suit was dismissed.248  Likewise, a plaintiff would 
lose if he or she did not present enough evidence.249  One piece of 
evidence was always key; in a suit on an obligation, the written 
obligation had to be put into evidence.250 
When litigants chose to try a case by jury, the court and the jury 
typically functioned harmoniously.  But on rare occasions conflict 
between court and jury emerged.  One early case of conflict was Saffin v. 
Watson,251 a 1668 matter in which a “verdict . . . appear[ed] to th[e] court 
to be grounded upon the insufficiency of the evidence,” and another 
evidence being produced to the court,252 it was the opinion of the court 
                                                                                                             
Churchill's Executors (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1766), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1766–1767, at 39–40 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1995) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1766–1767] (holding the plaintiff’s oath was sufficient to 
authenticate even accounts older than one year).  But see Ball v. Ball (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 
10, 1698), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra note 144, at 77 (requiring one witness in addition to 
the plaintiff to prove an account against decedent’s estate); cf. Ellis v. Edmondson (Essex Cnty. 
Ct., June 11, 1702), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra, at 119–20 (holding certification on account of Lord 
Mayor of London was sufficient proof of account without further evidence).  More generally, a 
court would decide in favor of a party who gave evidence under oath when the opposing party 
offered “nothing material in bar.”  Almond v. Macarty (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 
1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689–1692, supra note 56, at 57; accord Martin v. Woodson 
(Goochland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1729/1730), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 185–
86 (rendering judgment for the plaintiff upon his oath and where the defendant failed to 
appear).  But in another case, in which a plaintiff had been permitted to swear that no suit had 
been brought previously upon his claim, judgment went against him when pleadings from 
such a suit were produced in court.  Gibson v. Peale (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 13, 1693), in 
STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 114–15. 
248 Lee v. Jenkins (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1685), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–
1686, supra note 232, at 66.  For another example of an early, irregular jury verdict, compare 
Potter v. Robinson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, 
at 24 (reporting jury verdict that could “not find any such tract of land” ever possessed by the 
plaintiff), with Potter v. Robinson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1681/1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–
1686, supra note 184, at 28 (reporting a third person’s claim to title and appeal to the General 
Court). 
249 See, e.g., Thacker v. Devolve (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1709), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1708–1710, at 21 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1708–1710] (finding one piece of evidence not 
enough). 
250 See, e.g., In re Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 20, 1727), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1725–1729 (PART I), at 100 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART I)] (rejecting the petition because the 
written obligation was not presented); Powell v. Doniphan (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 4, 1692), 
in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra note 184, at 38 (dismissing a suit when the plaintiff did not 
produce the written agreement). 
251 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1668), in LANCASTER 1666–1669, supra note 45, at 47. 
252 Id. 
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“that that jury should yet again to enquire further of the . . . said 
evidence[,] whereupon” six named members “of the said jury did 
dissent, for which their contempt the court . . . impose[d] a fine of 400 lb. 
of tobacco to be paid by each of the said dissenters.”253  When three of 
the jurors then appealed, the General Court confronted essentially the 
same issue of jury law-finding power that the Court of Common Pleas in 
England would face two years later in Bushell’s Case.254 
Unfortunately, we do not know what the General Court decided, 
and the issue of the power of juries to determine law does not appear to 
have arisen again before the end of the century.  Accordingly, the issue 
needs to be regarded as unresolved.  In the years following the turn of 
the century, however, judges developed several mechanisms by which to 
control the power of juries. 
One mechanism was to direct juries to return special verdicts, which 
they did with some frequency.255  Once a jury had been “directed by the 
court to find the special facts proved and leave the law to the court,” a 
general verdict could be set aside and a retrial granted if the jurors did 
not obey.256  Another device was the grant of a new trial when a judge 
concluded that a jury had returned a general verdict contrary to the 
evidence; such grants occurred with some frequency.257  On at least one 
                                                 
253 Id. 
254 See generally (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.), in VAUGHAN’S REPORTS 135 (1669) 
(discussing the court’s powers where a jury acts contrary to the court’s direction). 
255 E.g., Stepto v. Hattaway (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 10, 1734), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1732–1736, at 62–63 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1732–1736]. 
256 Holt v. Custis (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1730), microformed on 00327515162127 
(Library of Va.); see also Holt v. Custis (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 10, 1730/1731), microformed 
on 00327515162127 (Library of Va.) (setting aside the jury verdict where jurors disobeyed the 
court’s direction). 
257 E.g., Darnall v. Morgan (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Oct. 26, 1764), in FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra 
note 160, at 6; Batson v. Batson, (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 11, 1732), microformed on 
00327515162127 (Library of Va.); Stubblefield v. Moore (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1740), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 104; cf. Drummon v. Hauxford (Richmond Cnty. 
Ct., June 2, 1709), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1708–1709, at 58 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 
1708–1709] (granting the defendant leave to appeal based on a claim that the jury verdict was 
against the evidence).  But compare Garner v. Darnall (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1761), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1759–1761, at 93 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1759–1761] (reporting 
defendant’s motion for new trial on the ground that the jury rendered a verdict for the wrong 
party), with Garner v. Darnall (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra 
note 144, at 19–20 (denying defendant’s motion for new trial).  Even when a jury found 
contrary to evidence, a court had discretion to accept its verdict.  See Henslee v. Tutt 
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1742/1743), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 3–4 
(reserving ruling on grant of a new trial upon jury finding against the evidence).  In Henslee v. 
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occasion, a court penetrated beyond the rubric that a verdict was 
contrary to the evidence, which often meant not that a jury had 
misconstrued the evidence but that it had rejected the judges’ view of the 
law, and explicitly set aside a verdict as contrary to law.258  In that case, 
the jury had returned a verdict for the defendant, but the court, 
“conceiving the matter as confessed both of fact and law,” directed the 
defendant to make a further plea, and when the defendant refused, it 
entered judgment for the plaintiff.259  Courts also set aside verdicts when 
juries found incorrect issues, as in a case of trespass, where the jury 
mistakenly found the defendant committed waste.260 
Finally, jury verdicts were set aside when they were improper as to 
form or otherwise insufficient as a basis for judgment.261  Judges also 
                                                                                                             
Tutt, the court ultimately did, in fact, grant a new trial.  (Spotsylvania County Ct., Apr. 5, 1743), 
in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 7–8. 
258 Bertrand v. Fox (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 8–9, 1703), in LANCASTER 1701–1703, supra note 
247, at 92–93. 
259 Id. at 93. 
260 Hobson v. Occany (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 27, 1715), in WESTMORELAND 1714–
1716, supra note 138, at 37–38; accord Warren v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct., 9, 1745), 
microformed on 00327525162128 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (finding the verdict “so 
contradictory and imperfect that the court [could] not render their judgment thereupon”).  But 
see Watts v. Field (King George Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra 
note 127, at 34–35 (rendering judgment for the plaintiff even though the jury failed to identify 
who should pay). 
261 See, e.g., Doe v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1743/1744), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ABSTRACTS OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1740–1745, at 93–94 
(Lydia Sparacio Bontempo ed., 2002) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1740–1745] (setting aside a verdict 
for insufficiency).  Compare Weekes v. Clarke (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1711), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1710–1712, at 35–36 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1710–1712] (finding by the jury, at 
the initial trial, £5 damages for the plaintiff if “the law be with him”), with Weekes v. Clarke 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1711), in MIDDLESEX 1710–1712, supra, at 40 (considering parties’ 
motion for new trial based on an imperfect jury verdict), and Weekes v. Clarke (Middlesex 
Cnty. Ct., Jan. 1, 1711/1712), supra, at 58 (granting motion for new trial because the former 
verdict was imperfectly found); compare Houison v. Elly (Orange Cnty. Ct., Sept. 29, 1749), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1748–1749, at 93–
94 (Sam Sparacio & Ruth Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter ORANGE 1748–1749] (reporting the 
plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to law), with Houison v. Elly (Orange 
Cnty. Ct., May 24, 1750), in ORANGE 1749–1752, supra note 247, at 9–10 (ordering a new trial 
based on an imperfect verdict); compare Clay v. Alloway (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1709), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1709–1710, at 8–
9 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1709–1710] (reporting the 
initial verdict in an action relating to property ownership), and Clay v. Alloway (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1, 1709/1710), in RICHMOND 1709–1710, supra, at 21 (finding the previous verdict 
to be insufficient), with Clay v. Alloway (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 6, 1710), in RICHMOND 1709–
1710, supra, at 73–75 (reporting the second impanelled jury verdict upon reconsideration of the 
action).  If imperfections in the verdict were intentional, jurors might also be fined.  See, e.g., 
Pope v. Miller (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1704), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER 
BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1702–1704, at 128 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 
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tightly policed the processes of jury selection262 and deliberation.263  A 
jury verdict would be set aside, for example, if some of the jurors 
“appear[ed] to be in drink, and not fully agreed in their verdict.”264  
Cases of hung juries that could not agree on a verdict were exceedingly 
rare, however.265 
An even more effective form of jury control than the motion for a 
new trial, and one used more frequently in the early eighteenth century, 
was a chancery decree enjoining execution of judgment on a jury 
verdict.266  It is noteworthy that a litigant could turn to chancery for 
injunctive relief even after denial of a post-verdict motion, although a 
county court sitting in chancery would not grant an injunction when it 
did “not see[] any cause therefor.”267 
                                                                                                             
1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1702–1704] (fining jurors for contempt when they failed to return 
a perfect verdict upon court order). 
262 See, e.g., Coleman v. Hawly (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF 
WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 37–38 (setting aside the verdict because jurors 
were not all freeholders); Jones v. Samford (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1710/1711), in 
MIDDLESEX 1710–1712, supra note 261, at 2 (rejecting several veniremen who were unable to 
read and write for jury service). 
263 See, e.g., Flower v. Blanch (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 10, 1695), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1691–1695, at 102 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1691–1695] (ordering the jury to be kept “together 
without meat, drink or candle until they have agreed on their verdict,” which is to be returned 
to a specified justice); Day v. Wilton (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 2, 1711), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1710–1711, at 79 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1710–1711] (separating the jury before giving 
its verdict); Chilton v. Redman (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 1707), in WESTMORELAND 
1707–1709, supra note 130, at 7–8 (finding a verdict signed only by foreman rather than the 
entire jury erroneous).  Compare Pigg v. Pain (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1724/1725), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 34 (summoning the jury to court to deliver 
their verdict the following day due to absence of two jurors), and Pigg v. Pain (Spotsylvania 
Cnty. Ct., May 4, 1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 42 (staying the 
judgment because of errors), with Pigg v. Pain (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1725), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 54 (finding that the entire jury must appear 
in court to present a verdict).  But see Dalton v. Lynch (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 5, 1706/1707), 
in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 90 (holding the verdict will not be invalidated when 
a juror is called as a witness if a timely objection is made and the juror does not testify). 
264 Spotswood v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART III), supra note 127, at 106–07. 
265 For an example of such a rare case, see Smyth v. Richardson (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 4, 
1696), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 91. 
266 See, e.g., Baker v. Minton (King George Cnty. Ct., July 6, 1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, 
supra note 127, at 37 (relieving the defendant from judgment rendered against him). 
267 Whitton v. Burgoyne (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 10, 1696), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1695–1699, at 21–22 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSEX 1695–1699]; accord Macon v. Wharton, (Goochland Cnty. 
Ct., July 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 378 (enjoining the verdict). 
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In addition to setting jury verdicts aside, judges controlled the 
evidence they permitted juries to hear.  On many occasions, they 
concluded that proffered evidence did not support parties’ legal 
contentions and accordingly declined to admit it.268  The procedure 
available to a party against whom evidence was offered was to make and 
preserve an objection by a demurrer to the evidence and a bill of 
exceptions.269  Objections also could be interposed to the competence or 
interest of witnesses as well as to the substance or weight of what they 
had to say.270 
Despite all these available tools, courts nonetheless at times stayed 
their hand and declined to interfere intrusively in the trial process.  Thus 
in one case, in which the defendant relied on a 1663 statute concerning 
entertainment of strangers, the court ruled that the statute was no longer 
in force, but the jury nonetheless returned a verdict for the defendant, 
and the court upheld the verdict.271  In another case, in which the court 
had directed the jury to find a special rather than general verdict, the 
court, after a debate in which one justice changed his vote, accepted the 
                                                 
268 See, e.g., Corbin v. Beverich (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 7, 1709/1710), in MIDDLESEX 1708–
1710, supra note 249, at 66–67 (permitting the plaintiff to swear to tobacco weights rather than 
admit a list of weights into evidence).  On other occasions, of course, they admitted material 
into evidence.  See, e.g, Meaver v. Hewitt (York Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 1734), in YORK COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA WILLS, INVENTORIES AND COURT ORDERS 1732–1737, at 93, 95 (Mary Marshall Brewer 
ed., 2005) [hereinafter YORK 1732–1737] (admitting an account book into evidence). 
269 See, e.g., Stretton v. Martin, (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1736), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra 
note 144, at B52, B55–56 (admitting a certificate into evidence to which the plaintiff tendered a 
bill of exceptions and appealed); Jameson v. Vawter, (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1736), in 2 RANDOLPH 
& BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B51–52 (reversing the judgment where the defendant 
demurred to the plaintiff’s evidence but the court did not force plaintiff to join); Campball v. 
Sayers (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Feb. 18, 1763), microformed on 00303765162115 (Genealogical Soc’y of 
Utah) (admitting the plaintiff’s evidence, to which the defendant demurred); Jett v. Barrow 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1706/1707), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 94–95 
(admitting a will entered by the plaintiff, to which the defendant demurred).  Of course, if the 
demurrer was sustained, the challenged evidence would not be given to the jury.  For an early 
example of an apparent bill of exceptions, see Spotswood v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 20, 
1721), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1723 
(PART III), at 118 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART 
III)]. 
270 See, e.g., Morris v. Chamberlayne (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1735), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, 
supra note 144, at B50–51 (refusing to admit an interested witness).  A claim of interest or lack of 
competence would require a witness to undergo a voir dire.  See, e.g., Edmondson v. Robinson 
(Essex Cnty. Ct., June 19, 1728), in ESSEX 1727–1729, supra note 151, at 32–33 (refusing to allow a 
witness to testify because the witness refused to undergo a voir dire).  For an example of a voir 
dire, see Samford v. Suggitt (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1719), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1719–1721, at 3–4 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1719–1721]. 
271 Churchhill v. Lomax (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1707), in MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, supra 
note 169, at 5–6. 
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general verdict that the jury returned.272  Of course, there were many 
cases in which a losing party sought relief from a jury verdict and the 
court, without giving reasons, simply denied the request.273 
The declining power of juries confirms, in short, what other facts 
suggest—that the legal system of Virginia and especially the judges 
thereof gained effective power to enforce their commands in the seventy-
five years following Bacon’s Rebellion.  Whereas a rowdy lower class 
guided by a few elite leaders had come close in the 1670s to 
overthrowing the colony’s government and driving established elites 
from power, those elites had more than recovered their power by the 
mid-eighteenth century.  By the mid-eighteenth century, Virginia’s legal 
system, and in particular its judiciary, clearly possessed sufficient power 
to govern the colony effectively. 
E. Center and Periphery 
But how was that power divided among the judges?  Could the 
General Court, sitting first in Jamestown and later in Williamsburg, 
control the work of county courts?  How much power did the General 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction,274 its exclusive jurisdiction over felony 
trials, and its concurrent jurisdiction over major civil litigation give it?  
The evidence suggests that the General Court’s power was somewhat 
limited and that predominant power in colonial Virginia rested in the 
hands of county courts, which had jurisdiction over civil and most 
criminal cases, a wide variety of regulatory matters, and even chancery 
litigation. 
This section first explicates the jurisdiction of Virginia’s county 
courts.275  Second, it describes the structure of the colony’s political 
power.276  Third, it details the structure of the legal knowledge in 
Virginia.277  Finally, it explains county court independence.278 
                                                 
272 Weekes v. Mountague (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1710), in MIDDLESEX 1708–1710, supra 
note 249, at 73–74. 
273 Compare Bruce v. Dowdy (Orange Cnty. Ct. May 19, 1736), in ORANGE 1734–1736, supra 
note 207, at 77 (reporting a jury verdict against the defendant, to which the defendant filed 
errors), with Bruce v. Dowdy (Orange Cnty. Ct., July 21, 1736), in ORANGE 1734–1736, supra note 
207, at 94–95 (upholding the verdict against the defendant). 
274 Before the 1680s, appeals also were taken on occasion to the General Assembly, but after 
the 1680s the Assembly's appellate jurisdiction disappeared.  Warren M. Billings, Temple v. 
Gerard, 1667–1668:  An Example of Appellate Practices in Colonial Virginia, 94 VA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 88, 89 (1986); Warren M. Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves in Seventeenth-
Century Virginia, 99 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45, 56 n.37 (1991). 
275 See infra Part III.E.1 (examining what matters came before county courts). 
276 See infra Part III.E.2 (discussing political power in colonial Virginia). 
277 See infra Part III.E.3 (examining the sources and extent of legal knowledge in colonial 
Virginia). 
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1. The Jurisdiction of County Courts 
In the decades following Bacon’s Rebellion, Virginians, in the words 
of one grand jury, continued to consider themselves entitled to “the 
benefit of the laws of England,”279 and courts frequently proclaimed their 
adherence to English law.  They ruled, for example, that criminal 
prosecutions could be instituted only “according to the laws of England 
and this country;”280 that “the law of England require[d] two witnesses” 
for resolving any dispute in court;281 that guardians had to be appointed 
for minors “by the law of England;”282 and that a sheriff could not retain 
fees “exacted . . . contrary to equity & law.”283 
They also turned continually to the procedures and vocabulary of 
the common law.  Young people, for example, were apprenticed 
“according to custom in England.”284  Other common-law words of art 
similarly appeared, such as “bills of exchange,”285 “escheat,”286 “fee 
tail,”287 “curtesy of England,”288 “quietas est,”289 “in trust,”290 “joint 
                                                                                                             
278 See infra Part III.E.4 (examining the lower courts’ independence from the General 
Court). 
279 Information Against Robins (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1687), microformed on 
00327495162125 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
280 Order Against Quakers (Va. Gen. Ct., June 16, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 409–10. 
281 In re. Gale (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1676), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y 
of Utah). 
282 In re. Bowler (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, 
at 450. 
283 In re. Page (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1671), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y 
of Utah). 
284 In re. Executors of Flynt (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 25, 1670/71), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 31–32. 
285 Foxcraft v. Newell (Va. Gen. Ct., May 24, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, 
at 338.  Bills of exchange were widely used from an early date.  E.g., Spencer v. Austen 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 17, 1674/5), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra note 52, 
at 25–26.  Suit did not lie on a bill of exchange that had not been the subject of a legal protest.  
See Whitticer v. Atkins (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Apr. 11, 1683), in LANCASTER 1682–1687, supra note 
247, at 16 (dismissing an action based on a bill of exchange where no legal protest was made).  
Further, the drawer of a bill of exchange was not liable thereon once the bill was accepted by 
the drawee.  E.g., Whetstone v. Laight (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1678), in Middlesex 1677–
1680, supra note 134, at 25; Bayley & Co. v. Gwin (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 8, 1699/1700), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1699–1701, at 10 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1699–1701]. 
286 Bridger v. Pitt (Va. Gen. Ct., May 23, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
337; accord In re. Bowler (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 450; Starkey v. Vauson (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 9, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 372. 
287 Dunkan v. Remy (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 30, 1714), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, 
supra note 138, at 19. 
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tenancy,”291 “consideration,”292 “demurrer,”293 “dedimus potem,”294 
“dower,”295 “executor,”296 “administrator,”297 “adm. cum testamento 
annexo,”298 and “non est inventus.”299  Finally, judges and the lawyers 
appearing before the courts routinely cited both English statutes adopted 
before the settlement of Virginia and other English authorities as bases 
for decision.300 
Doctrines that are recognizably common-law rules of law also were 
adopted in Virginia, although they did not always have the same social 
                                                                                                             
288 Smith v. Cheesman (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 25, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, 
at 353; accord In re. Bowler (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 448, 450 (following the “curtesy of Virginia”). 
289 Reeves v. Reeves (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 9, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
371–72. 
290 West v. Wilson (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 9, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
371–72. 
291 Beverly v. Pate (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
385–86. 
292 Waggaman v. Anderson (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 22, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, 
supra note 6, at 451–52. 
293 Ludwell v. Scarborough (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 239–40. 
294 Chicheley v. Potter (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 6, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, 
at 250–51. 
295 Hansford v. Seawell (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 22, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 
6, at 266.  A widow was entitled to dower even in land in which her husband’s fee simple failed 
if he died without heirs.  See, e.g., Sheares v. Courtnall (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 18, 
1682), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 76 (granting the widow one third of 
her deceased husband’s estate). 
296 Bacon v. Swan (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
276–77; accord In re Executors of Flynt (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 25, 1670/1671), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 31–32 (reporting a motion brought by 
“executors” of Flynt’s estate). 
297 Estate of Vassall (Va. Gen. Ct., April 19, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 
207–08; accord In re. Langley (Norfolk Cnty. Ct, Oct. 16, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of 
Va.).  In the absence of a close relative, the “greatest creditor” of the estate would be appointed 
administrator.  Estate of Ralph (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1669), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 99–100. 
298 Estate of Gregory (York Cnty. Ct., Feb. 24, 1669/1670), microformed on 1000445991 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
299 Abrahall v. Payne (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 22, 1671/1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 293–94; accord Lee v. Elmey (Charles City Cnty. Ct., 1672/1673), in 13 VA. COLONIAL 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 78. 
300 See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. Dade (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 106–08 (citing a statute of King Henry VI); Brent v. Dunne (Stafford 
Cnty. Ct,. Apr. 7, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 84 (citing a statute 
of Queen Elizabeth).  Virginia courts held, however, that statutes enacted subsequent to the 
colony’s settlement that did not expressly state they were applicable, such as the 1677 Statute of 
Frauds, were not of force in Virginia.  See, e.g., Hayberd v. Hawksford (Richmond Cnty. Ct., 
Mar. 6, 1700/1701), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 55–56 (holding a statute of King 
Charles II inapplicable). 
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and economic effects that they had in England.  For example, Virginia 
courts held that a tenant in less than fee simple could “have the use of 
the land not committing any waste thereupon and not to dispose of the 
same.”301  Lawyers also knew how to engage in a “privy examination of 
a feme covert” to convey real property without subjecting it to dower.302  
Above all, the county courts continued to exercise plenary common-
law jurisdiction grounded in the use of the common-law forms of action.  
Among the common-law writs filed were account,303 audita querela,304 
case,305 covenant,306 debt,307 deceit,308 detinue,309 elegit,310 replevin,311 scire 
facias,312 trespass,313 and trover.314  Two suits—one grounded on a statute 
                                                 
301 Appleton v. Waugh (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 
6, at 384.  A lessee who failed to maintain land as required by the lease would be subject to 
liability but could set off improvements he had made to the land against any damages.  See, e.g., 
Towers v. Bryan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 3, 1674/1675), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1674−1677, supra note 52, at 17–18 (taking into account work done on the land when 
determining damages). 
302 (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 28, 1669), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 513; e.g., 
Examination of Micham (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1702), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra 
note 128, at 86–87.  As Linda Sturtz has shown, however, the adoption of common law rules of 
coverture did not subordinate women to men in Virginia as much as they did in England.  See 
LINDA L. STURTZ, WITHIN HER POWER:  PROPERTIED WOMEN IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 20–21 
(2002) (discussing successful and powerful women in Virginia). 
303 E.g., Callahan v. Phillips (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 13, 1703), in LANCASTER 1701–1703, 
supra note 247, at 97; Estate of Traverse (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1672/1673), in LANCASTER 
1670–1674, supra note 52, at 76; Solo v. Pinton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1672/1673), 
microformed on 1000549064 (Library of Va.). 
304 E.g., Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 100. 
305 E.g., Mingo v. Poole (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1673), microformed on 1000457503 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); Foxhall v. Jones (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1721), in KING 
GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 7–8. 
306 E.g., Brent v. Dunne (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, 
supra note 127, at 106. 
307 E.g., Lewis v. Henley (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., Oct. 18, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of 
Va.); Gibson v. Richee (Stafford Cnty. Ct. Mar. 10, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 63. 
308 E.g., Digges v. Lilly (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 JOHN RANDOLPH & EDWARD 
BARRADALL, VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS:  THE REPORTS OF DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL 
COURT OF VIRGINIA 1728–1741, at R1, R7 (R.T. Barton ed., 2005) (1909). 
309 E.g., Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 
1689–1690, supra note 127, at 77. 
310 See, e.g., Taylor & Co. v. Jones (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–
1704, supra note 203, at 77. 
311 E.g., Whitty v. Aldridge (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 17, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra 
note 6, at 252–53. 
312 E.g., Parker v. Genesis (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1674/1675), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 22–23.  It was decided early that courts 
processing writs of scire facias would not entertain defenses available in the original, underlying 
suit and not therein raised.  See Briscoe v. Tignor (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1689), in 
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of Henry VIII providing that tenants in common were entitled to 
partition their land,315 and the other on a suit for “negligence” in letting a 
horse lent by one person to another die316—made the growing breadth of 
jurisdiction clear. 
Along with the growth of common-law jurisdiction came an 
increasing use of common-law defenses.  Defendants learned, for 
example, how to interpose proper pleas of the general issue to different 
writs, such as pleading not guilty to a writ of trespass,317 and pleading 
                                                                                                             
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1686–1690, at 
85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1686–1690] 
(confirming the judgment against the defendant where he failed to raise an available defense in 
the original suit). 
313 E.g., Page v. Marshall (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1724), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, 
supra note 127, at 53–54; Bayley v. Pritchett (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1668), in LANCASTER 
1666–1669, supra note 45, at 50. 
314 E.g., Poole v. Huxford (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1677), in Middlesex 1673–1678, supra 
note 104, at 60–61.  By the end of the seventeenth century, plaintiffs were pleading in proper 
formulary words:  in one assault case, for example, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant “by 
force and arms . . . did beat bruise and batter and evilly entreate” the defendant “so that of his 
life he did despair.”  Maupin v. Winder (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 25, 1699), in 
Northumberland 1699–1700, supra note 190, at 69, 71.  Failure to use proper words could result 
in abatement of a suit.  E.g., Clarke v. Hipkings (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1699), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1697–1700, at 73–74 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1697–1700].  Similarly, failure to 
recite “the action . . . in the [d]eclaration” could have the same affect.  E.g., Willis v. Thilman 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra, at 52–53.  Courts also had 
begun to specify what writs could be used for what purposes.  They ruled, for example, that 
case would lie on a promise to pay rent, e.g., Briscoe v. Dunkington (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 
7, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note 128, at 26–27; for recovery of a legacy, e.g., 
Covington v. Meriwether (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1701), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 
94–95; or for recovery of a statutory penalty, e.g., Swanson v. Burton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 
7, 1701), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note 128, at 47, 49–50.  However, case would not lie for 
a trespass committed on a freehold.  E.g., Pley v. Maguyer (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in 
ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 11.  Debt also would lie for rent.  E.g., Fitzhugh v. Williams 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 32–33.  There 
remained, however, clear instances in which plaintiffs used and recovered judgment on 
improper writs, as with a writ of debt on what was described as a “[n]ote,” but was in fact a bill 
of exchange.  Parrott v. Morgan (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 7, 1705/1706), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1705–1707, at 25–26 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1705–1707].  Similarly, another 
plaintiff improperly used and recovered on a writ of case for an assault.  Cobb v. Eaton 
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 11, 1730), microformed on 00327515162127 (Library of Va.).  For 
information on the common law forms of action in Virginia, see PAGAN, supra note 5, at 68–
70. 
315 Brent v. Thompson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, 
supra note 127, at 97–98. 
316 Hall v. Stribling (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 8, 1692/1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 
158, at 65. 
317 E.g., Taylor v. Willis (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1696/1697), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, 
supra note 144, at 31. 
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owes nothing to a writ of debt.318  Defendants also knew how to 
interpose other pleas, such as performance—either total319 or partial320—
duress,321 illegality,322 self-defense,323 statute of limitations,324 res 
judicata,325 settlement,326 discount or set-off,327 want of consideration,328 
                                                 
318 E.g., Wormely v. Fluker (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 16, 1699), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1699–1700, supra note 190, at 83, 86.  However, an incorrect plea would be rejected.  E.g., Smith 
v. Gray (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1699), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 314, at 78. 
319 E.g, Brent v. Darnell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 13, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 
1689–1690, supra note 127, at 69–70. 
320 E.g., Gibson v. Battalia (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 58; cf., e.g., Butler v. Hammersley (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in 
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 96 (holding an executor who paid a debt up 
to the limit of estate funds in his possession was free from further liability). 
321 E.g., Somervill v. Settle (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra 
note 160, at 41. 
322 See, e.g., Russell v. Mathews (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1736), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1735–1736, at 77–78 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1735–1736] (barring suit on an 
account because the plaintiff, an ordinary keeper, had extended more credit to the defendant 
than allowed by statute); cf., e.g., Arnold v. Bramham (Orange Cnty. Ct., May 30, 1752), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1752–1753, at 26–
27 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter ORANGE 1752–1753] (allowing the 
plaintiff to testify to accounts for liquor sales since he was within proviso of law allowing 
merchants to sell liquor for consumption off the premises). 
323 E.g., Norris v. Thomas (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1700), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1700–1702, supra note 130, at 1–2.  A defendant was not entitled to use force against a plaintiff 
who merely threatened him with force.  See Hubbard v. Lynn (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 2, 
1747), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1746–1748, at 27–28 (Sam Sparacio & Ruth Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 
1746–1748] (granting judgment against the defendant for assault and battery where the plaintiff 
only verbally threatened the defendant). 
324 E.g., Booth v. Dudley (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 
308, at R9–11; Ellis v. Garton (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 8, 1739), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, 
supra note 122, at 67–68; see Clay v. Day (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 25, 1712), in 
WESTMORELAND 1712–1714, supra note 128, at 6–7 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
based on the amount of time he occupied the land).  Special rules existed for suits against a 
decedent's estate; suits could be brought for any debts “authentically proved.”  Ellis v. Tomlin 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1695/1696), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 75–76.  
Suits could also be brought for debts contracted within one year before the decedent’s death 
and proved by the oath of the creditor and one other person.  E.g., Haslewood v. Tomlin 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1695/96), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 74; see 
Campbell v. Callaway (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Aug. 9, 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT 
COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 33 (barring a suit for being “out of date”); see also Cole v. 
Godwin (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1699), microfilmed on 00327505162126 (Library of Va.) 
(barring a suit even though the debt was acknowledged within one year prior to the decedent’s 
death). 
325 E.g., Abbot v. Abbot (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 
308, at R21; Nusum v. Spencer (Lancaster County Ct., Apr. 13, 1693), in LANCASTER 1691–1695, 
supra note 263, at 50.  In Hill v. Whitfield, the court ruled that a final judgment for the plaintiff in 
a suit for stealing hogs did not preclude a subsequent suit for a statutory penalty for stealing 
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and, in a slander case, that words were not actionable.329  Defendants 
could also plead that persons who did not control their own legal affairs, 
such as wives,330 minors,331 and servants,332 could not bring suit or enter 
                                                                                                             
the same hogs.  (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Oct. 9, 1693), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT COUNTIES 
1693–1695, supra note 87, at 1–2. 
326 E.g., Sharp v. Marshall (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1705), in LANCASTER 1703–1706, supra 
note 238, at 69.  Compare Canterbury v. Sclater (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 2 1733), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1732–1734, at 52 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1732–1734] (reporting the jury’s 
recognition of settlement between the parties), with Canterbury v. Sclater (Richmond Cnty. Ct., 
Aug. 6, 1733), in RICHMOND 1732–1734, supra, at 65–66 (holding the settlement found by special 
verdict as binding).  But see Drummond v. White (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1717), in 16 
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK COURT CASES & C 1717–1719, at 31–32 
(Howard Mackey & Marlene A. Groves eds., 2003) [hereinafter 16 NORTHAMPTON 1717–1719] 
(holding that an oral agreement may not be pleaded in bar to suit on specialty). 
327 E.g., Carter v. Trent (Richmond County Ct., Mar. 6, 1700/1701), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, 
supra note 285, at 57. 
328 E.g., Chapman v. Bevan (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Aug. 9, 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF 
WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 32.  The court rejected the defense in Chapman v. 
Bevan, which involved suit on a specialty.  Id.; cf. Green v. Ward (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Dec. 
1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 45 (stating prior 
agreements “cut off & excluded by a specialty”); Drummond v. White (Northampton County 
Ct., Sept. 17, 1717), in 16 NORTHAMPTON 1717–1719, supra note 326, at 32 (holding a parole 
agreement not binding against specialty).  But see New v. Morriss (Goochland Cnty. Ct., May 
1729), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 88–89 (holding lack of consideration 
was a valid defense to suit on a bond). 
329 E.g., Batson v. Fitchet (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1730), microformed on 
00327515162127 (Library of Va.); Gibson v. Richee (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in 
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 95.  In some cases, courts rejected such a 
plea.  E.g., Mutlow v. Ballard (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 
308, at R9–10.  Compare Scott v. White (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 20, 1700/1701), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 54 (considering the defendant’s plea that the 
plaintiff failed to allege that the words “were spoken falsely and maliciously”), with Scott v. 
White (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1701), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 
130, at 63–64 (overruling the defendant’s plea).  Slanders, of course, generated considerable 
litigation.  See, e.g., Bryant v. Cammell (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 18, 1681/1682), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 53 (reporting a case in which the defendant 
called plaintiff's wife a “whore”).  Much of said litigation was ended by a public apology by the 
defendant.  E.g., Neavil v. Arnold (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1766), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, 
supra note 247, at 38; Swan v. Hedgman (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1706), in LANCASTER 
1703–1706, supra note 238, at 99–100; cf. Hamelin v. Jarmin (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Feb. 5, 
1693/1694), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 170–71 (finding words “not 
actionable” but “contrary to good manners” and reducing damages given by the jury to costs 
only).  People who repeated slanders initiated by others were not liable.  E.g., Rallings v. 
Fraquair (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1738), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 
26.  In one case, a county justice sitting on the bench accused the presiding justice of being 
drunk.  In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 1, 1704/1705), in Middlesex 1702–1704, supra 
note 203, at 96–97.  The court determined that the presiding justice was not drunk.  Id. at 97. 
330 See, e.g., Jones v. Courtney (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 22, 1681), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 51 (voiding a contract because a wife entered 
into it without her husband); see also Nusum v. Spencer (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 
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into contracts, or that one joint owner of an obligation could not sue 
thereon without joining co-owners.333  Indeed, by the end of the 
seventeenth century, special pleading had begun to emerge in Virginia's 
county courts.334  Pleas, it should be noted, were required to be in writing 
“for the better regulating and keeping the records and transferring the 
pre[ce]dents to posterity.”335 
                                                                                                             
1691/1692), in LANCASTER 1691–1695, supra note 263, at 9–10 (holding property of a wife before 
marriage becomes that of the husband upon marriage); cf. Jones v. Smith (Isle of Wight Cnty. 
Ct., Mar. 9, 1693/1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 18 
(upholding suit against a widow and her new husband for bed claimed by the widow as 
inheritance from her deceased husband); Graves v. Barker (Prince William Cnty. Ct., Sept. 9, 
1762), in PRINCE WILLIAM 1762, supra note 157, at 68 (holding suit abated by plaintiff’s 
marriage).  But see In re. Payne (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 
267, at 14–15 (granting the wife of an absent husband power to sue for debts); Millner v. 
Hightower (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 8, 1736), in RICHMOND 1735–1736, supra note 322, at 48 
(upholding a deed executed by a woman prior to marriage); Payne v. Mathews (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1701/1702), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 102 (upholding a note 
signed by a wife on behalf of her “lame” husband). 
331 See Velden v. Chelton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1730), in LANCASTER 1729–1732, supra 
note 126, at 30 (holding a minor may not appear in court except by guardian); Glascock v. Goad 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1705/1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 11–12 
(stating in dictum that “no minor . . . [is] permitted to sue in any [c]ourt”); see also Johnston v. 
Johnston (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Oct. 15, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1773–1774, at 37 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter CAROLINE 1773–1774] (reporting a case where a minor entered a plea that he was 
not bound by his contract).  But see In re. Terret (King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1722/1723), in 
KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 66 (binding an underage youth who agreed to 
indenture even though his parents never agreed to it). 
332 See, e.g., Lennox & Co. v. Donaldson (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Aug. 10, 1768), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1768–1769, at 53 (Lydia 
Sparacio Bontempo ed., 2001) [hereinafter LOUISA 1768–1769] (reporting the defendant’s plea 
that he was a servant at the time of the sale); Peyton v. Marston (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 19, 
1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 82–83 (voiding a bill of sale entered into by a 
servant); McCarty v. Philpott (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1693), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, 
supra note 184, at 64 (dismissing suit where bill was passed during the time of servitude).  A 
statutory penalty could also be imposed for unlawfully trading with a servant.  See Carey v. 
Barefoote (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 15–16 
(ordering the defendant pay four times the value of the contract as a penalty); cf. In re. 
Sheppard (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1676), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 53 
(holding a servant may not assign the right of executorship). 
333 E.g., Dudley v. Beverley (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. Feb. 5, 1682/1683), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, 
supra note 184, at 42. 
334 See, e.g., Robinson v. Skipwith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1697), in MIDDLESEX 1697–
1700, supra note 314, at 12–13 (reporting the defendant’s plea of lawful seizure of the plaintiff’s 
property).  Compare Carter v. Scholfield (Lancaster County Ct., Dec. 11, 1701), in LANCASTER 
1701–1703, supra note 247, at 14 (reporting the defendant’s plea that the “Negroes” at issue in 
the suit lawfully belonged to him), with Carter v. Scholfield (Lancaster County Ct., Feb. 11, 
1701/1702), in LANCASTER 1701–1703, supra note 247, at 17 (rejecting the defendant’s plea). 
335 Fitzhugh v. Dade (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 11, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, 
supra note 127, at 90.  Contra Carter v. Beale (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 26, 1711), in 
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Defendants also learned how to interpose procedural pleas in 
addition to substantive pleas in bar.  By the early eighteenth century, for 
example, demurrers were in regular use.336  Suits would be dismissed if a 
plaintiff “brought the wrong action”337 or brought an action on a statute 
that had been repealed;338 if either the plaintiff339 or the defendant340 
died; if a defendant did not reside in the county where suit was 
brought341 or the matter at issue had occurred in another county;342 if a 
                                                                                                             
WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206, at 43; see Order re Records (Charles City Cnty. Ct., 
Aug. 10, 1689), in CHARLES CITY 1687−1695, supra note 105, at 59 (directing the clerk to keep 
records at the courthouse rather than his own house). 
336 E.g., Arnold v. Sharp (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 6, 1726), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART II), supra note 165, at 18. 
337 Robinson v. Whitaker (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1692/1693), in MIDDLESEX 1690–1694, 
supra note 162, at 61.  Thus, courts decided that case would lie on a promise to pay rent.  E.g., 
Briscoe v. Dunkington (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note 
128, at 26–27.  Debt also would lie for rent.  E.g., Fitzhugh v. Williams (Richmond Cnty. Ct., 
June 6, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 32–33.  Case also would lie for 
recovery of a legacy.  E.g., Gouldman v. Ransone (Essex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1700/1701), in ESSEX 
1699–1702, supra note 247, at 74; accord Covington v. Meriwether (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 
1701), in Essex 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 94.  Likewise, case would lie for recovery of a 
statutory penalty.  E.g., Swanson v. Burton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1701), in MIDDLESEX 
1700–1702, supra note 128, at 47, 49–50.  However, case would not lie for a trespass committed 
on a freehold.  E.g., Pley v. Maguyer (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra 
note 267, at 10.  Similarly, debt would not lie on an account.  E.g., Stringer v. Robins 
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1712), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 63.  
Further, trespass would not lie for committing waste by cutting down trees.  E.g., West v. 
Robyshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1713), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 
225, at 91, 93. 
338 See Francis v. Cock (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1702), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 
117 (holding a defense based on legislation that has been repealed void).  Compare Johnson v. 
Henderson (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1734/1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 
209, at 81–82 (reporting the defendant’s assignment of errors in the judgment against him), with 
Johnson v. Henderson (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra 
note 209, at 94–95 (dismissing the suit where the action was based on legislation that had been 
repealed). 
339 E.g., Walker v. Row (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1721), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1719–1721, at 71 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1719–1721]. 
340 E.g., Draper v. Clayton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Apr. 9, 1701), in LANCASTER 1699–1701, supra 
note 210, at 87–88. 
341 E.g., Grymes v. Harrison (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, 
supra note 193, at 89.  But see Stepto v. Jones (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1704), in LANCASTER 
1703–1706, supra note 238, at 44 (overruling a plea that the plaintiff and defendant were non-
residents of the county since the plaintiff was a freeholder of the county); Neale v. Barrow 
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 27, 1707), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 77 
(holding the defendant may be sued in any county where he or she owns property even where 
the underlying offense is not local).  A nonresident plaintiff would be required to give security 
to pay costs before suit could proceed.  See Chamberlaine v. Marchbanks (Goochland Cnty. Ct., 
Nov. 1728), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 35 (dismissing an action where 
the nonresident plaintiff failed to give security); Carstarphan v. Lewis (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., 
Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
814 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
writ was “not . . . executed in due time”343 or a declaration was 
“untimely” filed;344 if a declaration was uncertain345 or “not full or 
sufficient,”346 in that it did not, for example, indicate the time at which 
pleaded events occurred or were to occur347 or whether money became 
due by “bill bond or account;”348 if a variance existed between a writ and 
a declaration;349 if a party submitted an unsigned plea350 or a double 
plea;351 if a suit against an estate sought judgment against an executor 
personally rather than against goods of the estate in the executor’s 
hands;352 or if a suit for a statutory penalty was brought in the name of 
the informer only, rather than the informer and the crown.353 
                                                                                                             
July 1, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 108−09 (dismissing an action where 
the nonresident plaintiff failed to give security). 
342 E.g., Barrow v. Metcalfe (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar 2, 1709/1710), in RICHMOND 1709–1710, 
supra note 261, at 41. 
343 Johnson v. Hay (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART 
I), supra note 184, at 79. 
344 Hawkins v. Moseley (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 
11. 
345 E.g., Gray v. Grymes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, supra 
note 193, at 74; Peale v. French (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 71–72. 
346 Wormeley v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 9, 1691/1692), in LANCASTER 1691–1695, 
supra note 263, at 14–15. 
347 E.g., Pafford v. Jennings (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 4, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, 
supra note 203, at 86–87; see Gibson v. Brent (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–
1693, supra note 158, at 90 (showing a plea lacking a certain time).  But see Davis v. Tayler 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 31–32 
(permitting a declaration that lacked the time at which the trespass was committed); Gerrard v. 
Allerton (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1705/1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra 
note 225, at 19−20 (overruling the defendant’s motion for dismissal based on several 
uncertainties). 
348 Herford v. Clarke (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1698/1699), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, 
supra note 314, at 66.  Contra Haines v. Pinkard (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 15, 1702), in 
LANCASTER 1701–1703, supra note 247, at 50–51. 
349 E.g., Mann v. Bertrand (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 10, 1697), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra 
note 144, at 55; Baker v. Jones (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1708), in MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, 
supra note 169, at 88.  But cf. Garlington v. Berratt (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1700), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 4–6 (denying a motion to abate for variance 
between the writ and declaration). 
350 E.g., Plunkett v. Mercer (King George Cnty. Ct., Nov. 5, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725, 
supra note 226, at 104−05. 
351 E.g., Pope v. Long, Richmond Cnty. Ct. Mar. 1, 1703/1704, in RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra 
note 261, at 94–96. 
352 E.g., Russell v. Downing (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1703), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1702–1704, at 73–74 
(Lydia Bontempo & Ruth Sparacio eds., 2003) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1702–1704]; cf. 
Robinson v. Skipwith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 8, 1699), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 
314, at 72–73 (dismissing a suit where executors were not properly appointed); Garner v. 
Straughan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 17, 1703/1704), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1702–1704, 
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There were limits, however, to the willingness of courts to rely on 
common-law technicalities.354  On one occasion, for example, a defendant 
interposed a technically insufficient plea that he “kn[e]w nothing of the 
matter,” issue was joined, and the case nonetheless proceeded to a 
plaintiff's verdict.355  Parties at times also joined issue on other erroneous 
pleas, such as not guilty to a writ of debt,356 “nil debet” to an action of 
case,357 and not his deed to case.358  An especially interesting plea was 
interposed in Thompson v. Frezer,359 a suit by a county clerk for his fee for 
marrying the defendant.  The defendant responded that the amount 
sought was “too large” and “exhorbitant” and in excess of the sum 
provided by the legislature.360  The defendant won.361  Yet another 
defendant won when a jury returned a verdict in an action for breach of 
contract that neither “the words or treatment between the parties nor the 
                                                                                                             
supra, at 95–96 (dismissing a suit brought against the defendant personally rather than as 
administrator of the decedent). 
353 E.g., French v. Hawksford (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, 
supra note 285, at 14–15; Quidley v. Bledsoe (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1725), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 58–59.  But see Lyell v. Russell (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1739/1740), in RICHMOND 1738–1740, supra note 151, at 85–86 (holding joinder 
of an officer was not required in a suit against a creditor for unlawful arrest); see also Thornbury 
v. Coward (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra note 184, at 46–47 
(holding that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be brought until plaintiff who brings 
the action is acquitted of charges in the initial prosecution). 
354 See Bag v. Cooke (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1736), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at 
R42–43 (arguing whether a plea in abatement could be interposed after special imparlance 
without known result). 
355 Harvey v. Shelton (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 17, 1702), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1702–1704, supra note 352, at 1, 4–5; accord Smitton v. Jones (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 17, 
1702), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1702–1704, supra note 352, at 18–20 (overruling the defendant's 
plea that he never sold any cow to the plaintiff and granting judgment for the plaintiff). 
356 E.g., Tunney v. Conner (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1724), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART I), supra note 184, at 6.  At a later term of court, however, the suit was dismissed on the 
ground of unspecified errors.  Tunney v. Conner (Spotsylvania County Ct., June 1, 1725), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 49. 
357 Chew v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1724/1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 35–36.  But see Harrall v. Williams (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 
6, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 111–12 (holding nil debet was 
not a proper plea to an action of case). 
358 E.g., Mackey v. Stone (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra 
note 237, at 40−41. 
359 (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 
127, at 79–80. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at 79–80.  However, in another case, in which a defendant tore in pieces a plea to which 
the plaintiff had objected, the court “[took] the said plea to be insufficient.”  Hipkings v. Gray 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1697), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 314, at 14–15. 
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evidence at bar doth amount so high as to make a contract nor 
consummate a bargain.”362 
Nor would cases be dismissed simply because a plaintiff failed to 
plead words not material thereto.363  Thus, a court did not dismiss an 
action for an apparent assault for want of the words “contra pacem” or 
“vie et armis” in the declaration.364  A court would not dismiss a suit 
involving title to land for the plaintiff’s failure to plead that his 
predecessor in interest was seised in fee simple as long as the 
predecessor was, in fact, so seised.365  Nor would a court dismiss a suit 
because the plaintiff’s name had been misspelled.366  Courts also rejected 
other technical claims, such as one that a defendant was improperly 
arrested on a court day when he happened to be in court on other 
business,367 and one that a defendant had improperly joined a plea in bar 
to a plea in abatement.368  Finally, the courts enforced agreements among 
                                                 
362 Gundry v. Bennet (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 11, 1692), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 
158, at 1–2.  In Gibson v. Bowrne, the parties accused each other of detaining goods.  (Stafford 
Cnty. Ct. Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 87–88.  In a subsequent suit 
between the parties over the same matter, the court was met by pleas such as one that the 
defendant did not “in his heart think scorn to keep or detain any thing of the plaintiff.”  
Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 
92–93.  After highly irregular pleading, the court decided the first case in favor of Gibson where 
he was the plaintiff.  Gibson v. Bowrne (Stafford Cnty. Ct. Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, 
supra note 158, at 87–88.  A jury decided the second case in his favor where he was the 
defendant.  Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra 
note 158, at 92–93. 
363 E.g., Scholfield v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, 
supra note 193, at 84–85. 
364 Barloe v. Mitchell (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 11, 1699), LANCASTER 1699–1701, supra note 
210, at 24.  But see Jones v. Mackey (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1699), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1697–1699, at 128 (Ruth Sparacio 
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1697–1699] (dismissing a slander action for 
failure to allege that words were spoken “falsely and maliciously”). 
365 E.g., Payne v. Shipway (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 8, 1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 47–48; Pope v. Pitman (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1698/1699), in 
RICHMOND 1697–1699, supra note 364, at 74–75. 
366 E.g., Willcocks v. Cammell (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1702/1703), in RICHMOND 1702–
1704, supra note 261, at 42.  But see Paris v. Stool (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 15, 1711/1712), in 
15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 36, 38 (dismissing suit where the plaintiff 
misspelled the defendant’s name); cf. Lynch v. Tarpley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1703), in 
RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra note 261, at 78–79 (dismissing suit for misnomer in plaintiff’s 
replication). 
367 Evans v. Jones (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1683), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 
184, at 58. 
368 Briscoe v. Dunkington (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra 
note 128, at 26–27. 
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attorneys not to take advantage of technical errors369 and permitted 
parties to cure other technical defects by amending their pleadings.370 
Judges also tolerated other sorts of deficient behavior on the part of 
attorneys.  Illness of an attorney was reason for postponement of a 
matter,371 as was death.372  In addition, courts permitted defendants, 
whose attorneys had defaulted, to reopen cases on the date set for 
judgment and to plead to issue immediately.373  Another court permitted 
a litigant, whose attorney had “runaway,” to substitute a plea of the 
general issue in lieu of a possibly invalid double plea previously entered 
by the runaway attorney.374  A court would not grant an attorney a 
postponement, however, even of “a cause of great weight,” for the 
purpose of drafting a plea in bar after the defendant’s plea in abatement 
had been overruled.375  Similarly, a court would grant judgment against 
and charge costs to a litigant who personally and through counsel 
“unfairly left his action.”376 
As the common-law jurisdiction of the county courts was maturing, 
an extensive jurisdiction in chancery was also emerging in those courts.  
Chancery, for example, performed key functions relating to the 
distribution of estates,377 such as setting off dower,378 distributing 
                                                 
369 E.g., Thurman v. Bowdoin (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 13, 1731), microformed on 
00327515162127 (Library of Va.). 
370 E.g., Bell v. Hord (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 23, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra note 
247, at 75; Skinker v. Robinson (King George Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1727), in KING GEORGE 1725–
1728, supra note 126, at 54; cf. Fantleroy v. Smith (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1708), in 
RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra note 160, at 77 (permitting the clerk to amend the record to correct 
an error in transcription). 
371 E.g., Corbin v. Beverich (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1709/1710), in MIDDLESEX 1708–1710, 
supra note 249, at 53–54; cf. Barrow v. Metcalfe (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1711), in RICHMOND 
1710–1711, supra note 263, at 70 (postponing the case when the defendant’s attorney was absent 
“by reason of some other extraordinary business”). 
372 E.g., In re. Morgan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 15, 1680), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–
1683, supra note 162, at 17. 
373 Compare Ireson v. Stevens (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1703/1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–
1704, supra note 203, at 45–46 (granting the defendant’s plea to hold over until next court 
session), with Ireson v. Stevens (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, 
supra note 203, at 58–59 (finding the defendant’s ultimate plea insufficient and ruling for the 
plaintiff). 
374 Pley v. Beckham (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 11, 1702), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 
127. 
375 Scholfeild v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. Feb. 3, 1695/1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, 
supra note 193, at 59–60; cf. Jackson v. Weekes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 1, 1699/1700), in 
MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 314, at 91–92 (refusing postponement for the defendant to 
bring in discount when the case already had been placed on the calendar twice). 
376 Willis v. Scholfeild (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1697/1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, 
supra note 314, at 37–38. 
377 See, e.g., Dunn v. Wythe (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1739), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra 
note 144, at B80–82 (deciding whether beneficiaries inherit as a next of kin or through the 
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legacies,379 and directing the execution of deeds.380  In one case, chancery 
went beyond these functions when an administrator of an estate sued a 
man who purchased hogs from the decedent’s widow, but when the 
purchaser responded that he had no knowledge whether the hogs 
belonged to the decedent or the widow personally, the court dismissed 
the suit.381  Chancery also played a key role in determining rights of 
creditors.382  In one case, for example, chancery enjoined a common-law 
judgment on a debt when it concluded that the debtor had paid it in 
full,383 while in another, chancery stayed a common-law suit on a bill 
allegedly obtained by fraud.384  It was the jurisdiction of chancery, of 
course, to foreclose mortgages.385 
More generally, a litigant could seek “relief in th[e] equitable Court 
of Chancery according to the merits of his case” whenever he or she was 
                                                                                                             
express devise); Waddy v. Sturman (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1731), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, 
supra note 308, at R61–63 (deciding an action of trespass arising out of the distribution of an 
estate); Griffin v. Long (Caroline Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1768), in CAROLINE 1767–1768, supra note 
153, at 59–60 (concluding that specified slaves were not part of the decedent’s estate); Stone v. 
Stone (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 21–22 
(commanding an executrix to show cause for failing to probate a will when children brought 
suit to compel probate). 
378 Compare Wormeley v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in LANCASTER 1691–
1695, supra note 263, at 4 (referring an action for failure to assign a dower correctly until the next 
court), with Wormeley v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1691), in LANCASTER 1691–1695, 
supra note 263, at 8–9 (dismissing the action where the sherrif incorrectly arrested the 
defendant). 
379 E.g., Taylor v. Pratt (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725, 
supra note 226, at 96. 
380 E.g., Orchard v. Gowre (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1693), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra 
note 184, at 58. 
381 Alliman v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1701), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note 
128, at 73–75. 
382 See, e.g., Pendleton v. Harrison (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 13, 1765), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1765, at 58–59 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1765] (upholding a marital trust preventing a 
creditor from reaching a wife’s assets); Hickey v. Sumers (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 3, 
1706/1707), in MIDDLESEX 1705–1707, supra note 314, at 96 (voiding a previous judgment for a 
creditor and requiring the creditor to reimburse the plaintiff).  
383 Field v. Bronaugh (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1730), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1730–1732, at 2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732]. 
384 Brown v. Ingo (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1718), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra note 
151, at 4–6; cf. Irby v. Portis (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Feb. 9, 1693/1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF 
WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 16–17 (staying a judgment on specialty pending 
a chancery determination whether a prior, unfulfilled oral agreement constituted a defense to 
suit on specialty). 
385 E.g., Wilson v. Gardner (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Nov. 21, 1769), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1768–1770, at 50–51 (Lydia Sparacio 
Bontempo ed., 2001) [hereinafter FAIRFAX 1768–1770]. 
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“by the strict rules of the common law debarred of any satisfaction in the 
premises.”386  A litigant could not seek relief in chancery, however, if he 
or she had a remedy at common law,387 or if the issue to be tried in 
chancery was identical to that already tried at law.388  The precise 
location of the line specifying the availability of equitable relief was not, 
however, clear.  Thus, Virginia courts permitted a person who would 
inherit an estate to seek injunctive relief against a current tenant 
threatening to commit waste.389  However, they did not permit an 
overseer who had managed an estate to sue in chancery to recover his 
promised share of the crop he had grown;390 apparently his only remedy 
was a common-law breach of contract suit.  Of course, “Equity never 
decree[d] against an Act of Parliament [or of the colonial assembly,] 
which indeed would be transferring the legislative power.”391 
Another area of expanding jurisdiction was the criminal law.392  
Throughout the decades following Bacon’s Rebellion, Virginia’s courts 
                                                 
386 Haley v. Eyres (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra 
note 127, at 57.  Thus, chancery set aside a jury verdict on a bill “[i]gnorantly” given by a 
widow under persuasion by a creditor for her deceased husband’s debt when she had never 
possessed or administered any part of his estate; the defense had not been available to her at 
the jury trial.  Northington v. Poole (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1689), in MIDDLESEX 1686–
1690, supra note 312, at 86.  In another case, the plaintiff’s correspondent in London had shipped 
goods to the plaintiff in Virginia, but the commander of the vessel, who had all the papers, 
refused to deliver the goods; because the plaintiff had no “evidence to prove the same . . . by 
the strict rules of law,” he was permitted to bring an action in chancery.  Gwin v. Scott 
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 26; see 
Gwin v. Scott (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 43 
(presenting the defendant’s answer to the complaint); accord Allerton v. Withers (Stafford Cnty. 
Ct., Sept. 10, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 119–120 (reporting an 
action in chancery against an agent of the decedent who alone had knowledge of decedent’s 
assets but could not testify to that knowledge in suit at common law). 
387 See, e.g., Lutwidge v. French (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1735), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra 
note 144, at B181–83 (agreeing with counsel’s argument on the matter); Gibson v. Maddocks 
(Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 87 (quashing the 
complaint because the plaintiff could pursue a common law remedy). 
388 See, e.g., Jones v. Beere (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–
1689, supra note 145, at 42 (denying an injunction that had been tried at law). 
389 E.g., Pigg v. Pigg (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Feb. 2, 1730/1731), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, 
supra note 383, at 11–12. 
390 Rooker v. Tarpley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1731), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1731–1732, at 24–25 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1731–1732]. 
391 Knight v. Triplett (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1740), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, 
at B111, B127–28.  Here, the court declined to invalidate or otherwise ignore legislation 
declaring an unrecorded deed void.  Id. at B128–29; accord Jones v. Porters (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 
1740), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B93, B95, B99 (showing counsel’s 
argument requesting not to transfer the legislative power to the equity court). 
392 For the most useful work on colonial Virginia criminal law, see generally CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, supra note 198. 
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continued to prosecute all the standard offenses of English law.  Major 
felonies were sent to the General Court but only after a county court had 
found probable cause to prosecute, whereas lesser felonies, 
misdemeanors, and minor offenses were prosecuted at the county level. 
Felonies sent to the General Court included assault resulting in 
disfigurement,393 arson,394 infanticide,395 larceny,396 murder,397 rape,398 
and treason.399  Also arrested was a defendant who “dr[a]nk a health to 
King James and curse[d] his present majesty:  King William.”400  
Standard crimes tried at the county level were assault,401 attempted 
rape,402 contempt of court,403 defamation,404 hog-stealing,405 larceny,406 
                                                 
393 See, e.g., Queen v. Quan (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1708), in WESTMORELAND 1707–
1709, supra note 130, at 52 (reporting a man was arrested for allegedly biting off someone’s ear). 
394 E.g., King v. Cheek (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART III), supra note 127, at 71–72. 
395 See, e.g., King v. Jones (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 8–9 (reporting a case where a jury of matrons examined the alleged 
mother to determine if she had recently given birth).  Another case involved a prosecution for 
concealing the birth of an illegitimate child; the testimony of the mother is reported in the court 
records.  King v. Lawson (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 14, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 14.  It is noteworthy that the alleged father also was named 
Lawson.  Id.; see also Queen v. Marson (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 29, 1706/1707), in 
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 69–70 (reporting another case giving the 
testimony of a mother). 
396 E.g., King v. Marsh (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART III), supra note 127, at 11–12; see also R v. Alworthy (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 3, 
1715), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, supra note 138, at 51–53 (reporting an examination of 
several witnesses and a defendant accused of larceny). 
397 See, e.g., King v. Day (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1700), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 
29; see also Examination of Bush (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1704), in LANCASTER 1703–1706, 
supra note 238, at 28–33 (recording detailed examinations of witnesses to the murder of a 
servant).  Compare Queen v. Several Indians (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1704), in RICHMOND 
1702–1704, supra note 261, at 124–26 (reporting examinations of several Native Americans 
suspected of murdering a white man), with Queen v. Several Indians (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 
5, 1704), in RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra note 261, at 130–31 (reporting the subsequent 
prosecution of those Native Americans). 
398 E.g., King v. Burk (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1715/1716), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1714–1716, at 62 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1714–1716]. 
399 E.g., King v. Jackman (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1686), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 106. 
400 King v. Loveless (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, 
supra note 56, at 65. 
401 See, e.g., King v. Poore (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra 
note 184, at 19 (prosecuting a servant for an assault on his overseer). 
402 E.g., Queen v. Melone (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1702/1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, 
supra note 203, at 16. 
403 See, e.g., King v. Dinwiddie (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–
1723, supra note 127, at 46 (prosecuting a county sheriff for sundry abuses and contempt); see 
also King v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 11, 1697), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 43 
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perjury,407 publishing “false scandallous [sic] . . . news,”408 riot,409 servant 
conspiracy,410 and trespass.411 
The important development in the late seventeenth century, as 
shown above, was not the prosecution of standard offenses, but a revival 
of prosecutions of morals and regulatory offenses, which had largely 
disappeared from court dockets in the post-1660 era.  Indeed, by the 
early eighteenth century, grand juries had developed the habit of 
presenting and having prosecuted as criminal virtually any conduct on 
which they frowned.  As just noted, the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century saw a revival of regulatory prosecutions.  Some 
regulatory offenses, such as contempt of court,412 disturbing the peace,413 
                                                                                                             
(penalizing a man for speaking threatening words to the jury foreman); King v. Richins 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 23, 1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 68–69 
(punishing a man with banishment for scandalous words to the court and threatening 
language to the sheriff); Summons of Upshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 12, 1715), in 15 
NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 171–73 (holding a man in contempt of court for 
refusing to give his evidence on his oath).  But see Russell v. Southall (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., 
Oct. 5, 1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 70 (requiring the  peace 
bond of a “peaceable quiet” man who cursed justices after receiving an accidental blow to 
head). 
404 See, e.g., King v. Field (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 12, 1687), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra 
note 186, at 10 (ordering thirty lashes for a man calling a woman a “whore” and claiming to 
have committed fornication with her). 
405 E.g., Carter v. Dunkan (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 26, 1713), in WESTMORELAND 1712–
1714, supra note 128, at 41; see also King v. Sheppard (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 7, 1674), in 
MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 23–24 (ordering a penalty of two years servitude in 
lieu of corporal punishment for hog-stealing). 
406 E.g., King v. Simpson (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, 
supra note 127, at 104. 
407 E.g., King v. Cooper (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1683/1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1683–1685, supra note 159, at 4–5; cf. Goodridge v. Darnell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 
1690/1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 9–10 (ordering the sherrif to arrest a 
defendant found guilty in a civil suit of fraudulent packing of tobacco and to repair a pillory for 
his use thereof). 
408 King v. Townsend (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1687/1688), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, 
supra note 312, at 40. 
409 E.g., King v. Braydon (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 24, 1686), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 86. 
410 See, e.g., King v. Nickson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 14, 1687), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, 
supra note 312, at 2 (examining a servant charged with conspiracy with others to procure 
weapons and run away). 
411 See, e.g., King v. Locker (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 6, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 46 (ordering a penalty of 120 lashes after trial for trespass). 
412 E.g., King v. Fleming (Goochland Cnty. Ct. Sept. 1731), in 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, supra 
note 90, at 2–3. 
413 E.g., King v. Holladay (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART III), supra note 127, at 99. 
Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
822 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
failing to appear as a juror414 or witness,415 failing to notify authorities of 
tithables under a defendant’s control and thereby undermining the tax 
system,416 failing to read laws in church,417 failing to assist or obstructing 
a sheriff or constable,418 and jail break,419 were prosecuted in an effort to 
strengthen the legal order and preserve the public peace. 
                                                 
414 E.g., King v. Keeling (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Oct. 2, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 41.  But see Worsdell’s Petition (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1, 1715/1716), 
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1714–
1715, at 85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1714–1715] 
(remitting a fine when the jury refused to conduct a survey of land boundaries over three days 
in which no provisions were made available). 
415 See, e.g., King v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 3, 1727), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART II), supra note 165, at 40–41.  Courts protected witnesses from civil arrest while 
attending or travelling to or from court.  E.g., Motion of Mercer (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 
1733), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734, supra note 160, at 61–62. 
416 E.g., Barnes v. Nelmes (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 23, 1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1677–1679, supra note 133, at 4–5.  Compare Vause v. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 3, 
1689/1690), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 95 (finding a sheriff guilty of receiving 
tax money attributable to concealed tithables), with Willis v. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 
3, 1689/1690), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 96–97 (presenting the sheriff’s motion 
to dismiss the action), and Willis v. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1690), in MIDDLESEX 
1686–1690, supra note 312, at 102–03 (granting the sheriff’s motion to dismiss).  An owner of a 
servant could obtain an opinion from the court whether that servant was tithable or not.  See, 
e.g., In re. Ransom (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1673/1674), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 
104, at 4–5 (finding the woman servant not tithable). 
417 Compare King v. Churchwardens of King William Parish (Goochland Cnty. Ct., June 1731), 
in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 359 (presenting the churchwardens for 
failing to read the law in church), with King v. Churchwardens of King William Parish 
(Goochland Cnty. Ct., June 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 393 
(dismissing the presentment). 
418 E.g., King v. Sturman (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1719), in WESTMORELAND 1718–
1721, supra note 169, at 61–62; cf. King v. Evans (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1718), in VIRGINIA 
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1723 (PART II), at 18 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART II)] (fining a constable 
for misexecuting a warrant); King v. Rapone (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 1731), in 3 
GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, supra note 90, at 41–42 (fining the defendant for assaulting a 
constable in execution of office); R v. Robinson (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1729), in 
LANCASTER 1729–1732, supra note 126, at 1–2 (fining the defendant for abusing a deputy sheriff 
in execution of office).  Civil liability also existed for persons who obstructed officials, even if 
officials subsequently were able to perform their duty and no long-term obstruction occurred.  
Compare Foster v. Parker (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 2, 1730), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART IV), supra note 186, at 59 (reporting jury finding that the defendant assaulted a sherrif 
who came to the defendant’s home to serve an execution and that the sherrif was subsequently 
able to serve the execution), with Foster v. Parker (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1730), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART IV), supra note 186, at 71–72 (finding the defendant guilty 
and fining him forty shillings). 
419 E.g., Queen v. Cleve (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 17[0]7), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra 
note 160, at 4–5; King v. Pigg (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 5, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART III), supra note 127, at 52–53; cf. King v. Robinson (Essex Cnty. Ct., July 16, 1728), in ESSEX 
1727–1729, supra note 151, at 44 (fining the defendant for rescuing a prisoner). 
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A second sort of regulatory prosecution was brought to promote 
development of the economy.  By the early eighteenth century county 
courts had assumed vast powers over economic matters.  They 
determined county tax rates,420 supported the poor,421 ordered men and 
goods impressed into public service,422 probated wills,423 supervised the 
administration of estates,424 apportioned dower,425 examined separately 
                                                 
420 E.g., Order to Pay Sheriff (King George Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1726), in KING GEORGE 1725–
1728, supra note 126, at 31–32. 
421 See, e.g., In re. Paine (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 12, 1683/1684), microformed on 
00327495162125 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (granting 1000 lb. of tobacco to an “[a]ged, 
[i]mpotent widow”); In re. Tilfaire (Northampton County Ct., Jan. 1, 1677/1678), in 10 
NORTHAMPTON 1674–1678, supra note 125, at 226, 228 (remitting payment to the person caring 
for a woman accidentally burned in a fire); see also In re. Baker (Charles City Cnty. Ct., 1665), in 
3 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 36 (exempting from taxes a youth suffering from 
“convulsion [fits]”). 
422 E.g., Order for Forty-Nine Men (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1676), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra note 52, at 70–71; In re. Townsend (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 
27, 1666), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 28; cf. Assignment of Stith 
(Charles City Cnty. Ct., Sept. 15, 1691), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 109 
(noting the public condemnation of land for construction of a town); In re. Taylor (Charles City 
Cnty. Ct., 1687/1688), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 7, 10 (noting the public 
condemnation of land for construction of a town); In re. Lindsey (King George Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 
1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 80 (seeking reimbursement for a horse 
pressed into public service); In re. Haynes (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1677), in LANCASTER 
1674–1678, supra note 156, at 82–83 (seeking reimbursement for a gun impressed into service); 
Impressment of Roome (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, 
supra note 159, at 16 (certifying that Roome had been impressed into service).  But see Motion of 
Vallicote (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1690), in MIDDLESEX 1690–1694, supra note 162, at 8 
(exempting a school teacher from military service); Read v. Pope (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 
1738), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1737–1738, at 81–82 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1737–
1738] (finding a tort in the absence of proof of public need). 
423 E.g., Nuncupative Will of Whitnall (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1686), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra note 101, at 39.  In the absence of a will or an heir, an estate 
would escheat to the crown.  See Will of Norman (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 1665), in STAFFORD 
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 9 (preventing an estate from escheating where an heir 
was found and proved). 
424 See, e.g., Meriwether v. Coleman (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 11, 1701), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra 
note 247, at 88–89 (upholding the validity of a grant of administration by the county court); see 
also In re. Burge (Charles City County Ct., Dec. 3, 1688), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 
105, at 34–35 (granting a lapsed legacy to the widow rather than the nieces of the decedent); In 
re.Wharton (King George Cnty. Ct., May 8, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725, supra note 226, at 
83 (appointing surety of administrator as administrator when in danger of being held liable on 
bond); Nusum v. Spencer (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 14, 1691/1692), in LANCASTER 1691–1695, 
supra note 263, at 9–10 (holding that a husband, upon marriage, does not gain control of 
property held by his wife as executrix of her father); Lewis v. Muttoone’s Children 
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 21, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 
29 (ordering equal distribution of the estate among the children even though the decedent had 
left the plaintiff daughter out of his will); Thomas v. Bloomfield (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 
5, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 41 (holding an administrator who 
Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
824 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
wives whose husbands were conveying land,426 and appointed and 
policed the work of guardians.427  More directly related to the economy 
was the judiciary’s jurisdiction to distribute liquor licenses;428 to direct 
appropriate officials to care for the poor;429 to establish and maintain 
roads,430 bridges,431 ferries,432 and facilities for processing tobacco;433 to 
                                                                                                             
executes a note promising to pay debts of the estate is liable on the note even if no assets of the 
estate are in his possession); In re. Burnard (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 11, 1690), in STAFFORD 
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 92 (exercising “charitable consideration” and granting a 
widow goods in addition to her paraphernalia). 
425 E.g., In re. Metheny (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 11, 1691/1692), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra 
note 184, at 75. 
426 E.g., Acknowledgment of Keare (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 11, 1688), in LANCASTER 1687–
1691, supra note 186, at 36. 
427 See, e.g., In re. Ellison (King George Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, 
supra note 127, at 93 (requiring the guardian appear before the court for alleged 
mismanagement of the estate); In re. Lund (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1690), in STAFFORD 
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 128 (ordering the guardian deliver property that 
rightfully belongs to the minor); Order for Removal of Peirce (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 27, 
1705/1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 8–9 (ordering the removal of a 
minor from the guardian’s care because the guardian was also adjudged a minor). 
428 E.g., In re. Mason (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 
184, at 51.  They also set liquor prices.  E.g., Order re Rates of Liquor (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 
4, 1711), in MIDDLESEX 1710–1712, supra note 261, at 15.  A license to sell liquor at one location 
did not authorize its holder to sell at any different location.  Compare King v. Searle (Essex Cnty. 
Ct., Mar. 21, 1720/1721), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART III), supra note 269, at 72 (reporting jury 
verdict finding the defendant sold alcohol in a place other than where he was permitted), with 
King v. Searle (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 17, 1721), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART III), supra note 
269, at 87–88 (fining the defendant 2000 lb. of tobacco for selling said alcohol). 
429 See, e.g., In re. Stone (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra 
note 184, at 35 (directing a doctor to treat a man’s sore leg); cf. Stapleton v. Reeves (Middlesex 
Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1687), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 26–27 (finding a doctor’s 
charges “unreasonable”). 
430 E.g., Order for Clearing of Highways (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Oct. 10, 1666), in STAFFORD 1664–
1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 32; see also King v. Harrison, (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1737), in 2 
RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B60, B66 (conceding power in county courts to 
license gates across highways); cf. Donally v. Mickleburrough (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 
1718), in MIDDLESEX 1716–1719, supra note 184, at 59–60 (ordering the implementation of a 
private road across neighboring plantations); In re. Newton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 12, 1693), in 
STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 106–07 (allowing a private road across a neighboring 
estate for getting tobacco to water without compensation). 
431 E.g., King v. Snall (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 6, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART 
III), supra note 127, at 79. 
432 E.g., In re. Ferry by Straham (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Oct. 9, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra 
note 184, at 48. 
433 E.g., Rolling House of Heaberd (King George Cnty. Ct., July 7, 1721), in KING GEORGE 
1721–1723, supra note 127, at 5–6; cf. Inspection of Davis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1681), in 
MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 8 (reporting an inspectors’ finding that Davis’s tobacco 
was fraudulently packed). 
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appoint leather inspectors;434 to approve the amount of rent charged for 
leases;435 and to direct the keeping of boundary records.436  One of the 
judiciary’s most important powers, authorized by statute, was to grant to 
owners on one side of a stream an acre of land on the opposite side, 
thereby enabling construction of a mill dam.  In the process, the court 
would summon a jury to assess damages both to the individual whose 
acre was seized as well as to others along the stream whose land might 
be damaged by the mill.437 
Courts also used the criminal law to discipline people who ignored 
their regulatory commands, as they prosecuted, for example, subjects 
who failed to maintain highways,438 farmers who planted tobacco after 
June 30439 or failed to grow the minimum required amount of corn,440 
millers who failed to keep proper measures at a mill,441 and vagrants.442  
Cases involving forfeiture of vessels for violating the Navigation Acts 
                                                 
434 E.g., Appointment of Darrell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 18, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, 
supra note 158, at 95. 
435 E.g., Leases from Lee to Williams (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., May 15, 1769), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, 
supra note 385, at 82. 
436 E.g., In re. Processioning of Lands (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 13, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–
1692, supra note 184, at 61; cf. In re. Jones (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1684), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 12 (certifying that Jones had imported a specified 
number of immigrants and was entitled to fifty acres of land each); In re. Mitchell (Spotsylvania 
Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1747), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1746–1748, supra note 323, at 24 (recording a bill of 
exchange). 
437 E.g., In re. Jerdone (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1767), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1767–1768, at 42 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter LOUISA 1767–1768]; In re. Snell (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1728), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 13.  Rarely, courts denied petitions as 
being too prejudicial to the owner whose land was sought.  E.g., Branham v. Dozier (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 1724), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, at 64.  But see, e.g., Adams v. 
Randolph’s Executors (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra 
note 183, at 406 (granting a petition to build a mill that was prejudicial to an existing mill since 
the existing mill was out of repair).  Also, legislation authorized the taking of land for mill 
dams.  2 HENING, supra note 115, at 260–61. 
438 E.g., Chandler v. South (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., May 28, 1707), in WESTMORELAND 1705–
1707, supra note 225, at 93. 
439 E.g., King v. Traverse (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Sept. 13, 1692), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra 
note 158, at 33; cf. R v. Feild (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1727), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 
(PART II), supra note 165, at 82 (finding the defendant guilty of tending tobacco seconds). 
440 E.g., King v. Rawlls (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1692), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra 
note 184, at 34. 
441 E.g., King v. Brown (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1719), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART III), supra 
note 269, at 110. 
442 See, e.g., King v. Eager (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1767), microformed on 00303775162116 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); King v. Burgess (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1714), in RICHMOND 
1714–1715, supra note 414, at 7; cf. Queen v. Mickenon (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1704), in 
MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 203, at 58 (ordering a man to appear before the court for 
“entertaining a sickly woman . . . likely to come upon the [p]arish”). 
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were also tried in county courts,443 as were cases involving the 
importation of slaves without payment of duty.444 
It is noteworthy that courts prosecuted crime with little regard for 
procedural niceties.  In many cases, courts dispensed with niceties and 
tried defendants summarily and administered punishment.445  A court, 
for example, judged one servant, who claimed to have committed a theft 
at the order of his master, “to be an [i]gnorant person” and thus gave 
him twenty lashes.446 Another court, however, found a man who had 
fraudulently taken and sold a horse to be “a man of [i]dle dissolute and 
lewd behavior and . . . of a very evil and loose conversation” as well as 
guilty of prior thefts and sentenced him to jail until further court 
                                                 
443 E.g., Spencer v. Finny (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1677/1678), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1677–1679, supra note 133, at 24–26.  A subsidiary issue in this case was 
whether the crew of the forfeited vessel could recover its wages and transportation expenses 
back to its home port out of the proceeds of the vessel and its cargo.  Id. at 26. 
444 E.g., Lee v. Hall (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 26, 1712), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, 
supra note 206, at 97.  Peace bonds were another device used for these purposes.  Thus, courts 
required individuals who threatened the community to give peace bonds upon some other 
individual’s complaint, although they would discharge the bond as long as the person 
thereunder proved that he had, in fact, kept the peace.  See, e.g., In re. Mussen (Stafford Cnty. 
Ct., Mar. 11, 1690/1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 6 (discharging Mussen 
from his peace bond).  The court also required comparable securities from two leaders of local 
Native Americans.  See Trial of the Indians (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 9, 1691/1692), in STAFFORD 
1691–1692, supra note 184, at 95 (releasing six Native American prisoners after two of their 
leaders gave security).  Peace bonds could be required not only for threatened acts of violence 
but even for moral offenses, as in the case of one Robert Hunter “notoriously known to have 
unseemingly kept company with” another man's wife.  Bond of Hunter (Northumberland 
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 28.  Even when a 
bond was violated, a court might treat an impoverished man who put up security “as an object 
of charity” and remit the penalty.  In re. Ripley (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1724), in ESSEX 1725–
1729 (PART I), supra note 250, at 85.  A court might show mercy even toward an 
“impoverish[ed]”defendant who, on the whole, had behaved well and recommend that the 
governor remit the penalty of a bond.  Davis’s Petition (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 
1718/1719), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra note 151, at 40. 
445 See, e.g., King v. Arramore (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1725), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1723–1725 (PART II) 67 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II)] (ordering thirty-nine lashes 
at the public whipping post for threatening to break into a house and murder the inhabitants); 
King v. Hughs (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 
127, at 9–10 (ordering twenty lashes for a husband and ten lashes for his wife at the public 
whipping post for receiving rum from a Negro slave).  Compare Golding v. Jackson 
(Northampton County Ct., Aug. 17, 1715), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 
184–85 (ordering the defendant to present a certificate to show that the tithable was not 
concealed), with Golding v. Jackson (Northampton County Ct., Nov. 15, 1715), in 15 
NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 189, 192 (dismissing the information because it 
was unsigned). 
446 King v. Lewis (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1726), in KING GEORGE 1725–1728, supra note 
126, at 26. 
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order.447  Another court held a third man “of a bad character and by 
pregnant circumstances . . . guilty” of a theft and ordered thirty-nine 
lashes, even though “the evidence [would] not touch his life.”448 
Similarly, a court refused to declare an indictment insufficient 
because it lacked an addition to the defendant’s name stating his 
occupation or status.449  More significantly, courts issued broad search 
warrants, such as one to “search . . . every such suspected house[] and 
place” in response to complaints of crime,450 and another to seize twenty-
nine hogsheads of tobacco, allegedly about to be shipped unlawfully 
from the colony.451 
Especially in the late seventeenth century, lines between the civil and 
criminal jurisdiction of courts were not always clear.  One plaintiff, for 
instance, brought a civil action for conversion of a horse, which a court in 
1691 resolved by requiring the defendant to acknowledge his offense on 
his knees and give a peace bond;452 another brought a suit against a man 
who had stabbed him, which resulted both in damages and in the 
defendant being jailed and required to give a peace bond.453  Yet another 
plaintiff brought an ambiguous suit against a woman for “sinful & 
unchristian-like carriages” toward him and others during Sunday 
services.454  The attorney general brought suit against a fourth defendant 
who married the half-sister of his first wife.455  When the jury returned a 
                                                 
447 Elkin v. Jones (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 
93. 
448 Queen v. Evans (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 16, 1712/1713), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1712–1714, at 12 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1712–1714]. 
449 King v. Monteith (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1724), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725, supra 
note 226, at 44. 
450 In re. Hamerton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 4, 1702/1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra 
note 203, at 6–7. 
451 See Information of Wharton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1681/1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–
1686, supra note 184, at 25 (joining the information’s prayer to the governor to seize the 
tobacco); see also Information of Wharton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1681/1682), in 
MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 27 (condemning the tobacco seized in a subsequent 
search by the governor). 
452 Mason v. Jones (Stafford County. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 
184, at 56. 
453 Smyth v. Lugg (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 20, 1679/1780), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1677–1679, supra note 133, at 101; cf. Richa v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in 
STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 54–55 (reporting a suit that simultaneously sought 
money damages, time in the pillory, cutting off the defendant’s ear, and imprisonment for 
fraud). 
454 Palmer v. Kendall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1692), microformed on 00327495162125 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
455 See Attorney Gen. v. Bartholmew (Charles City County Ct. Aug. 3, 1694), in CHARLES CITY 
1687–1695, supra note 105, at 180–81. 
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verdict of not guilty, the attorney general appealed to the General Court, 
contrary to the principle that no appeal is available to the prosecution 
following an acquittal in a criminal case.456 
Ambiguity also resulted when peace bonds were used in lieu of 
criminal prosecutions.  Courts, for instance, required individuals who 
threatened the community to give peace bonds upon some other 
individual’s complaint, although they would discharge the bond as long 
as the person thereunder proved that he had, in fact, kept the peace.457  
Peace bonds could be required not only for threatened acts of violence 
but even for morals offenses, as in the case of one Robert Hunter 
“notoriously known to have unseemingly kept company with” another 
man’s wife.458 
Six decades later, however, lines were clearly drawn.  In one matter, 
when a victim and an alleged criminal settled their civil disputes and 
requested dismissal of a pending indictment, the king’s attorney 
opposed the dismissal and the court ordered the criminal proceeding to 
go forward.459  By the mid-eighteenth century it had become clear that 
the same action simultaneously could be both a felony against the 
commonwealth and a trespass against an individual.460 
Another area of expanded jurisdiction at the turn of the century 
covered criminal prosecutions against slaves.  All slaves accused of crime 
were tried at the county level, even for the most serious offenses,461 and 
they were punished for offenses of which only they could be guilty, such 
as verbal abuse of a white man, which a court found to be “intolerable 
                                                 
456 Id. 
457 See supra note 444 and accompanying text (discussing discharge of peace bonds). 
458 Bond of Hunter (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–
1683, supra note 162, at 28. 
459 King v. Mannen (Orange Cnty. Ct., May 29, 1752), in ORANGE 1752–1753, supra note 322, 
at 15. 
460 Smith v. Brown (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at 
R1–7; see King v. Pryor (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, 
at B34, B39 (refusing to dismiss the assault case because the defendant owed the king a fine). 
461 Compare King v. Jack (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct. Apr. 4, 1732), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, 
supra note 383, at 82 (finding a slave guilty of conspiring to rebel and murder a man), with King 
v. Jack (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1732), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 93 
(imposing the death penalty on the slave); compare King v. Old Caesar (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., 
Nov. 4, 1724), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 33 (finding a slave 
guilty of committing buggery on a four-year-old girl), with King v. Old Caesar 
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1724), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, 
at 33–34 (sentencing the slave to fifteen minutes in the pillory, ears cut off, and twenty-one 
lashes). 
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and insufferable.”462  On the whole, trials of slaves nonetheless appear to 
have been fair, even though slaves were tried without juries and no 
grand jury presentments were required.463  However, many were 
acquitted, even of serious charges,464 and even slaves who were found 
guilty of felonies typically avoided the death penalty.465 
Acquittal, however, did not always mean that no penalty was 
imposed—courts nonetheless subjected many slaves who were not guilty 
to serious whippings, often of thirty-nine lashes.466  One court even gave 
a master permission to castrate a “notorious runaway and night walker” 
who could not “be reclaimed by the ordinary methods of 
punishment,”467 while another was permitted to cut off a runaway 
slave’s “two great toes.”468  Another discrimination against blacks lay in 
more severe penalties given to women who bore illegitimate mulatto 
                                                 
462 In re. Barbee (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 28, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 
69; accord Mills v. Wilke (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1682), in LANCASTER 1682–1687, supra 
note 247, at 2. 
463 See, e.g., Queen v. Dick (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–
1707, supra note 225, at 52–54 (convicting five slaves without a jury and ordering they be 
hanged). 
464 See, e.g., King v. Prince (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 18, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra 
note 247, at 88–89 (acquitting a slave charged with rape); see also King v. Dick (Louisa Cnty. Ct., 
Apr. 29, 1747), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
ORDERS 1744–1747, at 94–95 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LOUISA 
1744–1747] (acquitting a slave of the murder of a white man). 
465 See, e.g., Queen v. Dick (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., June 22, 1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, 
supra note 203, at 28 (sparing a slave guilty of theft by gubernatorial pardon).  Of course, some 
slaves were executed.  See, e.g., Queen v. Rascow (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1707), in 
MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, supra note 169, at 31–32 (convicting a slave of larceny and sentencing 
him to death by hanging).  For some crimes of which slaves were found guilty, such as hog-
stealing, their masters also were liable to pay monetary penalties to victims.  See, e.g., Newton v. 
Corbin (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 28, 1711), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206, 
at 93 (sentencing the slave to thirty-nine lashes and requiring his owner pay 200 lb. of tobacco).  
Slaves could not be executed unless at least four judges concurred.  8 WILLIAM WALLER 
HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 522–23 (Univ. Press of 
Va. 1969) (1821). 
466 E.g., King v. Prince (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 18, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra note 
247, at 88–89. 
467 In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1736), in MIDDLESEX 1735–1737, supra note 169, at 
82.  Castration was subsequently prohibited by statute except in cases of attempted rape of a 
white woman.  8 HENING, supra note 465, at 358. 
468 King v. Sawney (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 1718), in WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, 
supra note 169, at 19–20.  Sawney, it appears, was a “continual runaway.”  Motion of Eskridge 
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1719), in WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, supra note 169, at 67, 
69.  Practices such as these later received statutory confirmation.  See 6 HENING, supra note 142, 
at 111 (permitting dismemberment of runaway slaves). 
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children—five years of additional servitude469—instead of the usual two 
years for an illegitimate white child.470  However, the greatest failure of 
the criminal justice system in connection with slavery lay in its failure to 
protect slaves’ lives; whites charged with murdering slaves were 
invariably found not guilty by juries.471 
The county courts performed a number of other functions, which 
individually were of less importance than most of those noted above but 
which collectively conferred significant authority.  Thus the courts 
legislated general rules, such as one prohibiting the capture of wild 
horses without prior court approval472 and another prohibiting fishing at 
night.473  They also performed housekeeping tasks, such as scheduling a 
celebration for the birth of James II’s son;474 selecting a site for building a 
courthouse;475 setting the boundaries of the jail yard;476 purchasing 
record books and law books,477 including copies of all the colony laws 
                                                 
469 E.g., Edmonds v. McCollins (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1705), in LANCASTER 1703–1706, 
supra note 238, at 68.  King v. Jones presented an unusual legal issue when Jones declared that an 
East Indian slave fathered her illegitimate child.  (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 4, 1736), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738, supra note 142, at 23.  The issue was whether Jones was guilty of 
bearing a mulatto child; the court decided she was not since the statute “only relat[ed] to 
Negroes & mulattoes & [was] silent as to Indians.”  Id.  Another unusual issue arose when a 
mulatto woman—following intercourse with a white man—produced an illegitimate child; she 
too was only required to undergo the penalty appropriate for bearing an illegitimate white 
child.  See Westcomb v. Bryan (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 26, 1708/1709), in 
WESTMORELAND 1707–1709, supra note 130, at 66–67 (requiring the woman serve her master for 
an additional year). 
470 E.g., Ward v. Owen (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 
25. 
471 E.g., Inquisition into Death of Jack (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 
1697–1700, supra note 314, at 46–47. 
472 See Rule re Wild Horses (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 106 (fining a man 500 lb. of tobacco for capturing a wild horse); cf. 
Complaint re Wolves (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 10, 1688), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra note 
186, at 45 (seeking the Governor’s permission to grant bounties for wolves’ heads). 
473 By-Law Against Fishing (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1677/1678), in MIDDLESEX 1673–
1678, supra note 104, at 96–97. 
474 Order re. Birth of Prince of Wales (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1688/1689), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 67. 
475 Compare Order for Courthouse (Essex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 18, 1726), in ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART 
I), supra note 250, at 29 (directing a courthouse to be built on Thomas Plumer’s land), with 
Order for Courthouse (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 16, 1727), in ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART I), supra note 
250, at 48 (directing the courthouse to be built “near [the] top of [the] [h]ill”). 
476 Order re Prison Rules (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 27, 1711), in WESTMORELAND 1709–
1712, supra note 206, at 57−58. 
477 E.g., Order re Law Books (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 21, 1685), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–1686, supra note 232, at 91–92; Order for Record Book (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1714), in RICHMOND 1714–1715, supra note 414, at 8.  On one occasion when a 
loose sheet of judgments was lost, the individuals against whom the court had issued 
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that were in force;478 providing food and lodging for the justices during 
court term;479 adopting rules concerning scheduling of jury trials480 and 
postponement of cases on account of attorney absences;481 prohibiting 
foreigners from pleading in court;482 threatening anyone appearing 
drunk in court with time in the stocks;483 and prohibiting smoking in 
court.484  Finally, they received petitions, such as one 
“unanimously . . . [and] earnestly desired” by the people requesting the 
governor to call an Assembly into session.485 
2. The Structure of Political Power 
The county courts, in theory, were creatures of the central colonial 
government.  Counties were created by statute, and judges were 
formally appointees of the Governor.  However, in practice, the county 
                                                                                                             
judgments had to return to court so that new judgments could be entered.  Summons of 
Dangerfield (Essex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1701), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 101–02. 
478 See Appointment of Mercer (King George Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 
1721–1723, supra note 127, at 36−37 (appointing John Mercer to write out all of the current laws 
for the court); cf. Adjournment of Court (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1706), in MIDDLESEX 1705–
1707, supra note 314, at 65 (postponing session of court until a copy of new enacted laws arrived 
from Williamsburg). 
479 E.g., Order to Ordinary Keeper (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1726), in SPOTSYLVANIA 
1724–1730 (PART II), supra note 165, at 24. 
480 See, e.g., Rule About Actions (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1712), in WESTMORELAND 
1712–1714, supra note 128, at 9 (requiring that jury trials be “entered and called the first of every 
succeeding [docket]”). 
481 See, e.g., Rule re Attorneys (King George Cnty. Ct., July 5, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–
1723, supra note 127, at 95 (ordering that no future cases be continued due to attorney absences 
without a sufficient excuse); see also In re. Darrell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1692), in STAFFORD 
1691–1692, supra note 184, at 117 (reporting the complainant’s request for immediate trial of the 
case so that servants summoned as witnesses could return to a frontier plantation to work and 
protect it against Native Americans). 
482 E.g., Order re Foreigners (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1666), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 30. 
483 See, e.g., Rule About Drunks in Court (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1683), in LANCASTER 
1682–1687, supra note 247, at 26 (ordering anyone coming before the court drunk be placed in 
the stocks); Queen v. Callahan (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, 
supra note 160, at 3 (ordering an attendee who is drunk in court to be placed in the stocks); cf. 
King v. Taylor (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 15, 1677), in LANCASTER 1674–1678, supra note 156, at 
75–76 (fining a justice who was drunk in court 500 lb. of tobacco); In re. Belfield (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Oct. 2, 1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, at 40 (granting a justice’s 
request to deny the rumor he is drunk on the bench). 
484 E.g., Rule re “Rude and [U]ncivilized Custom of Sm[ok]ing in Court” (Rappahannock 
Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1691), in in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, supra note 56, at 61. 
485 In re. the People (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 
184, at 21; see also Petition to House of Burgesses (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 9, 1700), in 
MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 31–32 (protesting an increase in the minister’s salary 
and other matters). 
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courts were largely self-perpetuating bodies, in that their sitting judges 
recommended whom the colony’s Governor should appoint to the 
bench,486 and Governors generally followed their recommendations.  On 
June 5, 1723, for example, the judges of Richmond County recommended 
to the Governor a list of men to appoint to the court, and on July 3, 1723, 
the Governor appointed each and every man on the list and no others.487  
Although Governors appointed many other local officials,488 here too 
they typically acted on the advice of the county magistrates.489 
Local oligarchies were strong, in part, because they typically acted 
with unanimity; only in rare cases did minorities “publicly and openly” 
express their “dissent,”490 whereas in the General Court publicly 
recorded dissents were frequent.491  Governors accordingly had to 
placate local oligarchies, and they did not always succeed.  In 1691, for 
instance, the presiding justice of the Stafford County Court refused to 
continue sitting after Martin Scarlet, whom the presiding justice accused 
of defaming him, had been sworn to serve on the bench.492  Also in 1691, 
                                                 
486 E.g., Recommendation of Corbin (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–
1700, supra note 314, at 32. 
487 Compare Recommendation of Justices (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1723), in RICHMOND 
1722−1724, supra note 159, at 18 (presenting a list of recommended judges to the governor), with 
Swearing of Justices (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, 
at 19 (presenting a list of sworn justices identical to the prior list of recommended justices).  A 
similar judicial appointment occurred in Westmoreland County.  Compare Recommendation of 
Justices (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 22, 1709/1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 
206, at 11−12 (presenting a list of recommended judges to the President), with Swearing of 
Justices (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., May 31, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206, 
at 16 (reporting the oath taken by those recommended), and Swearing of Justices 
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206, at 18 
(listing those appointed as justices). 
488 See, e.g., Appointment of Pope (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 
1709–1712, supra note 206, at 20–21 (reporting the appointment of a prosecutor). 
489 See, e.g., Recommendation of Barradall (King George Cnty. Ct., May 3, 1728), in KING 
GEORGE 1725–1728, supra note 126, at 79 (recommending Barradall to serve as the King’s 
Attorney General); Recommendation of Baker (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 3, 1699/1700), in 
RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 3 (recommending Baker to serve as coroner).  The 
power of local courts to recommend appointees rested on legislation.  See Recommendation of 
Stoner (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1728/1729), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, 
at 83 (referring to an Act of Assembly that determined the method of appointing a sheriff). 
490 In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, 
at 65.  Compare West v. Rabyshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1713), in 15 Northampton 
1710–1717, supra note 225, at 96 (delaying the decision because of a 2-2 vote), with West v. 
Rabyshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., June 16, 1713), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 
225, at 97 (reaching a decision with a “fuller court” and with no dissent noted). 
491 E.g., Blackwell v. Wilkinson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1768), in JEFFERSON, supra note 181, at 73, 
85; Rogers v. Spalden (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1739), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at 
B80–81. 
492 Compare Swearing of Scarlet (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, 
supra note 184, at 21 (reporting Martin Scarlet’s sworn oath), with In re. Fitzhugh (Stafford Cnty. 
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in the same county, William Buckner refused to take the oaths required 
by Parliament to William III since he previously took oaths to James II 
and did not “in his conscience think himself fairly discharged from the 
said oaths in the life of King James,”493 while in the same year in 
Rapphannock County, a man appointed as sheriff likewise refused to 
take Parliament’s oaths.494  Loyalty to the monarchy established in the 
Glorious Revolution was a treasonous matter in the reign of William III, 
but Governors could do nothing about conduct bordering on treason 
beyond excusing locally important men from public service and 
weakening that service as a result. 
Perhaps the greatest reason for the strength of county courts by mid-
century was that the Governor, the Council, and the General Court 
became overworked.  As Virginia expanded westward into the Piedmont 
and its population grew, the General Court had more work than it could 
process in its few brief sessions over the course of any year.  In addition, 
distances between Williamsburg and outlying counties became too great 
for many litigants to bother bringing cases to the General Court. They 
turned instead to county courts and accepted what those courts 
decided.495 
3. The Structure of Legal Knowledge. 
The expanding common-law, equitable, criminal, and regulatory 
jurisdiction of Virginia’s county courts nonetheless fails to capture fully 
the power that those courts accumulated in the aftermath of Bacon’s 
Rebellion.  Their power depended to some significant degree on the 
structure of legal knowledge in Virginia, which was quite different from 
what it was in most other colonies. 
In New York and Pennsylvania, for example, most men who were 
learned in the law lived and were educated in the colonial capital and 
practiced both before local courts and their colony’s Supreme Court.496  
                                                                                                             
Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 21−23 (reporting the justice’s 
refusal to take the bench until his name had been cleared). 
493 Refusal of Buckner (Stafford Cnty Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 
184, at 28; cf. Refusal of Gregge (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra 
note 184, at 28 (reporting Gregge’s refusal to take an oath required by Parliament to the 
governor because he had given the governor “some reasons why he refused the same and 
further alleged that his honour [sic] did not then seem to be very well satisfied with his 
reasons”). 
494 Comm’n of Travers (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 60. 
495 See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 213. 
496 See 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA:  THE MIDDLE 
COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS, 1660–1730, at 57–58, 106–07 (2013). 
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These lawyers travelled out from the colonial metropolis and transmitted 
knowledge back and forth between the capital and outlying counties.497  
Virginia, in contrast, sent more of its sons to study law in the Inns of 
Court than did any other North American colony—over sixty in all.498  
However, most of these men did not return to Virginia to practice law; 
instead, they came home to manage their estates and fortunes.499  As 
wealthy men of their counties, they then served on county courts.500 
Edmund Scarborough, a county judge in Northampton County who 
had been trained at the Inns of Court, is an early example.  What is 
interesting is how Scarborough wrote several opinions in the early 1660s 
reflecting rule-of-law and common-law values that he probably had 
learned in England.  In one case, for example, he directed litigants to 
produce evidence that “may have such light as to guide us in the way of 
justice, which to do is the care & duty of the court,”501 while in another 
he sought to reassure multiple creditors having claims against an estate 
that the court would “assure all effectual Justice” and would not be 
“more indulgent to one than the other in respect of priority.”502  
Scarborough’s views came together most clearly in a third case, Foxcroft 
v. Gething.503  As always, Scarborough was “zealous to do justice”—this 
time in connection with disposition of property under a will, for which 
he sought “the best construction of the donor’s intent.”504  The task, he 
recognized, was not easy.  In words that would echo repeatedly in the 
centuries to come, he declared that law required “great study & much 
knowledge” and that he “could never read” or “determine [it] without 
contradiction:  Sometimes the questions of right & wrong call in for their 
support statute law[,] precedents[,] equity[,] and when those lie not in a 
direct line to serve the occasion analogy must come in.”505  
                                                 
497 Id. 
498 See E. ALFRED JONES, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT, xii–xxx (1924) (listing 
members of the Inns of Court and the states from which they came). 
499 See, e.g., id. at 35, 41, 53, 96 (discussing the careers of William Byrd, Robert Carter, Gawen 
Corbin, and Benjamin Harrison). 
500 See, e.g., id. at 20, 42 (discussing the careers of Robert Beverley and Wilson Cary). 
501 Boys v. Webb (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1662/1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 287–88.  Judge Scarborough also wrote opinions in two other 
relevant cases.  See Allen v. Bucknor (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1662/1663), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 287; Alexander v. Estate of Bucknor (Northampton 
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1662/1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 286–87. 
502 Alexander v. Estate of Bucknor (Northampton County Ct., Mar. 2, 1662/1663), in 8 
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 286–87. 
503 (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 28, 1662/1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 
34, at 276–80. 
504 Id. at 279. 
505 Id. at 277. 
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“Reason . . . dictated this discourse,”506 although he also took the step “of 
writing what I speak that this may stand for affidavit to posterity . . . for 
whose sake I count myself chiefly obliged to vindicate truth & justice, 
which must prevail or the walls perish.”507 
As a judicial author, Edmund Scarborough was no Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.  Nonetheless, his opinion in Foxcroft conjoined all the central 
elements of common-law thinking—justice, precedent, and analogy—
along with the importance of producing written opinions to guide judges 
and litigants in the future.  Foxcroft thereby shows how post-restoration 
Virginia judges were committed to ascertaining, enunciating, and 
governing under law, in general, and Virginia’s version of the common 
law, in particular. 
Career patterns such as Scarborough’s made the structure of legal 
authority in Virginia very different from what it was elsewhere.  In New 
York and Pennsylvania, for example, trained lawyers aware of the work 
product of their colony’s highest court brought their legal knowledge to 
bear on local judges who were not trained in the law.508  In Virginia, on 
the other hand, county benches might contain men learned in the law 
who possessed independent knowledge of what the law required.509  
Thus, in New York and Pennsylvania, it appears that lawyers taught law 
to local courts, whereas in Virginia it appears that county courts had 
sufficient confidence to determine the law by themselves. 
The early Virginia bar, in short, was weak compared to local courts.  
In a colony like Pennsylvania, the bar served as the glue holding the 
legal system together, as most lawyers practiced both in local and 
colony-wide courts and thereby kept judges informed of what their 
colleagues in other courts were doing.510  In Virginia, in contrast, lawyers 
who practiced in the General Court were not permitted to practice in 
county courts and vice-versa,511 whereas county court lawyers tended to 
practice only in their own county and immediately adjacent ones.512  
County courts determined who could practice law before them, and 
                                                 
506 Id. at 279. 
507 Id. at 276.  For a later brief opinion by another judge construing an article of a will, see In 
re. Tankard (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 31, 1671), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674, supra note 
7, at 307–08. 
508 See 2 NELSON, supra note 496, at 57–58 (describing New York lawyers’ legal 
sophistication). 
509 See id. at 58 (describing the variances in Chesapeake area colonies’ laws versus those 
in New York). 
510 See id. at 107 (describing Pennsylvania’s bar system). 
511 See 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 140, 143 (requiring General Court attorneys apply for 
county licenses and vice-versa, while restricing attorneys to one license at a time). 
512 See FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON:  LAWYER 1 (1986) (noting that county lawyers 
would generally practice on a circuit of several adjacent counties). 
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efforts to give the Governor control even of initial admissions to local 
bars appear to have failed, at least in the late seventeenth century.513  
Moreover, especially in early eighteenth-century Virginia, many 
attorneys were comparatively insignificant men—one man on whom 
there is data, for example, kept an ordinary in addition to engaging in 
some practice of law.514 
County courts also admitted and disciplined lawyers and thereby 
determined how they could practice.515  In one case, for example, a court 
imprisoned a lawyer who refused to ask leave of the court whether the 
questions he proposed to ask witnesses might be asked of them, 
declaring “he would ask what questions he pleased.”516  Local courts also 
determined issues such as the liability of lawyers for clerk’s fees in the 
cases they filed,517 and whether, on the basis of the court’s view of the 
                                                 
513 See Barnes v. Conway (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 19, 1684), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 42 (refusing to enforce Laws of 1680, Act VI, which required 
attorneys to obtain a license from the governor); cf. In re. Taverner (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 8, 
1687), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra note 186, at 1 (permitting a lawyer “to plead to such 
business as [he] formerly entertained” despite his lack of license required by the governor’s 
proclamation).  But see Slaughter v. Waters (Rapphannnock Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1686), in 
RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra note 101, at 51 (entering an information against Waters for 
pleading without a license from the governor). 
514 See Order re Laton (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 22, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra 
note 445, at 82 (granting Laton a license to keep an ordinary); Merit v. Mayfield (Essex Cnty. 
Ct., Feb. 17, 1724/1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 40 (identifying Laton as 
“Attorney” who confessed judgment on behalf of defendant); see also Fisher v. Brown (Essex 
Cnty. Ct., Sept. 16, 1724), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 13 (outlining a case 
in which Laton confessed judgment on behalf of defendant). 
515 See License of Harris (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1684), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 36 (granting an attorney’s license where licensure could not be 
obtained without court approval); cf. Churchill v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1702/03), 
in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 203, at 17–18 (granting judgment for the defendant in a suit 
against the county justice for appearing in violation of a statute as a lawyer in a case pending 
before the court).  Compare Carnegie v. Davies (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 30, 1708), in 
WESTMORELAND 1707–1709, supra note 130, at 32–33 (recording a motion that Eskridge, a 
member of the court, should not plead before the court as an attorney), with Excuse of Eskridge 
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1716), in WESTMORELAND 1714−1716, supra note 138, at 64 
(reporting refusal by the practitioner at bar to serve on the bench). 
516 Imprisonment of Prosser (Goochland County Ct., Aug. 18, 1730), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 
1728–1731, supra note 183, at 258–59.  While in jail, he also refused to turn over the declaration 
that had been returned to him in the case he was litigating, apparently on the ground that 
prisoners had no duty to provide material to courts.  Id. at 259.  Ultimately, Prosser made peace 
with the court and was permitted to continue practicing.  See In re. Prosser (Goochland Cnty. 
Ct., 1730), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 283. 
517 See, e.g., Colston v. Davis (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1699), in RICHMOND 1697–1699, 
supra note 364, at 125–26 (holding lawyers liable for clerks’ fees). 
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strength of the evidence, attorney’s fees should be awarded to plaintiffs 
in assault cases.518 
In the end, then, no one from outside the county judiciary controlled 
the county courts.  Early eighteenth-century Virginia was not governed 
by a rule of law administered by professional lawyers.519  Governors and 
appellate judges likewise were not in control.  Power was exercised by 
local elites, who often possessed some training in the law and who ruled 
as they thought best.  Their power, of course, was not absolute.  They 
always had to take other institutional players into account and often had 
to seek their cooperation.  However, the self-perpetuating oligarchy that 
sat on the county bench very much remained at the center of colonial 
Virginia’s legal and political system.520 
Rhys Isaac has described the place of county courts in the Virginia 
legal order of the first half of the eighteenth century.  His description 
bears quotation at length: 
At the county level the commissioning of squire justices, 
unsupervised by assizes of learned judges, encouraged 
the “determining of every thing by the Standard of 
Equity and good Conscience,” as Robert Beverley 
described procedures.  Beverley took pride in the way 
Virginia courts spurned “the impertinences of Form and 
Nicety.”  Colonel Landon Carter thought that issues 
should be decided rather by ‘Good reason and Justice’ 
than by “Precedents” and sneered at the “Mechanical 
knowledge” of attorneys.  In this the colonel . . . was 
setting his face against the strict, literal application of 
what was to be found in law books and asserting a 
substantial role for the common sense of men of 
affairs . . . .521 
Another scholar of colonial Virginia law agrees.  As Peter Hoffer has 
observed, the county courts “did not fear or compete with a professional 
judicial cadre” sitting on a central court.522  “The highest court in the 
colony was not composed of professional judges, as in some of the other 
                                                 
518 See, e.g., Morris v. Taylor (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1733), in RICHMOND 1732–1734, 
supra note 326, at 52 (awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees). 
519 See A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS:  CREATORS OF 
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680−1810, at 53 (1981) (explaining how a possibly able bar in late 
seventeenth-century Virginia did not survive into the eighteenth century). 
520 PAGAN, supra note 5, at 58. 
521 ISAAC, supra note 172, at 134. 
522 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, supra note 198, at xix. 
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colonies and . . . in England.”523  Instead, the General Court, like the 
county courts, was composed of “experienced planter-lawyers rather 
than full-time judges.  The county bench did not function in the shadow 
of more learned and respected central courts, but labored alongside them 
in a two-track system,” 524 and judicial decisions “did not reflect hard 
and fast rules,” but judicial efforts “to make practical, not fine, 
distinctions.”525  Similarly, in Isaac’s view, “it was very much the 
gentleman’s sense of right, rather than the technical interpretation of 
texts, that prevailed” in localities.526 
Both Isaac and Hoffer overstate somewhat the informality of county 
courts, which were more observant of legal norms than either concedes.  
Thus, there were instances of citation of General Court precedent both in 
the General Court itself and in a county court.527  However, Isaac and 
Hoffer are absolutely correct that county judges did not function in the 
shadow of the General Court.  Local magistrates knew as much law as 
anyone in Virginia and accordingly felt free to depart from technical 
rules when equity and practical good sense so required. 
4. The Independence of County Courts 
As time went on, the county courts thus felt increasingly free to 
ignore the law laid down by the General Court.  The 1731 case of Waugh 
v. Bagg528 and later county court cases on the same issue illustrate this 
point.  Waugh v. Bagg addressed an important issue:  whether a county 
court possessed power to set aside a jury verdict awarding excessive 
damages and to grant a new trial.529  The General Court ruled that it did 
not, reversed the county court judgment, and thereby reinstated the jury 
verdict.530  Nonetheless, county courts continued to grant new trials 
when juries returned verdicts awarding either excessive531 or insufficient 
                                                 
523 Id. 
524 Id. 
525 Id. at xxix. 
526 ISAAC, supra note 172, at 134. 
527 See, e.g., Reeves v. Waller (Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B34 
(using its own precedent to interpret a statute); Stocker v. Bisse (Charles City Cnty. Ct. Feb. 3, 
1689), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 73–74 (using a five-year-old General Court 
case to determine the issue at present). 
528 Waugh v. Bagg (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1731), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at 
R61, R77–78. 
529 Id. 
530 Id. at R78. 
531 E.g., Ashmore v. Scott (Prince William Cnty. Ct., July 7, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1761−1762, at 106–07 (Ruth 
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter PRINCE WILLIAM 1761−1762]. 
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damages.532  Perhaps Waugh v. Bagg was distinguishable on its facts from 
the subsequent lower court cases; perhaps the lower courts did not even 
know that Waugh v. Bagg had been decided.  Unfortunately, the 
destruction of most General Court records and the scantiness and 
imprecision of the records that have been preserved make it impossible 
to be certain.  However, it seems that county court judges regarded 
General Court decisions merely as suggestions for how to think about 
issues rather than as fixed rules they were bound to follow. 
Reeves v. Waller533 and later lower court decisions provide another 
example.  Legislation enacted in 1715 had provided that suits for the 
recovery of debts under £5 be commenced by petition and tried by the 
court rather than commenced by writ and tried by jury.  Thus, when 
Reeves brought suit by writ and won a forty shilling verdict, a county 
court set the verdict aside and ordered him to pay costs.534  Reeves then 
brought a writ of error in the General Court, which, although inclined at 
first to deny the writ, ultimately granted it.535  Nonetheless, subsequent 
county courts, apparently seeking to clear their dockets by forcing 
plaintiffs to bring small debt claims under the simpler petition 
procedure, ignored the Reeves result.536 
At times, county courts even ignored mandates of central authorities 
in specific cases.  In theory, county courts were under the control of the 
General Court, consisting of the Governor and Council, in the sense that 
county court decisions were subject to appeal.  Appeals were, in fact, 
frequently taken from county courts,537 and the county courts routinely 
                                                 
532 See, e.g., Brown v. Hackett (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1773), in CAROLINE 1773–1774, 
supra note 331, at 55–56 (granting a new trial when damages were too small); Lenox & Scott v. 
Davis (Culpeper Cnty. Ct. July 22, 1763), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK 
CULPEPER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1763−1764, at 71 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter CULPEPER 1763–1764] (granting a new trial after the jury  returned the same verdict 
twice, which the court found contrary to the evidence); cf. Pulliam v. Turner (Spotsylvania 
Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1739), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 62 (finding “damage 
should be entered double” and therefore doubling the jury’s verdict). 
533 (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B34. 
534 Reeves v. Waller (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH V. BARRADALL, supra note 
144, at B34. 
535 Id. 
536 See infra notes 537–52 and accompanying text (demonstrating that county courts, although 
an inferior court, did not always obey mandates and rules of the General Court). 
537 E.g., North v. White (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 10−11; cf. Hughlett v. Howson (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 19, 
1700), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 27, 29 (referring a case in which the 
county court justices divided equally to the General Court).  In some cases, courts denied 
appeals prior to final judgment.  See, e.g., In re. Hambleton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1690), in 
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 137–38 (finding an interlocutory appeal to 
the General Court did not lie); see also Nichol v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1731), 
in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 74–75 (denying an appeal on the ground that the 
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obeyed the mandates rendered on appeal.538  As a general rule, “an 
inferior court [could] not hold plea or take cognizance of” a matter which 
“the General Court ha[d] adjudged,”539 and, even if not totally bereft of 
jurisdiction, a county court possessed only what limited jurisdiction the 
General Court delegated to it.540 
But the general rule was not always followed, and the General Court 
did not successfully enforce every judgment.  When one defendant, for 
example, moved to arrest judgment on a plaintiff’s verdict on the ground 
that the General Court had assumed jurisdiction over the case, which 
“therefore [ought] not to be judged of by an Inferior Court,” a county 
court denied the motion.541  In another case, a county court declined to 
appoint an administrator for an estate as the Governor had directed it to 
do.542  Similarly, the judges of another county refused to obey an order 
from the Governor to cease building a new courthouse on the grounds 
that they had already purchased materials and that their time in the old 
courthouse was about to expire.543  On yet another occasion, a county 
                                                                                                             
losing litigant had no “legal proof”); Bronaugh v. Field (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 1, 1730), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 6 (denying an appeal as untimely).  A litigant who 
failed to prosecute an appeal was liable for any damages suffered by the appellee.  E.g., Brent v. 
Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 98. 
538 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Ball (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 11, 1729/1730), in LANCASTER 1729–
1732, supra note 126, at 8 (enforcing reversal by the General Court); Spotswood v. Harrison 
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1731), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 74–75 
(receiving an order of the General Court reversing the verdict of the county court and granting 
a new trial); In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 16, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra 
note 184, at 62 (obeying a mandate of the General Court to adjudicate the case); Gibson v. 
Younge (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 57 
(reporting a finding by the General Court that the defendant had “very litigiously made his 
appeal” with “little reason” and direction to the county court to give “a definitive judgment of 
all matters depending without further benefit of appeal”); cf. Dwight v. Wormeley (Middlesex 
Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1689), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 82 (obeying an order of the 
Governor that no counselor may be sued except by summons under hand of the Governor); 
Geldinge v. Dixon (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 29, 1675), microformed on 00327495162125 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (submitting a statement of facts, on orders of the House of 
Burgesses, for legal decision by the legislature). 
539 Morris v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1695/96), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra 
note 144, at 5–6. 
540 See, e.g., Smoot’s Petition (Richmond Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1702), in RICHMOND 1702–1704, 
supra note 261, at 5 (obeying an order to find facts on the claim that a sheriff had assaulted the 
petitioner’s wife). 
541 Grymes v. Beverley (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 6, 1706/1707), in MIDDLESEX 1705–1707, 
supra note 314, at 83. 
542 Letter of Gooch (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART 
III), supra note 127, at 45. 
543 Opinion re Courthouse (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 6, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, 
supra note 203, at 83–84.  Apparently, there previously had been doubt whether the court was 
complying with earlier rulings when it proceeded with the construction.  Order re Courthouse 
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 203, at 75–76. 
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court declined to determine, as a letter from the Governor had directed, 
whether a Native American was properly held as a servant and sent the 
case back to the General Court,544  while, in a fifth case, a lower court 
reissued a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, even though the defendant 
had appealed to the General Court and the case apparently was pending 
there on appeal.545 
Some county courts relied on technicalities to avoid enforcing 
General Court orders.  Thus, one court declined to obey an order 
reversing a county court chancery decree on the ground that the 
appellant had failed to prosecute the order of the appellate court in a 
timely fashion.546   In another case in which the General Court had 
directed a defendant to submit an answer and the defendant refused, 
claiming the order of the General Court was “out of date,” the county 
court agreed that the defendant need not answer.547 
The spirit of independence displayed by county courts emerged with 
special clarity in Colsworthy v. Smith,548 in which the General Court had 
enjoined Colsworthy and his agents and attorneys from proceeding on 
any suit at common law against Smith in the Essex County Court.  The 
county court’s response was that the order to Colsworthy was “no 
prohibition to them to hear the said cause” if Colsworthy brought it 
forward to trial, which he did.549  Ultimately, however, the parties agreed 
to submit the case to referees.550  Later, when issues emerged in regard to 
the referees and the defendant sought to stop proceedings by relying on 
his injunction, the county court continued to persist in its view that it 
need “not take notice of the [i]njunction.”551 
In short, when county courts presented a united front to outsiders, as 
they usually did, they possessed considerable freedom to render 
whatever judgments they wished.  They did not need to follow legal 
                                                 
544 Letter of Governor (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1683–1685, supra note 159, at 72. 
545 Maddocks v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 
158, at 86. 
546 Belfield v. Port (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 6, 1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra note 
257, at 72–73.  The earlier litigation was Port v. Belfield.  (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 3, 
1708/1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra note 257, at 38–39; (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 
1708/1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra note 257, at 37–38. 
547 Gwyn v. Thomas (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 7. 
548 (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 18, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 71; 
(Essex Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 59. 
549 Colsworthy v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), 
supra note 445, at 59. 
550 Id. 
551 Colsworthy v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 18, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), 
supra note 445, at 71. 
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doctrines elaborated and enforced by appellate courts.  Despite 
Virginia’s outward reception of common-law forms, law in the county 
courts ultimately rested on the common sense of local judges as well as 
on formal rules imposed from above.  Everything effectively reinforced 
the power of local gentry.  As Rhys Isaac has concluded, “[a]ll the 
different forms of gentry domination were subtly concentrated and 
institutionalized in the system of local government,” where “county 
courts and parish vestries” worked together to ensure “the rightful rule 
of those whom . . . property, family, and learning set above the common 
folk.”552 
IV.  THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LAW 
The concentration of power in the local gentry determined, in turn, 
the substance of mid-eighteenth-century Virginia law.  Central political 
authorities did not, because they could not, determine the law.  
Whatever power they possessed, as we shall see, resulted from their 
employment of carrots rather than their use of sticks—from bargains 
they made rather than obedience they coerced.  Local gentlemen, as well, 
were not completely free to control the law; foundational market forces 
limited what they could do. 
The foundation for everything in colonial Virginia was tobacco.  As I 
have urged elsewhere, people migrated to Virginia in the early 
seventeenth century to get rich, and cultivating tobacco proved to be the 
way for some of them to do so.553  Growing tobacco, in turn, required 
three factors—capital, land, and labor—and law became the means by 
which those who got rich kept the three factors under control.554  
First, this section discusses the basic monetary and debt system of 
colonial Virginia.555  Second, it discusses real property law in colonial 
Virginia.556  Third, it details Virginia’s slavery laws.557  Finally, the 
section discusses how slavery fit into the colony’s general social order.558 
                                                 
552 ISAAC, supra note 172, at 133. 
553 See 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA:  THE CHESAPEAKE 
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660, at 7 (2008) (explaining that historians agree that “Virginia was 
founded primarily for economic profit”). 
554 See id. at 23–24 (discussing the history of tobacco cultivation in Virginia). 
555 See infra Part IV.A (discussing Virginia’s capital and debt laws). 
556 See infra Part IV.B (discussing Virginian laws concerning land). 
557 See infra Part IV.C (discussing Virginian law regarding slavery). 
558 See infra Part IV.D (examining the role of slavery law within Virginia’s social order). 
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A. Capital and Debt 
It had become clear by the 1660s that Virginia’s prosperity and place 
of preeminence among Britain’s North American colonies depended 
upon the production and marketing of tobacco, which produced 
substantial tax revenue for the crown and huge profits for British 
merchants.559  In good years, when the amount of tobacco produced 
equaled the market’s demand at a price at which planters could earn a 
profit and were also able to obtain capital to expand their production 
and buy luxury goods with which to celebrate their success.560  As a 
result, by the close of the seventeenth century Virginia was tied tightly 
into a complex, North Atlantic commercial economy. 
All sorts of commercial disputes arose in this economy.  Suits by 
mariners for wages were frequent,561 as were suits on construction 
contracts562 and suretyship agreements.563  Other common cases raised 
the issue of who bore the risk of loss.  In one case, for example, the king’s 
searchers seized a servant, who was being transported to Virginia at a 
Virginian’s request, in England as his vessel was about to leave.564  The 
court ordered the ship captain to return to the Virginian the fare he had 
paid for the servant’s transportation.565  In another case, in which a 
doctor leased a plantation with a dwelling house that burned down 
during the course of the lease, the issue was whether a covenant in the 
lease requiring the doctor to return the house in “good & tenantable” 
condition required him to rebuild.566  Other cases presented 
miscellaneous issues, such as one in which a court ruled that a buyer 
need not pay for tobacco delivered to him by contract until the seller 
delivered the entire contract amount,567 and another in which a 
                                                 
559 Gary M. Pecquet, British Mercantilism and Crop Controls in the Tobacco Colonies:  A Study 
of Rent-Seeking Costs, 22 CATO J. 467, 469–70 (2003). 
560 See id. at 470–72 (explaining the nature of the colonial tobacco market). 
561 E.g., Parker v. Foxall (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1685/1686), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1685–1687, supra note 101, at 33. 
562 E.g., Rice v. Pavey (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, 
supra note 159, at 53. 
563 See, e.g., Batty v. Bradley (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1694), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, 
supra note 105, at 193, 195 (ordering the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff for a payment on 
which defendant was surety). 
564 Chilton v. Wilson (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 12, 1678/1679), in LANCASTER 1678–1681, 
supra note 144, at 19. 
565 Id. 
566 Barber v. Clarke (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, 
supra note 101, at 90.  The court held that the covenant did not require him to rebuild.  Id. 
567 Compare Hawkins v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 19, 1718/1719), in ESSEX 1716–1723 
(PART II), supra note 418, at 51 (reporting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff refused to deliver 
the tobacco contracted for until the defendant had paid for the entire amount), with Hawkins v. 
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consignee of goods who failed to receive orders from the owners sought 
permission to dispose of them.568 
However, in addition to the good years that produced significant 
litigation, there also were bad years, and those years ultimately led to 
even more lawsuits.  In some bad years, conditions such as drought 
destroyed the crops of some planters, who had little choice but to borrow 
money and fall into debt.569  Other years saw overproduction of tobacco 
and consequent low prices at which almost no planter could break 
even.570  Almost everyone then had to borrow money, and nearly 
everyone fell into debt.571  Because everyone understood that no one 
could borrow unless creditors could be reasonably confident they would 
be repaid, facilitating the collection of debts soon became a staple of the 
Virginia legal system.572  It remained such throughout the colonial 
period. 
Although precise statistical analysis remains impossible due to the 
incompleteness and sloppiness of surviving court records, perusal of the 
extant records quickly shows that collection of debts remained 
numerically the most important category of judicial jurisdiction in the 
aftermath of the Restoration.573  In the early years, debt collection could 
be a remarkably informal process, as in one case in which the court 
authorized the creditor to retain the debtor’s steer, already in the 
creditor’s possession, in full satisfaction of the debt.574  In a second case, 
the court held the amount of corn that a debtor had consumed could not 
be “certainly proved or known” and gave judgment on the basis of a 
calculated guess.575  In a third situation, a debtor entered a plea that the 
giving of a mortgage constituted full satisfaction in payment of a bond 
                                                                                                             
Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 16, 1719), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART II), supra note 418, at 72 
(granting judgment for the defendant). 
568 In re. Corbin (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1694), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, supra note 193, 
at 3. 
569 See Pecquet, supra note 559, at 470. 
570 See id. at 470–71 (reporting a situation in 1681 where planters overstocked the tobacco 
market). 
571 BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, A PLANTER’S REPUBLIC:  THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC 
INDEPENDENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 23 (1996) (noting Virginia’s large amount of 
debt compared to other colonies). 
572 See 1 NELSON, supra note 553, at 44–47 (providing a summary of the development of debt 
collection in Virginia). 
573 Id. at 45. 
574 Donding v. Porter (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1664), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, 
supra note 127, at 3. 
575 Jackson v. Wright (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, 
supra note 101, at 13–14. 
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for a large sum of money, although the court rejected the plea.576  In a 
fourth case, a debtor petitioned successfully that all executions against 
his estate be suspended on the ground that he had no assets to pay 
them.577 
However, there never was a serious doubt that those who delivered 
goods were entitled to payment, even in the absence of an express 
promise to pay,578 and with increased caseloads, courts developed 
routinized and detailed procedures and processes, often favorable to 
creditors, which enabled them to collect.  In one case, for example, 
“where [a] debtor remain[ed] in prison,” a court ruled that “his estate 
may be taken;”579 while in another case an “attachment . . . according to 
law [was] granted” when an arrest warrant was returned “non est 
inventus.”580  A third creditor received an attachment against the estate 
of a debtor who had left the county,581 while other cases allowed 
recovery against individuals who helped debtors escape to or secret their 
property in another county beyond the jurisdiction of the court.582  Cases 
                                                 
576 Compare Beverley v. Prescott (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1684), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, 
supra note 184, at 69–70 (holding the mortgage did not constitute full satisfaction for the bond), 
with Beverley v. Prescott (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1687/1688), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, 
supra note 312, at 45–46 (ordering the defendant to pay the bond amount). 
577 In re. Michaell (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1676), in 10 NORTHAMPTON 1674–1678, 
supra note 125, at 134. 
578 Compare Gibson v. Hughes (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1749), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 5–6 (reporting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff’s account 
book did not contain any debts owed by the defendant), with Gibson v. Hughes (Spotsylvania 
Cnty. Ct., July 5, 1749), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 16 (holding that 
the defendant, who received goods from a merchant, was liable to the third party plaintiff who 
paid for them, even in the absence of a promise to reimburse the third party); compare Smith v. 
Russell (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 5, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART IV), supra note 
186, at 20 (reporting the jury’s finding that defendant failed to return a horse lent to him by the 
plaintiff), with Smith v. Russell (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART IV), supra note 186, at 29 (holding that the defendant was obligated to return the 
horse even in the absence of an express promise to return it). 
579 Declaration of Sept. 21, 1668 (Va. Gen. Ct.), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at  
510–11. 
580 Suit Against Estate of Phillip Lymby (Charles City County Ct., Feb. 1672/1673),  13 VA. 
COLONIAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 78. 
581 Derrick v. Jones (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 14 & 15, 1665/1666), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 
1689–1690, supra note 127, at 20; cf. Gibson v. Smith (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 10, 1706), in 
LANCASTER 1703–1706, supra note 238, at 101–02 (holding that attachment lies against property 
of a nonresident debtor located within the county).  But see In re. Willsheir (Charles City Cnty. 
Ct., Jan. 24, 1687), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 7–8 (releasing from attachment 
the property of a destitute widow whose husband under suit had absconded from the county). 
582 E.g., Curtis v. Conner (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1735), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1734–1735, at 84 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1734–1735]; Peake v. Merriott (Stafford Cnty. Ct., 
Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 59. 
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dealing with different issues of attachment also established rules of 
priority among creditors seeking payment out of the same assets.583 
Perhaps the most important pro-creditor rule, which remained in 
place from the past, was that, once a sheriff had served process on a 
debtor by arrest, the sheriff became liable for any judgment against the 
debtor, if—as occurred with some frequency—the debtor or his or her 
bail failed to appear in court.584  Similarly, if a sheriff attached personal 
property of a debtor, whoever possessed that property became liable for 
any judgment.585  Another important pro-creditor rule allowed debtors 
to appoint attorneys to represent them and come into court and confess 
judgment;586 this occurred in one seventeenth-century case for 400,000 lb. 
                                                 
583 See Green v. Buckner (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 12, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 
158, at 105 (dismissing the action where the debt had been paid several years earlier); Cooper v. 
Redman’s Adm’r (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1717), in WESTMORELAND 1716–1718, supra 
note 212, at 65–66 (holding the plaintiff’s action in debt took priority over a third party’s 
claims).  Compare Fardo v. Eyles (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1692), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, 
supra note 184, at 36 (granting judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant’s estate where 
the defendant left the county), with Harwood v. Eyles (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1692), in 
RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra note 184, at 36 (holding that the plaintiff’s debts took priority over 
all other debts owed by the defendant’s estate). 
584 E.g., Bowzer v. Price (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 10, 1674/1675), in LANCASTER 1674–1678, 
supra note 156, at 21; Johnson v. Farmer (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1733/1734), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 1–2.  If a deputy sheriff failed to properly insure a 
debtor’s appearance, the deputy was not liable.  Compare Nance v. Hill (Richmond Cnty. Ct., 
Aug. 6, 1729), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1729–1731, at 5–6 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1729–1731] 
(reporting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff’s debtor escaped while under the deputy 
supervisor’s supervision), with Nance v. Hill (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1729/1730), in 
RICHMOND 1729–1731, supra, at 23–24 (dismissing the suit against the deputy sheriff).  
However, the sheriff was liable in such situations.  E.g., Johnson v. Davis (Spotsylvania Cnty. 
Ct., Mar. 5, 1733/1734), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 11–12.  The sheriff could, 
in turn, sue the deputy and recover on the deputy's bond.  E.g., Johnson v. Davis (Spotsylvania 
Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 94.  But see Everitt v. 
Pabell (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1687), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 7, 13 
(holding the sheriff was not liable for an escape from a jail that was constructed as the law 
directs); Shapleigh v. Mathew (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 16, 1683/1684), in 
NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–1686, supra note 232, at 22–23 (holding the sheriff was not liable when 
process was never served on a debtor because the debtor was outside the jurisdiction).  Compare 
Bridges v. Chew (Orange Cnty. Ct., Mar. 26, 1748), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER 
BOOK ORGANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1747–1748, at 82–83 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 
1997) [hereinafter ORANGE 1747–1748] (reporting jury finding that the sheriff produced the 
debtor in court but later released the debtor for nonpayment of jailor’s fees), with Bridges v. 
Chew (Orange Cnty. Ct., June 23, 1748), in ORANGE 1748–1749, supra note 261, at 3 (holding the 
sheriff was not liable). 
585 E.g., Blackburne v. Symons (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1685–1687, supra note 101, at 15–16. 
586 E.g., Loxham v. Derrick (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra 
note 184, at 26. 
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of tobacco.587  Then there was the 1704 act of Parliament reversing the old 
rule that promissory notes assigned without the knowledge and consent 
of their maker could not be enforced at law by the assignee.588  There 
were also important rulings that land was subject to seizure to pay 
simple contract debts as long as a debtor’s personal estate was exhausted 
first.589  Courts would also enter judgment against an executor or 
administrator for an estate’s debts even if no estate property remained in 
his hands because courts recognized that the debtor might come upon 
such property in the future and ought to be liable to pay the debt.590  
Rules of evidence, such as the rule allowing merchants to recover debts 
simply by presenting and swearing to their ledgers, also tilted in favor of 
creditors,591 as did an act of Parliament permitting creditors residing in 
England to prove debts by affidavits sworn before the Lord Mayor of 
London.592 
There also were some pro-debtor rules.  The most important rule 
allowed debtors to pay in tobacco, “the customary pay of the country,” 
rather than in cash.593  Another allowed the release of any defendant 
imprisoned more than twenty days for a debt of less than 2000 lb. of 
tobacco,594 while a third outlawed usury.595  A fourth, grounded in 
                                                 
587 Stone v. Jones (Rapphannock Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, 
supra note 159, at 60. 
588 See Thomas v. Joanes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1686/1687), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, 
supra note 312, at 17 (dismissing an action where the defendant did not have knowledge of or 
consent to the assignment to the plaintiff).  But cf. Whetstone v. Laight (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., 
July 1, 1678), in Middlesex 1677–1680, supra note 134, at 25 (upholding assignment of a note by 
the maker and assumption of the obligation by the assignee in the presence of the payee).  The 
statute was the Promissory Note Act, 3, 4 Anne ch. 8 (1704). 
589  E.g., Farish v. Stevens (Caroline Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1773, at 74 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1994) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1773]. 
590 See, e.g., Self v. Floury (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., July 24, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra 
note 257, at 55–56 (holding the debtor was liable to pay a creditor with money the debtor 
received by inheritance). 
591  4 WILLIAM WALTER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL OF 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 327–
28 (Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1820); 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 53–55. 
592 See, e.g., Rogers v. Spalden (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1739), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra 
note 144, at B81.  In Rogers, the General Court refused to admit into evidence an affidavit sworn 
without notice to the debtor, but the plaintiff appealed that decision to the Privy Council.  Id.  
The Privy Council reversed the judgment of the General Court and granted a new trial without, 
however, ruling clearly on the admissibility of the affidavit.  JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO 
THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 382–83 (1965). 
593 Willis v. Chowning (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1686), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra 
note 312, at 11. 
594  E.g., In re. Jarman (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1733), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734, 
supra note 160, at 47–48; cf. In re. Wall (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 4, 1731, in SPOTSYLVANIA 
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eighteenth-century legislation common to the North American colonies, 
released insolvent debtors from jail if they turned over all their assets to 
be sold for the benefit of creditors.596  In fact, courts did release a large 
number of such debtors.597  However, these few concessions to debtors 
did nothing to change the reality that, to the extent debtors possessed 
assets, courts would do what they could to enable creditors to reach 
those assets for repayment of debts. 
B. Land Law 
The law of property was another subject on which Virginia adopted 
common-law rules, as modified by Virginia legislation—rules that 
persisted throughout the colonial era.  At the most basic level, courts 
protected property rights by ordering the sheriff to remove from land 
trespassers who had no claim of right to be there.598  They also enforced 
the “usual way of alienations of lands and estates in this country,” which 
was by deed and “by acknowledging . . . assignment or alienation in 
court and recording the same.”599  Finally, they made important legal 
                                                                                                             
1730–1732, supra note 383, at 31 (refusing to release the debtor from prison because his debt 
exceeded 2000 lb. of tobacco). 
595 See 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 294–95 (setting the interest rate at 6%); 6 HENING, supra 
note 142, at 101–02 (setting the interest rate at 5%). 
596 3 HENING, supra note 130, at 385–87; 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 151–52; 7 HENING, supra 
note 205, at 549; 8 HENING, supra note 465, at 326. 
597 E.g., In re. Mayfield (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 9, 1743), in CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
ORDER BOOK 1740–1746 PART TWO 1742/3–1744, at 35 (John Frederick Dorman ed., 1973) 
[hereinafter CAROLINE 1742/3–1744]; Carlyle & Dalton v. Burnett (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Mar. 22, 
1769), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 385, at 67; Chancey v. Childress (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Oct. 
27, 1747), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1747/48 AND 1766–1772, at 10–11 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
LOUISA 1747/48 & 1766–1772]; In re. Boyd (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 10, 1754), microformed 
on 00327545162130 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
598 E.g., Williams v. Harper (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 55; see also Thorpe v. Jones (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 11, 1700), in ESSEX 
1699–1702, supra note 247, at 52 (finding the defendant not guilty of trespass if he entered land 
to obtain personal property belonging to him); In re. Potter (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1681), 
in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 24 (authorizing Potter to enter another’s land to 
retrieve personal property); cf. Rider v. Hull (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 22, 1682/1683), 
in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 98–99 (placing tenant of a conditional fee in 
possession of the land with proviso that he not commit waste by cutting down more than an 
appropriate number of trees). 
599 Neale v. Shapleigh (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 29, 1675), in NORTHUMBERLAND 
1674−1677, supra note 52, at 28–29.  If a deed consisted of an indenture with multiple parts, a 
litigant relying on the deed had to present all parts thereof.  See King v. Fleming (Richmond 
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1703), in RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra note 261, at 98–99 (dismissing a suit 
where the plaintiff refused to present all parts of the indenture).  Someone who conveyed land 
to which he or she lacked good title was, of course, liable in damages on any warranties of title.  
See Rice v. Pavey (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 8, 1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, 
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policy judgments, such as one barring Lord Fairfax as proprietor of the 
Northern Neck from using the remedy of distress to collect arrearages of 
rent;600 a second implying warranties of title in deeds transferring 
land;601 a third barring judicial inquiries into the consideration received 
for a deed;602 a fourth holding that a tenant by curtesy forfeited his estate 
if he tried to convey it in fee simple;603 a fifth authorizing the taking and 
recording of depositions of elderly people “acquainted with the ancient 
bounds of . . . lands;”604 and a sixth ruling that crops growing on land 
were part of a decedent’s real rather than personal estate.605  Of course, 
courts also adjudicated boundary claims606 and resolved disputes over 
title to other sorts of property, such as slaves,607 servants,608 and other 
forms of wealth. 
The rules of property applied most frequently in court were those 
dealing with succession to land and other assets.  In the absence of a will, 
land descended under the common-law rule of primogeniture.609  That 
                                                                                                             
supra note 56, at 46–47 (ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff 1600 lb. of tobacco for 
conveying land in which he lacked good title). 
600 Newton v. Brokenburrow (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1696), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, 
supra note 151, at 115. 
601 Prosser v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1712), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS 
LAND TRIALS BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1711–1741, at 1–2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1992) [hereinafter ESSEX 1711–1741]. 
602 See Brown v. Woffendall (Richmond Cnty. Ct, June 2, 1697), in RICHMOND 1697–1699, 
supra note 364, at 2–3 (overruling the defendant’s plea that the plaintiff’s consideration was 
insufficient). 
603 Hammit v. Washington (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1708), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, 
supra note 160, at 75–76; cf. Rust v. Brent (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1705/1706), in 
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 15–17 (refusing to allow a life tenant to convey a 
fee simple). 
604 In re. Carter (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1713), in WESTMORELAND 1712–1714, supra 
note 128, at 64–65. 
605 In re. Travers’s Estate (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 97.  Title to crops was the issue of a case later argued by Thomas 
Jefferson and George Wythe in the General Court.  See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ ET AL., TH. 
JEFFERSON AND BOLLING V. BOLLING:  LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA (1997) (providing a detailed analysis of the Bolling case). 
606 See, e.g., Smith v. Briscoe (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, 
supra note 314, at 52 (ordering a surveyor to investigate the boundary line at issue in a trespass 
action). 
607 E.g., Taliaferro v. Taliaferro (Essex Cnty. Ct. Aug. 18, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), 
supra note 445, at 70. 
608 E.g., Smith v. Boughan (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Feb. 5, 1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 54. 
609 But see Estate of Moss (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1769), in LOUISA 1768–1769, supra note 
332, at 84 (ordering division of the decedant’s estate “equally among his children agreeable to 
the Act of Distribution notwithstanding any will”). 
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rule sometimes raised interesting issues, as in Salisbury v. Dennis,610 in 
which Grandpa John died seized of some 300 acres of land that his eldest 
son Richard inherited upon Grandpa’s death.  His second son Paskall 
died next, and then Richard died.611  Paskall’s only child, Mary, 
thereupon sued Grandpa’s third son, John, Jr., for the land and won.612 
In practice, however, most property owners did not observe the rule 
of primogeniture.  An owner of land or other property “might lawfully 
devise his estate to whom he thought expedient,” and the courts would 
enforce such devises.613  Many testators used wills to avoid 
primogeniture, and innumerable disputes arose over the meaning and 
validity of wills, in regard to both title to land,614 and title to other assets, 
especially slaves.615  In one case, for example, one of three devisees had 
been “unheard of and in remote parts for many years” and failed to 
appear to take his third of a devise.616  The court responded by dividing 
the land equally between the other two, subject to a bond that they give 
the missing devisee his third should he appear.617  He never did appear, 
but when his wife established upon his presumed death that she was his 
                                                 
610 (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 15, 1675/1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra 
note 52, at 61. 
611 Id. 
612 Id. 
613 Webb v. Smith (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1699), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1699–
1700, supra note 190, at 53.  Compare Curtis v. Ayres (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1725), in ESSEX 
1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 62 (reporting jury finding that the plaintiff inherited 
a “Negro girl” through her grandmother’s will), with Curtis v. Ayres (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 19, 
1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 74–75 (ordering the defendant to 
return the slave to the plaintiff).  A devise would be enforced even if it excluded a child from 
his or her equal share.  See In re. James (King George Cnty. Ct., Feb. 2, 1721/1722), in KING 
GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 30–31 (ruling it “lawful” for a father to exclude his son 
from a share under his will).  But see Smith v. Smith (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1725), in 
RICHMOND 1724–1725, supra note 184, at 63–64 (exercising chancery jurisdiction to give two 
granddaughters “a child’s part” of their grandmother’s estate). 
614 See, e.g., Elliot v. Robinson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1689), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, 
supra note 312, at 89 (determining a dispute over a child’s share of her father’s estate). 
615 See, e.g., Ball v. Fox (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1704), in LANCASTER 1703–1706, supra 
note 238, at 36 (examining a dispute over the disposition of two slaves by will).  The statement 
in the text remained true throughout the colonial period, as over one-third of the cases included 
in Jefferson’s Reports of Cases Determined in the General Court of Virginia from 1730, to 1740; and 
from 1768, to 1772 dealt with issues of inheritance and construction of wills.  See generally 
JEFFERSON, supra note 181. 
616 Will of Berry (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra 
note 101, at 13. 
617 Id. 
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“apparent heir,” she received his third of the land.618  Disputes also 
occurred about whether land and other assets had been fairly divided.619 
By far the most important practices in connection with land, 
however, were those by which virgin land was distributed by the crown.  
As shown above, a cause underlying Bacon’s Rebellion was that a small 
group of planters owned so much vacant land that indentured servants, 
upon completing their term of servitude, were unable to obtain land.  
After suppression of the rebellion, English authorities routinely 
instructed Governors to distribute land more equitably and to prevent 
the accumulation of large landholdings by a small number of wealthy 
planters.  As a result, land distribution policies became a subject of 
continuing political conflict between Governors and the Council, the 
entity of Virginia’s government most under the control of the great 
planters.  By 1710, however, when the Board of Trade omitted provisions 
about land reform from the Governor’s instructions, the great planters 
had won.  The old system in which land patents were given mainly to 
existing landholders was fully restored; grants often were made 
thereafter for tens of thousands of acres, and some even exceeded 
100,000 acres.620  A minor dispute about whether a tax could be levied for 
sealing patents also was resolved in favor of Virginians, when the Privy 
Council agreed that no official could charge a fee for attaching the 
provincial seal to patents.621 
C. The Law of Slavery 
As the previous discussion displays, Virginia’s labor force was 
transformed around the outset of the eighteenth century from one 
dependent on white indentured servants to one consisting mainly of 
black African slaves.  Economic and demographic forces predominated 
in the transformation, but law was not irrelevant in connection with 
slavery. 
                                                 
618 Will of Berry (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 6, 1686/1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, 
supra note 101, at 69–70. 
619 E.g., Marshall v. James (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–
1687, supra note 101, at 14–15.  A common problem occurred when a testator gave away more 
than he or she possessed; at that point, the court would appoint referees to distribute to every 
legatee his or her proportionate share.  E.g., Randolph v. Fetherston (Charles City Cnty., Apr. 3, 
1690), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 76, 78. 
620 See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 147, 153, 160–61, 171–72, 194–95, 209–11 (providing 
examples and explanations concerning the Privy Council’s role in land distribution).  These 
preceeding factual assertions can be located within this source. 
621 Glenn Curtis Smith, The Affair of the Pistole Fee, Virginia, 1752–55, 48 VA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 209, 213 (1940). 
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Statutes had created the category of slavery in the first place, and 
thereafter judges had to determine many legal issues involving slaves, 
such as whether a master was liable for the criminal act of his “Negro 
[w]oman.”622  Of interest here is that judges even turned to law to give 
blacks protection from the worst excesses of cruel masters.  For instance, 
they protected slaves whose masters beat them excessively.623  Also, 
courts required masters wishing to punish slaves even more severely by 
placing them in irons or by amputating body parts first to obtain judicial 
approval.624 
Perhaps the most telling difference, however, between early slavery 
law and what the law of slavery would later become was in regard to 
burdens of proof.  Unlike later law, early law did not presume that a 
person was a slave simply because he or she possessed an African 
ancestor.625  The person claiming the alleged slave had to prove the fact 
of slavery, and neither African ancestry nor possession of the alleged 
slave since the time of his or her birth sufficed as proof.626  As a result, a 
number of cases found persons of African descent to be free.627  By 
                                                 
622 Barret v. Gibson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1731), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at 
R61, R70.  The master was held not liable.  Id. at R72. 
623 E.g., Abuse of Lucy (Essex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 16, 1725/26), in ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART I), supra 
note 250, at 1. 
624 See, e.g., In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1736), in MIDDLESEX 1735–1737, supra 
note 169, at 82 (granting the master leave to castrate a runaway slave); King v. Sawney 
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 17198), in WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, supra note 169, at 19–
20 (granting the master leave to cut off Sawney’s “two great toes”).  Sawney, it appears, was a 
continual runaway.  In re. Eskridge (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1719), in 
WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, supra note 169, at 67, 69. 
625 See 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 365–66 (requiring proof that a person was a slave before 
returning that person to the owner). 
626 E.g., Loyd v. Thacker (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1697), in RICHMOND 1697–1699, supra 
note 364, at 10–11; see also 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 365–66 (stating that an owner claiming 
a runaway slave in the public realm must be able to prove his ownership of the property). 
627 E.g., In re. Jack (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Nov. 13, 1665), in 13 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS, 
supra note 93, at 53, 56; In re. Gardner (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Feb. 11, 1771), in LOUISA 1770–1772, 
supra note 151, at 33; Irvin v. Arnold (Orange Cnty. Ct., Mar. 27, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756, 
supra note 245, at 9; Roger v. Metcalfe (Richmond Cnty. Ct., May 6, 1734), RICHMOND 1734–
1735, supra note 582, at 4–5; Lewis v. Harris (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1691), in STAFFORD 
1691–1692, supra note 184, at 20; see also Gwinn v. Bugg (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1769), in JEFFERSON, 
supra note 181, at 87–89 (considering whether a child born to a “white woman” and “Negro 
man” was a free person); In re. Mingo (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1692), in CHARLES CITY 
1687–1695, supra note 105, at 130–31 (refusing to give effect to manumission granted by will by 
“taking note of the law barring [N]egroes their freedom”); In re. Parker (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., 
May 10, 1758), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK 
1757–1758, at 69–70 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1757–
1758] (revoking the sale of a mulatto child and granting custody to a couple who agreed to 
raise her).  But see Munro v. Shropshire (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1706), in 
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 43–44 (ordering the plaintiff to deliver the 
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statute, anyone who attempted to sell as a slave someone who was not a 
slave was subject to a penalty.628 
That masters and judges usually did not treat slaves cruelly and 
sometimes governed them by the rule of law did not mean, however, 
that Virginia slavery was just and humane.  It was not. However, it is 
necessary to think more precisely than many previous scholars have 
done to appreciate what made it unjust and inhumane.  The concept of 
slavery has been deployed to encompass many different sorts of master-
servant relationships, and we need to focus on Virginia’s unique form of 
slavery if we are to understand fully its injustice and inhumanity. 
Slavery, of course, is grounded upon inequality—a condition that 
would induce many nineteenth-century and later philosophers to 
condemn it.  However, inequality was a routine element of seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century life.  Slavery may have been worse in degree 
than most other unequal relationships of its time, but the inequality 
associated with it was not different in kind.  No society has ever in 
practice condemned every form of hierarchy.  Thus, we need to examine 
various factors beyond mere inequality to understand the peculiar 
injustice and inhumanity of Virginia slavery. 
Heightened cruelty is a possible factor, but there is no evidence that 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Virginia masters were especially 
cruel; Simon Legree was not among them.  Difficult working conditions 
could have the same impact; slaves on Caribbean sugar plantations, for 
example, were effectively sentenced to early death by the conditions 
under which they labored.629  Slaves in Virginia, in contrast, worked 
under the same conditions endured by white indentured servants and 
white owners of small plantations.630 
                                                                                                             
“mulatto” child to the defendant and that the child be bound to the defendant); cf. Obligation of 
Griggs (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1682), in LANCASTER 1682–1687, supra note 247, at 1 
(reporting an agreement to free “a Negro boy” after he completes twenty-one years of service); 
In re. Bowler (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Mar. 9, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS LOUISA 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK ABSTRACT 1766–1774, at 29 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio 
eds., 1999) [hereinafter LOUISA 1766–1774] (allowing slaves to bring suit for freedom in forma 
pauperis); In re. Maguire (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 2, 1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra 
note 257, at 56–57 (appointing counsel to represent an indigent servant in suit for freedom); 
William v. Neale (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 31, 1708), in WESTMORELAND 1707–1709, supra 
note 130, at 27–28 (finding that an East Indian fraudulently trapped in a native country and 
wrongfully sold as a slave was free). 
628 8 HENING, supra note 465, at 123–25. 
629 See SIDNEY W. MINTZ, THREE ANCIENT COLONIES:  CARIBBEAN THEMES AND VARIATIONS 
13–14 (2010) (noting that the number of living slaves in Jamaica and Saint Domingue 
indicated that slavery conditions were deadly). 
630 See supra text accompanying notes 125–66 (describing the treatment of white 
indentured servants compared to black slaves). 
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What made Virginia slavery particularly unjust and inhumane was 
the structure of Virginia’s economy and of the law undergirding that 
economy.  To understand why, we must return to basic facts about the 
law and economy and to analyze how the law of slavery intersected with 
them. 
Consider first the intersection of the law of slavery with the law of 
debtor and creditor.  Suppose a kindly master wanted to reward a 
faithful slave by keeping that slave’s family intact.  Could the master do 
that?  Could slaves enter into secure human relationships with each 
other and with those who owned them?  As outlined above, indentured 
servants could make and enforce contracts to serve their masters well 
and obtain early release as a reward.631  Could slaves enforce contracts 
for rewards in return for faithful service?  Were masters free to perform 
such contracts if they wished?  In general, the answer to these questions 
is no.  The law stood directly in the path of anyone treating slaves as 
human; they were merely assets that, in addition to performing labor, 
served as collateral for the payment of debts. 
The case of Hughlett v. Schreever,632 a suit by an administratrix c.t.a. 
against a defendant claiming under a decedent’s will, illustrates the 
inhumanity that the law of slavery made inevitable in Virginia.  The 
decedent had owned four slaves; his will gave these slaves to his 
subsequently deceased daughter, through whom the defendant 
Schreever, in turn, claimed.633  Perhaps the goal of the bequest was to 
keep the slaves together within the daughter’s family and thereby 
preserve ongoing human relationships.  In any event, when the daughter 
died, Schreever took possession of the slaves and kept them together.634  
The court, however, was concerned, as it had to be if Virginians were to 
continue borrowing money, about the “just rights and dues” of creditors 
and “that the debts” of the decedent “ought to be satisfied before any 
legacies.”635  Accordingly, it ordered that the administratrix be given 
possession of “the whole personal estate” of the decedent “as well 
Negroes as other his said estate of what nature or condition soever.”636  
The administratrix could then convert the slaves and other property of 
the decedent into cash or other fungible assets that creditors could accept 
                                                 
631 See cases cited supra note 142 (providing an example of such an agreement). 
632 (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 20, 1700/1701), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra 
note 130, at 54, 56–60. 
633 Id. at 56–67. 
634 Id. at 57. 
635 Id. at 57, 59. 
636 Id. at 59. 
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to satisfy debts. If she failed to do so, the slaves could be attached and 
sold by the sheriff to pay off the debts.637 
The same preference for the rights and dues of creditors and the 
satisfaction of debts applied even while debtors were alive.  Masters 
might try to treat slaves decently and kindly, but it was more important 
that they earned enough money to repay whatever debts they had 
accumulated and to keep from borrowing more.  If meeting their 
obligations meant that they had to work slaves harder, they had little 
choice.  If it meant selling a few slaves and breaking up slave families 
and communities, they had little choice.  Perhaps a slave owner who had 
a good relationship with his or her provider of capital could make 
promises for the future and thereby postpone the day of reckoning.  But 
ultimately, if planters failed to use their slave property to satisfy the 
claims of creditors, their slaves could be attached by the sheriff and sold 
at auction to pay off debts even while the original borrower remained 
alive.638 
The Virginia legislature vacillated between treating slaves as 
chattels, which would have rendered it easy for creditors to seize them 
for unpaid debts, and real estate, which made their seizure more 
difficult.  At first, in 1705, the legislature declared slaves to be real 
estate.639  However, when owners began to grant and bequeath slaves 
with less than fee simple titles and subject to remainders, which 
effectively exempted them from seizure by creditors, the legislature in 
1727 changed its mind.  It declared slaves to be chattels unless their 
owner took specified steps to annex them to a particular tract of land, in 
which event they would pass with the land subject to any limitations 
attached to the land.640  At the same time, the statute also sought to 
balance the policy of keeping slaves together on a plantation against the 
rights of creditors.  After providing that executors and administrators, in 
general, could not sell slaves, the statute declared that “to bind the 
property of slaves, so that they may not be liable to the payment of debts, 
must lessen, and in process of time, may destroy the credit of the 
country” and therefore gave executors and administrators authority to 
sell slaves to pay debts, although for no other purposes, even when 
                                                 
637 E.g., Taylor v. Estate of McCoy (Louisa Cnty. Ct., June 13, 1743), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1742–1744, at 27 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LOUISA 1742–1744]. 
638 E.g., James v. Estate of Tyler (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 86; Robinson v. Churchill (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1765), in 
FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra note 160, at 21. 
639 3 HENING, supra note 130, at 333–35. 
640 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 222–23, 225. 
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slaves had been annexed to land.641  Five years later, Parliament, in full 
agreement with the latter principle, made slaves, whatever the nature of 
property in them, liable throughout the empire to seizure for debt,642 at 
which point the Virginia legislature declared them to be chattels.643  The 
Privy Council, however, disallowed this act,644 and the 1727 law, as 
modified by Parliament’s 1732 act, thus remained in force throughout 
the colonial period.645 
It is difficult to see how the crown, British merchants, and Virginia 
planters could have prospered if the law had not made slaves subject to 
sale to pay debts.  As long as tobacco remained the main source of the 
colony's wealth, it was inevitable that planters would accumulate 
indebtedness during bad times.  It was equally inevitable that the law 
would adopt pro-creditor rules as a means of encouraging lenders to 
lend against the hope that better times would follow.  Once slaves, who 
had no bargaining power, became “the greatest part of the visible 
estates” of most planters,646 it is difficult to see how anyone could have 
avoided making them, in effect, collateral for loans.  The minute one 
understands what it means for human beings to be the collateral on 
which a system of credit and finance rests, one understands the 
perversity and ultimate inhumanity of Virginia slavery. 
Consider next the intersection of the law of property with the law of 
slavery.  Although primogeniture was the default rule for succession to 
real property, most property owners made wills that divided property, 
both real and personal, among all their children, often equally.  Even in 
the absence of significant debt, the law would force whoever 
administered an estate under such a will, in the absence of a specific, 
contrary direction from the testator or a court,647 to divide slaves among 
devisees on the basis of value rather than by reference to family or other 
                                                 
641 Id. at 225–26. 
642 See 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE FIR[S]T YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE 
SECOND 583 (London 1786) [hereinafter 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE] (setting forth An Act for the 
More Ea[s]y Recovery of Debts in His Majesty’s Plantations and Colonies in America enacted 
in 1732).  For a thorough analysis of the act and its effects on American debt and property law, 
see Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law:  Alienability and Its Limits in American 
History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 408, 408–39 (2006). 
643 5 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 432–36 
(Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1819). 
644 Id. at 432. 
645 See THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 66–71 (1996) 
(discussing the history and operation of the law in colonial Virginia). 
646 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 226. 
647 See, e.g., In re. Battaile (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1773), in CAROLINE 1773–1774, supra 
note 331, at 39–40 (ordering that slaves “be worked together” until the children who were to 
receive them under the testator’s will all reached their majority). 
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ties.648  Failure to do so to the satisfaction of the devisees would lead to 
complex litigation and subsequent judicial division of slaves.649 
Note how the law of succession, by placing this burden on executors 
and administrators, functioned much as the law of debtor and creditor 
did.  It treated slaves not as human beings but as fungible property 
capable of being translated into money. 
Even in the eighteenth-century world of inequality, it was possible 
for people in different socio-legal categories to enter into human 
relationships with each other.  Women surely were not the economic or 
legal equals of men, but eighteenth-century men and women nonetheless 
had loving relationships with each other.  Thus, we know that John 
Adams loved Abigail, and vice versa.650  Similarly, it seems clear that 
Thomas Jefferson had a decades-long, intimate relationship with a slave, 
Sally Hemings, from which Hemings derived considerable power, 
sustenance, and possibly even love.651 
Under profound conditions of inequality, Eugene Genovese tells us, 
slaves made their own world, built relationships with their masters and 
other whites, established families, and created communities.652  By 
allowing slaves to engage in such activities, their masters recognized 
them as human beings and formed human relationships with them.  
Relationships between masters and slaves were unequal, and for that 
reason one might be critical of them.  However, they were not different 
in kind from the many sorts of unequal, but nonetheless fulfilling 
                                                 
648 E.g., In re. Catlett v. Catlett (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1742/3), in CAROLINE 1742/3–
1744, supra note 597, at 3; In re. Retterford (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1728), in ESSEX 1727–1729, 
supra note 151, at 66–67; Moor v. Elliot (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 9, 1751), microformed on 
00327535162129 (Lib. of Va.); Div. of Slaves of Poythress (Prince George Cnty. Ct., July 1775), in 
PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY VIRGINIA MISCELLANY 1711–1814, at 12 (Benjamin B. Weisiger III ed., 
1986) [hereinafter PRINCE GEORGE 1711–1814]. 
649 E.g., Smith v. Griffin (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1772), in JEFFERSON, supra note 181, at 132; Marston 
v. Parrish (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1730), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at R35–36.  
Compare Wilson v. Belfield (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra 
note 159, at 31–33 (reporting jury finding that slaves devised by will to the plaintiff’s wife were 
taken to satisfy a debt to the defendant), with Wilson v. Belfield (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 2, 
1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, at 40–41 (granting judgment for the defendant).  
For a case addressing a complex legal issue, whether slaves could be entailed without being 
annexed to land, see Blackwell v. Wilkinson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1768) in JEFFERSON, supra note 
181, at 73–86. 
650 See generally MY DEAREST FRIEND:  LETTERS OF ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS (Margaret A. 
Hogan & C. James Taylor eds., 2007) [hereinafter MY DEAREST FRIEND] (exploring the 
relationship between John and Abigail Adams). 
651 See generally ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS:  AN 
AMERICAN CONTROVERSEY (1997) (detailing the relationship between Thomas Jefferson and 
Sally Hemings). 
652 See generally EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL:  THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 
(1974) (discussing the relationships that slaves created in their communities). 
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relationships that always have existed and continue to exist in the world.  
Slaves also formed invaluable, and sometimes equal, relationships with 
each other. 
However, the law—the law of property, the law of debt, and the 
patterns of indebtedness underlying it—rendered all slave relationships 
precarious.  Whatever masters may have done, the law and the 
underlying economy did not treat slaves as humans but as fungible 
property convertible into cash.653  The law said they were property—
“considered no otherwise than horses or cattle”—and the British 
merchants who lent money to Virginia planters thought of slaves as cash 
equivalents for securing their debt.654  Slaves were mere numbers that 
merchants used in an impersonal marketplace established to satisfy 
Europe’s demand for tobacco.  They were never considered as people 
capable of developing relationships either with each other or with 
whites—relationships that, however unequal, were still human. 
Whereas indentured servants could complete their terms of 
servitude and then live out human—if impoverished—lives, slaves could 
not.  Slaves’ complete lack of security—their constant vulnerability to an 
impersonal marketplace structured and supported by law that could 
deprive them at any moment of anything they created—meant that 
slaves could not hope to feel any of the emotions or enjoy any of the 
satisfactions that lie at the core of human existence.  The law and the 
economic conditions that governed it, by depriving slaves of the fruits of 
creativity, deprived them of humanity, and white Virginians were as 
powerless as blacks to modify that deprivation. 
In short, Virginia’s law of property and debt, together with the 
economic realities underlying it, were continually replicating the original 
sin of slavery.  The original sin lay in snatching people from their homes, 
their families, their communities, and all they had created, and 
depositing them in a strange world from which they could never return.  
Of course, indentured servants and other immigrants to America also 
experienced separation from home, family, and community.  But they 
had voluntarily made the decision to separate in order to build better 
lives for themselves, and, once in the new world, they could focus on 
building such lives.  Slaves could not.  If they tried, the law of slavery, 
grounded in the ownership rights of masters and creditors, sooner or 
later would destroy whatever they built.  The law, like the original slave 
trader, would snatch slaves from their homes, their families, their 
                                                 
653 See supra text accompanying notes 639–45 (discussing the treatment of slaves as real 
property and chattel). 
654 Tucker v. Sweney (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1730), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, 
at R35, R39. 
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communities, and the lives they had made and deposit them in yet 
another strange world from which they could not return.  Slaves thus 
had to live in constant fear that they would be separated from everything 
they valued, and, as a result, at least some must have given up trying to 
generate anything of value. 
D. Slavery and Social Order 
Based as it was on underpinnings of slavery, the legal order of 
Virginia functioned effectively into the mid-eighteenth century.  The 
eighteenth-century litigation process consisted of a series of inputs from 
the General Court, the county benches, and jurors in imprecise, varying 
amounts.655  Although each institution possessed a capacity to obstruct 
the others—county courts sometimes ignored General Court mandates, 
and judges and juries did not always agree—the system worked well 
when all three institutions cooperated.  It was this capacity for 
obstruction together with the need for cooperation that set the 
parameters within which the Governor and his councilors, the county 
justices, and juries had to perform their duties and exert their power.  
The Governor and other central authorities in Jamestown and 
Williamsburg needed the cooperation of the county elites that sat on the 
county courts to govern the localities effectively.  At the same time, the 
county elites needed the support of central authorities and, in particular, 
of the Governor to maintain their dominant position at home. 
The accommodation that center and periphery reached was for 
county oligarchies to support the crown’s mercantilist policies, which 
were highly profitable to British merchants and generated substantial 
revenues for the king.  In return, the Governor provided leading planters 
with what they most needed—land.  Tobacco quickly depletes the soil, 
and as land in the older, settled parts of Virginia became exhausted, the 
planters who lived there in great munificence became increasingly 
dependent on newly opened frontier lands for their income.  For some 
seventy-five years after Bacon’s Rebellion, authorities in Jamestown and 
Williamsburg accommodated the great planters more than ever, and 
                                                 
655 See supra Part II.D (discussing the roles of judges and jurors); supra Part II.E.1 (explaining 
the dichotomy of power divided between the county and General Court).  The destruction of 
the records of the General Court for the colonial period vastly complicates the task of 
determining the power of different institutions.  On the surface, for example, it appears that 
Virginia law was a good deal less uniform than the law of most colonies as counties disagreed 
with each other about the appropriate rule to follow on numerous issues.  However, that lack 
of uniformity may be a mirage:  the fact that two local courts disagree with each other may 
reflect disagreement, but it may also reflect an appellate court's intervening reversal of the first 
court’s judgment.  In the absence of the appellate court’s records or of citations thereto, a 
historian has no certain way of knowing. 
Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
860 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
nearly all new land patented east of the Blue Ridge found its way into 
wealthy planters’ hands.656  The planters, in turn, used their economic 
power in localities to keep underclasses in control.657 
V.  TOWARD REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE:   
VIRGINIA LAW AFTER THE MID-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
The Virginia legal system’s efficiency probably peaked around 1750.  
Thereafter, it entered into slow decline and finally in the mid-1770s came 
apart. 
A. The Decay of Judicial Power 
By the mid-eighteenth century, Virginia’s law had assumed the 
essential forms it would possess for the remainder of the colonial period.  
Of course, many features of that law would change in minor ways, but 
one trend was especially noteworthy.  Over the course of a quarter 
century, the power of the General Court over county courts and the 
power of judges over juries decreased marginally, while in two years—
1763 and 1774—the bargain over land on which the accommodation 
between county oligarchies and authorities in Williamsburg had rested 
broke down.  The result was that Virginia, which had been one of the 
most placid, well ordered, and reliably loyal of Britain’s North American 
colonies, became one of the most uniformly rebellious. 
The common-law forms of action remained the foundation for 
Virginia’s legal system,658 and over time that system became increasingly 
formalistic.659  Despite whatever flexibility may have existed earlier,660 it 
                                                 
656 See ISAAC, supra note 172, at 117–18 (discussing the expansion of “[g]reat houses” that 
were “monuments of family pride” in this area); accord, L. SCOTT PHILYAW, VIRGINIA’S WESTERN 
VISION:  POLITICAL AND CULTURAL EXPANSION ON AN EARLY AMERICAN FRONTIER 30–36 (2004) 
(discussing the preferential land policy that rewarded wealthy members of society with land). 
657 But see ISAAC, supra note 172, at 137 (noting that the mid-eighteenth-century role of 
Glasgow merchant houses in tobacco marketing undermined the economic power of Virginia 
elites).  The most recent analysis of the role of Scottish merchants is consistent with that of 
Isaac.  See TILLSON, supra note 173, at 154–55, 166–67 (explaining why Virginia’s wealthy 
planters lost power to the Scottish tobacco producers). 
658 See, e.g., Buckner v. Robinson (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1771), in CAROLINE 1771–1772, 
supra note 209, at 40 (recording a dower action); Taylor v. Boggess (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., June 20, 
1769), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 385, at 98 (recording a replevin action); Dempsey v. 
Shepherd (Orange Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1758), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK 
ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1757–1759, at 25 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter ORANGE 1757–1759] (recording a detinue action). 
659 Courts, however, still refused to dismiss cases for purely formalistic pleading errors.  
Compare Ramey v. Fletcher (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., July 24, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra 
note 257, at 55 (reporting the defendant’s plea that the plaintiff husband erroneously pleaded 
damage to himself and his wife rather than to himself alone), with Ramey v. Fletcher (Fauquier 
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became clear after mid-century, for example, that in suits where the 
amount in controversy was under £5, plaintiffs were required to proceed 
by petition rather than by writ,661 while cases under the value of 200 lb. 
of tobacco were within the exclusive jurisdiction of individual justices of 
the peace.662  Pleading also developed in an increasingly formalized 
fashion, as defendants continued to use proper pleas of the general issue 
in response to different writs, such as did not assume to a writ of 
assumpsit,663 not guilty to a writ of case,664 and owes nothing to a writ of 
debt.665  Parties also continued to file special pleas, such as performance, 
either total666 or partial,667 self-defense,668 the statute of limitations,669 full 
                                                                                                             
Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra note 257, at 69–70 (holding the 
defendant’s plea was not sufficient to prevent judgment for the plaintiffs). 
660 See Warren M. Billings, Pleading, Procedure, and Practice:  The Meaning of Due Process of Law 
in Seventeenth-Century Virgina, 47 J. S. HIST. 569, 582−83 (1981) (discussing the use and flexibility 
of “bill procedure” in colonial Virginia). 
661 See, e.g., Jones v. Pickett (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1762), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra 
note 144, at 106−07 (dismissing the action where the plaintiff did not proceed by petition).  For a 
judgment dismissing a suit when the jury returned a verdict under £5 because the court 
surmised the plaintiff had been evading “the Petition Law,” see Burford v. Phillips (Louisa 
Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1768), in LOUISA 1768–1769, supra note 332, at 7–8; accord Laird v. Smith 
(Botetourt Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1773), microformed on 00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of 
Utah) (dismissing a suit where the plaintiff utilized a writ to claim “more than is due him” to 
evade the petition requirement). 
662 See, e.g., Kelly v. Sims (Louisa Cnty. Ct., June 13, 1743), in LOUISA 1742–1744, supra note 
637, at 27 (dismissing a suit where the amount in controversy valued 83.5 lb. of tobacco); 
Broughton v. Duett (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1734), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra 
note 209, at 45 (dismissing a suit where the balance due was “not cognizable before the court”).  
Cases in which a plaintiff claimed £10 or more in damages could be commenced in the General 
Court even if the plaintiff ultimately recovered less than £10.  See, e.g., Tute v. Freeman (Va. 
Gen. Ct., Oct. 1736), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B52 (denying the 
defendant’s motion to overrule a judgment for £9 where the plaintiff claimed £25 in damages). 
663 E.g., Lewis v. Rootes (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., Mar. 18, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra 
note 532, at 7–8. 
664 E.g., Pinkard v. Petty (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra 
note 532, at 43. 
665 E.g., Williams v. Dobbs (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1735/1736), in MIDDLESEX 1735–
1737, supra note 169, at 69. 
666 E.g., Dillard v. Sanders (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., July 23, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra 
note 532, at 76. 
667 E.g., Davis v. Slaughter (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra 
note 532, at 41. 
668 E.g., Roach v. McKey (Louisa Cnty. Ct., June 13, 1743), in LOUISA 1742–1744, supra note 
637, at 24. 
669 E.g., Ashby v. Williams (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1763), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762–1763, at 89 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1762–1763].  Parties also sued to confirm title to land 
by adverse possession.  E.g., Buckner v. Lodowick (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1767), in 
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1765–1767, at 64–
65 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1765–1767]; see also 
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administration,670 lack of consideration,671 and usury.672  By mid-century, 
special pleading had fully developed in Virginia’s county courts.673 
At the same time, chancery practice also became formalized with the 
use, for example, of demurrers,674 depositions,675 and service of process 
by publication.676  One court, for example, dismissed a case dealing with 
distribution of an estate on demurrer when the complainant sued in his 
own name rather than in the name of his three daughters, the alleged 
heirs of the estate.677 
                                                                                                             
Harrison v. Blair (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1731), in 1 BARRADALL & RANDOLPH, supra note 308, at 
R54–55 (granting judgment based on the limitation period in force at the time of judgment 
rather than at the time of filing the plea). 
670 E.g., Nelson v. Edmondson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 25, 1750), microformed on 
00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
671 Compare Broadwater v. Connell (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Dec. 14, 1757), in LOUDOUN 1757–
1758, supra note 627, at 42 (reporting the defense of lack of consideration), with Broadwater v. 
Connell (Loudon Cnty. Ct., Apr. 12, 1758), in LOUDOUN 1757–1758, supra note 627, at 63 
(sustaining the defense on a post-verdict motion).  In the mid-eighteenth century, lack of 
consideration also appears to have constituted a good defense to a writ of debt.  E.g., Moffet v. 
Graham (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1746), microformed on 00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y 
of Utah). 
672 See, e.g., Sligh v. Broadik (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762, at 90–91 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1762] (recognizing a claim of compound interest as a 
successful defense in a post-verdict motion). 
673 See, e.g., Bowler v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1771), in CAROLINE 1771–1772, supra 
note 209, at 60 (granting the defendant leave to wave a former plea and file a new special plea); 
Pettitt v. Burton (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1745), microformed on 00327525162128 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (allowing the plaintiff to submit a special plea before the next 
court date). 
674 E.g., Coleman v. Kirtley (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., Aug. 19, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra 
note 532, at 102; Spotswood v. Davis (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 
1724–1730 (PART IV), supra note 186, at 29. 
675 E.g., Russell v. Estate of Borden (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 23, 1754), microformed on 
00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); Turner v. Nelson (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 23, 
1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra note 247, at 74–75.  Of course, depositions also were used 
at common law and could be taken in colonies outside Virginia.  E.g., Deposition of Stocton 
(Albemarle Cnty. Ct., Sept. 28, 1773), in ALBEMARLE COUNTY VIRGINIA COURT PAPERS 1744–
1783, at 54 (Benjamin B. Weisiger III. ed., 1995) [hereinafter ALBEMARLE 1744–1783].  Courts 
preferred, however, to hear testimony viva voce.   E.g., Palmer v. Word (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., 
July 5, 1738), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 14–15.  Thus, the court would not 
grant postponements for taking depositions when a litigant had had sufficient time to obtain a 
deposition in the past.  E.g., Scarburgh v. Holden (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 9, 1748), 
microformed on 00327525162128 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
676 E.g., Bullitt v. Strother (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 23, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1772–1773, at 43 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1772–1773]. 
677 Heale v. Fox’s Adm’rs (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 10, 1730/1731), in LANCASTER 1729–1732, 
supra note 126, at 41–43.  Chancery also had developed the capacity to refer an issue of fact to a 
jury for trial at common law.  Compare Mann v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., June 11, 1768), in 
CAROLINE 1767–1768, supra note 153, at 77 (referring the issue to a jury of whether the 
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A positive consequence of increased formalism was that attorneys 
became able to use either printed or pre-written forms with blanks to be 
filled rather than having to draft individualized pleadings on a case-by-
case basis.678  However, the main consequence of formalism’s growth 
was to decrease judicial discretion and hence the degree of judicial 
control over the processing of litigation. 
This weakening of judges is clearest when the role of formalism is 
examined in the mid-eighteenth-century Virginia criminal process, 
where conformity with legal niceties increasingly came to matter.  One 
court dismissed a presentment for profane swearing, for example, 
because the defendant had “never had the . . . law delivered to him by 
the churchwardens . . . & was entirely ignorant thereof.”679  Other courts 
threw out presentments because of uncertainty of the presentment680 or 
“irregularity of the Proceedings.”681  For example, the case of a defendant 
charged in a county where his offense had not occurred was transferred 
to the proper county,682 and another court dismissed a presentment for 
swearing because of the crown’s failure to insert “the particular oaths” 
therein.683  Other courts dismissed presentments for not including the 
                                                                                                             
complainant was a slave or free person), with Mann v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1768), 
in CAROLINE 1767–1768, supra note 153, at, 81 (granting judgment for the plaintiff upon jury 
finding that she was a free person).  The inevitable result was that the jurisdiction of equity and 
common law became somewhat overlapping.  See In re. Thompson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 21, 
1767), microformed on 00303775162116 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (authorizing a debtor, who 
sought injunctive relief against a judgment on a note he had allegedly paid before the 
promissee had assigned it to the party who brought suit, to file the bill in chancery although 
noting that he “might have had his relief in the suit at law”). 
678 See Garner v. Covington (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 27, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra 
note 257, at 49–50 (granting the defendant’s motion to have the plaintiff fill in the blanks in the 
declaration); Chattin v. Buxton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 12, 1738), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1736–1739, at 61–62 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1736–1739] (abating the suit because blanks in 
the declaration were not filled up); Horsnail v. Glover (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1728), in 
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 27–28 (granting the plaintiff “leave to fill 
up the blanks in his declaration”). 
679 King v. Marye (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1736), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738, supra 
note 142, at 26. 
680 E.g., King v. Winter (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1735), in RICHMOND 1735–1736, supra 
note 322, at 6. 
681 Dismissal of Presentments (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1724/1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 
1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 36. 
682 See King v. Hollis (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1769), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1767–1769, at 105–06 (Ruth Sparacio & 
Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1767–1769] (transferring the case to Loudoun 
County). 
683 King v. Cannon (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Aug. 16, 1768), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 385, at 
11. 
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names of the persons on whose information they were rendered.684  
Likewise, when another defendant following conviction moved in arrest 
of judgment because the information against him had not stated the date 
of the offense or the penalty provided by the legislature and had not 
prayed for the issuance of process against him, the prosecution dropped 
the proceeding.685  One defendant even moved in arrest of judgment on 
the ground that he should have been indicted at common law rather than 
under a statute.686  Similar sorts of formalistic claims also were advanced 
and at times sustained in civil cases.687  Another, somewhat analogous 
case, however, rejected a lawyer’s claim of error in failing to grant him a 
continuance so he could prepare his legal argument.688 
In criminal cases, particular attention was paid to juries, who 
apparently had the power of nullification.  When one defendant, for 
example, was accused of living openly with a woman without benefit of 
marriage and the Queen’s attorneys objected “that the fact aforesaid in 
the presentment aforesaid was a sufficient conviction thereof,” the court 
overruled the crown’s objection and impanelled a jury; the jury acquitted 
the defendant.689  Another defendant obtained dismissal of a 
presentment because one member of the grand jury was not a 
                                                 
684 E.g., King v. Ansley (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Aug. 16, 1768), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 
385, at 11–12.  But see King v. Morrow (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 25, 1749), microformed on 
00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (denying a motion to quash because one grand 
juror was not a freeholder). 
685 Compare King v. Ramey (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., July 23, 1762), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra 
note 144, at 84 (recording the defendant’s reasons supporting his motion), with King v. Ramey 
(Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 24, 1764), in VIRGINIA COUTNY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK 
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1763–1764, at 86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter FAUQUIER 1763–1764] (recording the prosecutor’s discontinuance). 
686 King v. Walmsley (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., May 12, 1763), in LOUDOUN 1762–1763, supra note 
144, at 66–67. 
687 See, e.g., Chilton v. Lasswell (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Feb. 14, 1759), in VIRGINIA COUNTY 
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1758–1759, at 25–26 (Ruth Sparacio 
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1758–1759] (recording the plaintiff’s post-
verdict motion in a slander case that the defendant had failed to specify what goods the 
plaintiff had allegedly stolen), with Chilton v. Lasswell (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., June 14, 1759), in 
LOUDOUN 1758–1759, supra, at 73 (granting the defendant’s post-verdict motion). 
688 Downs v. Denton (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1750), microformed on 00303745162113 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
689 Queen v. Champ (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra note 
160, at 28.  The woman with whom Champ was accused of living had the judgment against her 
set aside because she “was not summoned to answer the suit nor had any notice of the trial.”  
Compare Queen v. Carter (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra 
note 160, at 30 (fining the defendant for failing to appear and answer the presentment against 
her), with Queen v. Carter (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra 
note 160, at 40–41 (finding the presentment insufficient for uncertainty). 
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freeholder,690 and a third moved to set aside a verdict because some of 
the petit jurors who convicted him had served on the grand jury that had 
presented him.691  Except for trials before the General Court in 
Williamsburg, juries were drawn from the vicinage where the crime had 
been committed; even for trials before the General Court six jurors were 
drawn from the county of the alleged crime.692  This reliance on jurors 
who often knew something about the defendant and the case, together 
with technical rules that limited prosecutorial freedom, inevitably 
reduced the freedom of judges, at least in some cases, to convict 
defendants whom they believed guilty. 
The judiciary’s declining power also emerged in prosecutions 
affecting law enforcement.  In a number of cases, for example, 
defendants were charged with interfering with judges and other officers 
in the execution of their duties.693  Another case grew out of a 
prosecution of a constable for refusing to serve a warrant—when a 
prosecution witness failed to appear, the court in formalist fashion 
declined to grant a postponement, thereby enforcing an agreement to try 
the case at the present term.694  The crown thereupon dropped the 
prosecution, the constable went free, and the warrant was never 
served.695 
Other changes in the mid-eighteenth century similarly altered the 
dynamic between the bench and the bar, strengthening lawyers and 
weakening lay judges, however slightly.  The most important change 
occurred when men seeking to practice as attorneys were required to 
pass an examination administered by a “person or persons, learned in 
the law,”696 although local courts retained power to grant leave to 
                                                 
690 King v. Kelly (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1734), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra 
note 209, at 40–41. 
691 King v. Scot (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1750/51), microformed on 00303745162113 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
692 Billings, supra note 660, at 579; see, e,g., Queen v. Peacock (Richmond Cnty. Ct. Apr. 11, 
1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 32–33 (ordering the case be continued in 
Williamsburg). 
693 E.g., Smith v. Matterson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1767, microformed on 00303775162116 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
694 King v. Colhoun (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 24, 1755), microformed on 00303755162114 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
695 Id. 
696 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 360–61; e.g., License of Lewis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 
1733), in MIDDLESEX 1735–1737, supra note 169, at 3.  The 1732 act, which gave the Governor and 
Council authority to appoint bar examiners, was repealed in 1742.  5 HENING, supra note 643, at 
171.  The act was replaced by a law authorizing the General Court to appoint examiners from 
among the attorneys practicing before it.  6 HENING, supra note 142, at 140; see also License of 
Buchanan (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., May 26, 1766), in FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra note 160, at 96 
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practice in individual cases697 and to recommend for examination men of 
“good demeanor.”698  The legislature also had succeeded in regulating 
attorneys’ fees.699  These changes weakened local courts marginally.  
Another change was the increasing presence of law books in the colony, 
which made it easier for attorneys to cite precedent rather than relying 
on a common-sense conception of justice.700 
Judges of the General Court lost even more power than county 
courts lost.  The county courts, it will be recalled, were largely self-
perpetuating bodies that recommended to the Governor whom he 
should appoint.701  A telling event occurred in Spotsylvania County in 
1744, when the Governor appointed three justices whom the court had 
not recommended; as a result, eight other justices refused to take their 
oaths or to serve,702 as did two of the three named by the Governor 
without court recommendation.703  Only one of the three, William Lynd, 
described by one of the eight as a man who “ha[d] begged himself into 
the Commission,” thereby “slighting the court,”704 took the oath.705  
                                                                                                             
(administering an attorney’s license); License of Pemberton (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Feb. 8, 1773), in 
LOUISA 1766–1774, supra note 627, at 17–18 (administering an attorney’s license). 
697 Compare Kennan v. Bailey (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1738/1739), in RICHMOND 1738–
1740, supra note 151, at 13 (reporting a suit against an attorney for practicing outside the county 
in which he was licensed), with Kennan v. Bailey (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1739), in 
RICHMOND 1738–1740, supra note 151, at 22–23 (granting judgment for the defendant attorney). 
698 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 141; see, e.g., Certification of Turner (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., 
Nov. 8, 1732), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734, supra note 160, at 33 (ordering the clerk to certify 
that Turner “h[a]s the [c]haracter of an [h]onest man”). 
699 See 5 HENING, supra note 643, at 181–82; 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 371–72 (placing 
limitations on attorney fees); see also Oath of Waller (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Dec. 13, 1742), in LOUISA 
1742–1744, supra note 637, at 2 (reporting several attorneys’ oaths not to exact or receive 
“exhorbitant fees”); Oath of Power (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 7, 1742), in MIDDLESEX 1740–1745, 
supra note 261, at 60–61 (reporting several attorneys’ oaths not to exact or receive “exhorbitant 
fees”). 
700 See Wills v. Estate of Prescoat (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1728), in ESSEX 1727–1729, supra 
note 151, at 41 (ordering the defendant to deliver several law books to the plaintiff to satisfy a 
debt). 
701 See, e.g., Recommendation of Madison (Orange Cnty. Ct., July 25, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–
1756, supra note 245, at 67–68 (recommending James Madison’s father to be a justice). 
702  Refusals of Johnston, Robinson, Thornton, Chew, Tutt, Carr, Waller & Turner 
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct. June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 72–73. 
703 Refusals of Strother & Hunter (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 
1742–1744, supra note 160, at 73; accord Refusal of Peyton (Prince William Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 
1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
1762–1763, at 2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter PRINCE WILLIAM 1762–
1763] (reporting a justice’s refusal to serve because “the Commission of the Peace [was] 
not . . . made out according to the late nomination” by the sitting justices). 
704 Refusal of Thornton (Spotsylvania County Ct., June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, 
supra note 160, at 73. 
705 Oath of Lynd (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra 
note 160, at 73. 
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Apparently the matter was solved by compromise, when the Governor 
issued a new commission of the peace containing one of the three men he 
wanted, but not Lynd.706 
Similarly, two decades later in Fauquier County, Wharton Ransdell 
refused to serve as a justice of the peace; John Churchill refused to serve 
while John Crump remained on the court; and George Lamkin indicated 
he did not want to be included in any future commission of the peace.707  
Similarly, the Northampton County Court withdrew a recommendation 
that it had made for the appointment of several justices of the peace 
when one of them declined to serve,708 while James Nisbett was willing 
to serve in Prince William County if he was placed third in the 
commission but not otherwise.709  Also, in 1762, Richard Coke presented 
the Northampton County Court with a commission to be crown 
prosecutor, after the court had recommended James Henry for the 
post.710  The court acted on an assumption, which was probably false, 
that its recommendation had not been properly communicated to 
authorities in Williamsburg and therefore ordered that Coke “be not 
admitted to take the oaths to qualify him” until the further pleasure of 
the Governor and Attorney General be known.711 
Appeals from county courts to the General Court remained the 
norm.  But at times, county courts denied appeals,712 while at other times 
appellate courts refused to consider appeals from general verdicts when 
evidence had not been taken down in writing and submitted on appeal 
under proper seal.713  This led one litigant to argue, somewhat vaguely 
and over broadly that “‘no such general verdict from Virginia . . . ever 
was opened or look[ed] into, or can be, by the laws of the land; which 
                                                 
706 See Comm’n of the Peace (Spotsylvania County Ct., July 3, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–
1744, supra note 160, at 73–74 (issuing commission for Waller and Robinson). 
707 Refusals of Lamkin, Ransdell, & Churchill (Fauquier County Ct., July 23, 1761), in 
FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra note 144, at 7. 
708 Recommendation for Comm’n of the Peace (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 12, 1768), 
microformed on 00327485162124 (Library of Va.). 
709 Reasons of Nisbett (Prince William Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1762), in PRINCE WILLIAM 1761−1762, 
supra note 531, at 76. 
710  Order re Coke (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 16, 1762), microformed on 00327485162124 
(Library of Va.). 
711 Id. 
712 See, e.g., Moffet v. Graham (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1746), microformed on 
00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (stating “no appeal should be granted on a 
general verdict without errors . . . first filed”). 
713 See SMITH, supra note 592, at 356 (providing Perry v. Churchill as an example).  But cf. id. at 
357–58 (discussing Lidderdale v. Chiswell where the council directed the court below to receive 
and authenticate the appellant’s bill of exceptions and thereupon considered appeal). 
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would be to find without evidence, for the plaintiffs, where twelve men, 
upon their oaths, have, upon evidence, found for the defendant.’”714 
County courts also refused at times to obey orders from the 
Governor and the General Court.  One case of direct disobedience 
occurred when a county court declined to obey a mandamus from the 
General Court requiring the county to build a specified bridge, which the 
county court declared would require a “needless tax” and be “altogether 
useless.”715  The court also took note of topographical conditions that 
would make construction difficult and challenged the bona fides of the 
man who had obtained the mandamus, when it accused him of offering 
not to enforce the mandamus if tithables under his control were relieved 
of other work on the roads.716 
As a result of disobedience such as this, the General Court 
developed a practice of issuing its orders, not to county courts, but to 
litigants, who were more amenable.  In Lewis v. Golston,717 for example, in 
which the General Court had prohibited the plaintiff from suing the 
defendant in county court, the county court, when presented with the 
prohibition, agreed only to “take the same into consideration.”  In the 
end, however, it did not need to do so, because the plaintiff, “rather than 
run the risk of being adjudged guilty of contempt,” withdrew his suit, 
“saving,” however, his “good right by law to commence his action 
& . . . to prosecute the same” in the county court.718  In a case such as 
Golston, the county court not only declared its independence from the 
General Court, but the General Court recognized that independence and 
did nothing direct about it. 
County courts, in turn, lost authority vis-a-vis juries impanelled in 
the cases they heard.  Of course, they continued to police procedures 
followed by juries during their deliberations,719 to enjoin enforcement of 
                                                 
714 Id. at 358 n.33. 
715 Slaughter v. Justices (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 28, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra 
note 247, at 90–91; see Letter of Gooch (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 
1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 45 (declining to appoint an administrator as directed by 
the governor).  But see In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 16, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–
1692, supra note 184, at 62–65 (obeying the mandate of the General Court to adjudicate the case). 
716 Slaughter v. Justices (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 28, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra 
note 247, at 91. 
717 (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 99; see 
also Lewis v. Golston (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra 
note 209, at 103 (granting the plaintiff’s motion for additional time to familiarize himself with 
the General Court’s order). 
718 Lewis v. Golston (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra 
note 209, at 108. 
719 See Shields v. Wilson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1751), microformed on 00303745162113 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (setting aside a verdict because two jurors departed the jury room 
during deliberations). 
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common-law judgments,720 to rule on the admissibility of evidence,721 to 
preserve objections to their rulings by way of bills of exceptions,722 and 
to set aside verdicts and grant new trials when juries returned verdicts 
contrary to the evidence.723  In another case, a court held a verdict “idle 
and void” because jurors had “misbehaved themselves.”724 
Judges also continued on occasion to penetrate beyond the rubric of 
contrary to evidence, which implicitly meant that a jury had disobeyed 
the law, and explicitly set aside verdicts contrary to law.  In one such 
case, a jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict for money owed, but the court, 
finding that the obligation arose out of “gaming contrary to act of 
Assembly,” set the verdict aside.725  In another case, a jury returned a 
                                                 
720 E.g., Crabb v. Martin (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Apr. 14, 1772), microformed on 00307225162119 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); see also Ledderdale v. Harrison (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1756), 
microformed on 00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (ruling in chancery that the 
petitioner in chancery owed only £6, 3 shillings, and 9 pence and that payment of that sum 
would discharge the larger verdict that Harrison had obtained at common law). 
721 See, e.g., McCollom v. Hunter (Augusta Cnty. Ct., June 18, 1757), microformed on 
00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (allowing the defendant to prove a written 
instrument given in consideration for land that was never conveyed); Beard v. Moore (Augusta 
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 19, 1756), microformed on 00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) 
(permitting a witness with a record of criminal conviction to give an unsworn statement to the 
jury, but not to testify under oath). 
722 E.g., Hamilton v. Ellzey (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Aug. 15, 1764), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUDON COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1764, at 54–55 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds.,1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1764]; Rogers v. Marshall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., 
May 8, 1750), microformed on 00327535162129 (Library of Va.). 
723 E.g., Doah v. Sayers (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1747), microformed on 00303745162113 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); Darnall v. Morgan (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Oct. 26, 1764), in 
FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra note 160, at 6; Stubblefield v. Moore (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 1, 
1740), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 104.  But compare Garner v. Darnall 
(Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra note 257, at 93 (reporting the 
defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury rendered a verdict for the wrong 
party), with Garner v. Darnall (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra 
note 144, at 19 (denying the defendant’s motion for new trial).  Even when a jury found 
contrary to evidence, a court had discretion to accept its verdict.  See, e.g., Henslee v. Tutt 
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1742/1743), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 3–4 
(considering whether to grant a new trial where the jury found contrary to the evidence).  
Although, in the case just cited, the court ultimately did, in fact, grant a new trial.  Henslee v. 
Tutt (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5 1743), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 7–8. 
724 Galloway v. Mann (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 23, 1764), microformed on 00303765162115 
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
725 Beverley v. Barksdale (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Aug. 15, 1772), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT 
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1772–1773, at 49–50 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam 
Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1772–1773]; see also Hackett v. Goodall (Caroline 
Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1773), in CAROLINE 1773, supra note 589, at 20–21 (admitting evidence that 
money was won playing dice in a suit for a statutory penalty for unlawful gambling); Thornton 
v. Evans (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 
22–23 (reporting jury verdict upholding the defendant’s plea that recovery of winnings at a 
game of cards was outlawed by statute).  But see Russell v. Morton (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 5, 
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general verdict for the defendant, and the court directed it to consider its 
verdict further.726  When it returned later with the same verdict, the court 
granted the plaintiff a new trial.727  In a third case, in which a defendant 
requested a special verdict and informed the jury of legal questions that 
would arise thereon, the court denied the request and instructed the jury 
“to do as pleased,”728 although when the jury returned a general verdict 
for the plaintiff, the court granted a new trial.729  On at least one occasion, 
a court dispensed with a jury entirely and concluded that particular 
evidence constituted a bar to a plaintiff’s suit, and accordingly, it 
rendered the equivalent of summary judgment for the defendant.730 
Nonetheless, despite the vast power of judges to reject jury verdicts, 
at least some lawyers were prepared to argue that general verdicts were 
immune from judicial review.731  For whatever reason, courts at times 
stayed their hand and did not exert their full power over juries.  A 1769 
case, Doe v. Anderson,732 which grew out of a title dispute to three 
plantations and 600 acres of land, probably typifies how cases were 
routinely tried.  At issue was the admissibility of a deposition taken 
some sixteen years earlier and a copy of an alleged original survey, 
which was certified as a true copy by the proprietor’s alleged agent.733  
Plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of oral testimony needed to 
                                                                                                             
1733), in RICHMOND 1732–1734, supra note 326, at 43–44 (allowing the plaintiff to recover 
winnings at a card game).  Compare Swan v. Parkes (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct. Mar. 5, 
1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 71 (reporting a suit brought to 
recover money owed on a wager on a horse), with Swan v. Parkes (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., 
May 6, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 80 (allowing plaintiff’s suit to 
proceed). 
726 Seekright v. Goar (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1743), in MIDDLESEX 1740–1745, supra note 
261, at 73. 
727 Id. 
728 Barbour v. Sandys (Orange Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756, supra note 
245, at 23. 
729 Compare id. (reporting the jury’s general verdict for the plaintiff), with Barbour v. Sandys 
(Orange Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756, supra note 245, at 34 (granting a new 
trial).  See also Thompson v. Boylston (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1772), microformed on 
00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for special 
verdict). 
730  Mercer v. Crump (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra note 
257, at 98. 
731 See SMITH, supra note 592, at 357–58 & n.33 (providing the respondent’s argument in 
Lidderdale v. Chiswell as an example); see also supra text accompanying note 714 (setting forth the 
text of the argument). 
732 (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 26, 1769), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK 
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1769–1771, at 12–13 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter FAUQUIER 1769–1771]. 
733 Id. at 12. 
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authenticate the documents and also to their quality as hearsay.734  
However, “[t]he court admitted them generally without giving any 
charge to the jury;”735 the court, that is, simply let the jury determine 
without guidance the weight to be given to disputed evidence and thus 
the entire outcome of the case.  Similarly, a court in a 1752 case, Patton v. 
Shann,736 refused a defendant’s request to direct the jury that special 
damages had not been proved and instead sent the jury out without 
direction. 
Judges, in short, possessed a limited willingness to police juries, as 
Riddle v. Stodghill,737 a 1751 action of trespass for an assault, illustrates.  
Initially, the jury in Riddle returned a verdict for the defendant, but the 
court, finding that verdict contrary to the evidence, directed it to 
reconsider.738  The jury did reconsider and returned a plaintiff’s verdict 
for one penny damages—technically, but not in practical impact, vastly 
different from the initial verdict rejected by the bench.739  Nonetheless, 
the court, for reasons the record fails to illuminate, accepted the new 
verdict and entered judgment thereon.740  Perhaps the court was satisfied 
with an apparent compromise.  Perhaps it appreciated that its real power 
to police juries was limited.  Perhaps there were underlying facts that the 
record fails to reveal. 
Several years later, a new issue of constitutional dimension came to 
the fore and led a jury to behave exactly as the jury in Riddle v. Stodghill 
had behaved.  Again the court stayed its hand. 
Legislation in 1696, which over the years had been slightly amended, 
set the annual salary of clergymen at 16,000 lb. of tobacco, which at the 
then price of 10 shillings per hundred lb. gave a salary of approximately 
£80 per year.  In 1755, the House of Burgesses, fearing that a drought 
would lead to a tobacco shortage and a spike in its price, gave local 
bodies the option of paying all salaries in cash rather than tobacco, at a 
rate of two pennies per lb. of tobacco.  When approved by the Council 
and the Governor, this act, which remained in force only for ten months, 
gave clergymen an annual salary of approximately £130.  Anticipating 
that tobacco prices might rise above two pennies per lb., some clergymen 
                                                 
734 Id. at 13. 
735 Id. 
736 (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 17, 1752), microformed on 00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of 
Utah). 
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were unhappy, but when prices topped out at the two penny rate they 
did nothing.741 
A second drought, with the accompanying concern about rising 
prices, led to the adoption of a second Two Penny Act in 1758, this time 
with a duration of one year.  When prices in fact rose to six pennies per 
lb., which would have worked out to annual salaries of £400, the clergy 
memorialized the Privy Council to disallow the legislation.  The council, 
in fact, disapproved the legislation in the summer of 1759, but official 
word thereof did not reach Virginia until over a year after passage of the 
1758 act, the effect of which had already expired.742 
Nonetheless, several ministers brought separate suits to recover back 
pay in the form of the difference during the year the act was in effect 
between the two pennies per lb. of tobacco they received and the six 
pennies market price.743  The legal issue in the cases was whether the 
Privy Council’s disallowance became effective only on the date when 
official notice was received in Virginia, in which case the ministers lost, 
or whether the Two Penny Act was void ab initio, in which case the clergy 
was entitled to its back pay.744  In the first two suits, one minister won 
and one lost.745 
A third suit, known to historians as the Parsons’ Cause was filed in 
Hanover County, in which the court ruled as a matter of law that the 
Two Penny Act was void ab initio and summoned a jury of enquiry to 
calculate the damages to which the plaintiff minister was entitled.746  The 
defendant vestry thereupon retained Patrick Henry, the son of the 
county court’s presiding justice, to represent it.747  In addressing the jury, 
Henry, whom opposing counsel accused of “‘treason,’” ignored the issue 
of damages and addressed directly the merits of his father’s ruling of 
                                                 
741 See 2 LYON GARDINER TYLER, HISTORY OF VIRGINIA:  THE FEDERAL PERIOD 1763–1861, at 61–
62 (1924) (discussing this controversial legislation).  The preceding factual scenario comes from 
this source. 
742 See id. at 63–66 (discussing the subsequent legislation regard clergymen’s salary).  The 
preceding factual scenario comes from this source.  See also SMITH, supra note 592, at 607–626 
(discussing this appeal and others surrounding the Parson’s Cause with great doctrinal 
precision); CRAIG YIRUSH, SETTLERS, LIBERTY, AND EMPIRE:  THE ROOTS OF EARLY AMERICAN 
POLITICAL THEORY, 1675–1775, at 169–79 (2011) (providing the most recent discussion of the 
Parson’s Cause itself and those surrounding it); infra text accompanying notes 746–51 (briefly 
discussing the Parson’s Cause). 
743 See TYLER, supra note 741, at 70–76 (discussing the several suits initiated in regards to 
the act). 
744 See id. at 70 (explaining that a plaintiff would receive damages only if a jury found the 
law to be invalid). 
745 ROBERT DOUTHAT MEADE, PATRICK HENRY:  PATRIOT IN THE MAKING 123–24 (1957). 
746 TYLER, supra note 741, at 70. 
747 RICHARD R. BEEMAN, PATRICK HENRY:  A BIOGRAPHY 19–20 (1974) (discussing Henry’s 
arguments before the jury). 
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law.748  Henry called the Two Penny Act “‘a good law . . . of general 
utility’” that “‘could not, consistently with the original compact between 
King and people, . . . be annulled.’”749  In Henry’s view, “‘a King, by 
disallowing Acts of this salutary nature, from being the father of his 
people, degenerate[d] into a Tyrant, and forfeit[ed] all right to his 
subjects’ obedience.’”750  The jury, like the one in Riddle v. Stodghill, 
agreed and effectively nullified the court’s ruling of law by returning a 
verdict of one penny damages, and when the plaintiff moved to set aside 
the verdict as contrary to the evidence, the court overruled the motion.751 
Some present in the courtroom may have wondered why Henry 
adopted so extreme a position, and it is possible that he was merely 
seeking popularity.752  However, there also may have been a legal 
reason.  Writing some fifteen years later in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson observed that, although juries typically 
decided only the facts and took their law from the court, “this division of 
the subject lies within their discretion only.  And if the question relate[s] 
to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in which the judges 
may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide both law and 
fact.”753  Henry, that is, may have needed to argue his case as a 
constitutional one in order to deny law-finding power to the court and 
confer such power instead on the jury. 
Knox v. Daniel,754 a case from 1768, is consistent with this 
interpretation of Jefferson’s understanding.  There the jury returned a 
verdict for £75 damages upon finding that the defendant “maliciously 
and unjustly to vex, injure, and oppress” the plaintiff “without any just 
or reasonable cause” had him bound over to an examining court on 
suspicion of felony.755  The defendant moved in arrest of judgment on 
                                                 
748 Id. at 19. 
749 Id. 
750 Id. 
751 Id. at 19–20; see also MEADE, supra note 745, at 124–34 (providing a detailed account of the 
Parson’s Cause).  Ultimately, the General Court, and later the Privy Council, rejected the position 
of the Hanover County Court and ruled that the disallowance of the Two Penny Act took effect 
only upon its official communication to authorities in Virginia.  See SMITH, supra note 592, at 
623–24 (discussing rejection by the Privy Council); TYLER, supra note 741, at 74 (discussing 
rejection by the General Court). 
752 See BEEMAN, supra note 747, at 20 (providing Henry’s supposed declaration to Maury that 
Henry took such position “to render himself popular”). 
753 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 140 (William Peden ed., 1955). 
754 Compare Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty Ct., Oct. 25, 1768), in FAUQUIER 1767–1769, supra 
note 682, at 62 (reporting the jury verdict and defendant’s motion to arrest the judgment), with 
Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1770), in FAUQUIER 1769–1771, supra note 732, at 54 
(reporting the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion). 
755 Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Oct. 25, 1768), in FAUQUIER 1767–1769, supra note 682, 
at 62. 
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four grounds:  (1) that suit had been brought in a county other than 
where the alleged tort had occurred; (2) the plaintiff had not given notice 
of his intent to sue; (3) the quite large £75 damage verdict was excessive; 
and (4) the jurors improperly had separated and taken meals at their 
own expense between the time they began receiving evidence and the 
time they returned their verdict in open court.756  Indeed, the defendant 
implied that the jurors changed their verdict after separating.  Normally 
the defendant’s fourth allegation would have led to rejection of a jury 
verdict, but in Knox it did not.757  Perhaps the court deferred to the jury 
because it did not credit the defendant’s factual claims.  However, the 
case also may have been one where the jury had ignored standard black-
letter law to protect a subject’s liberty and the court, recognizing the 
jury's superior authority, tolerated its doing so. 
Oldum v. Allerton,758 a 1739 case of which Jefferson was almost 
certainly aware, also fits with what he wrote in Notes on the State of 
Virginia.  Although Oldum involved a different issue—the immunity of 
judges to suit—the argument of counsel reported in the case made the 
same distinction presented in Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia 
between ordinary litigation, where judges should enjoy immunity, and 
matters involving judicial bias or threats to the liberty of the subject.759  
Counsel made the standard argument that it would be “dangerous” to 
place “Power . . . in the hands of a single person subject to no control” 
because “Human nature is too depraved to depend altogether upon the 
virtue & integrity of the judge[.]  Power is apt to intoxicate & spoil the 
best tempers . . . .  Fences against arbitrary power should be kept up.”760 
At the same time the argument of counsel recognized the “hardship” 
that would be imposed on judges by subjecting them to suit on account 
of their judgments.761  However, counsel continued: 
Besides the Justices in these cases are always very 
tenderly dealt with by the jury in their damages if it 
appears to be a mere mistake in judgment.  On the 
contrary where there are any marks of violence or 
oppression o[r] partiality or passion[,] they [the jurors] 
                                                 
756 Id. 
757 See Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1770), in FAUQUIER 1769–1771, supra 
note 732, at 54 (denying the defendant’s motion). 
758 (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1739), in 2 BARRADALL & RANDOLPH, supra note 144, at B320, B331–43. 
759 See id. at B332–34 (providing the issue presented in the case and the court’s distinction 
between liability and nonliability of the judiciary). 
760 Id. at B341. 
761 Id. at B342. 
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make them [the judges] smart for it in damages as 
indeed they ought.762 
We can best make sense out of Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia 
and the cases that have just been discussed if we start with the 
proposition that early eighteenth-century judicial practices of good 
conscience, good reason, and justice were being transformed in the 1760s 
and 1770s by lawyers like Jefferson into a more formal and mechanical 
body of legal knowledge and legal rules.  Gentlemen justices such as 
Patrick Henry’s father maintained control of their localities by avoiding 
appearances of oppression or partiality; they understood that, if they 
behaved badly, their underlings in one way or another might make them 
smart.  As Virginia’s legal profession moved to the fore in the second 
half of the century, however, lawyers like Jefferson were no longer 
satisfied that judges would practice good conscience and maintain 
appearances lest the people somehow sanction them.  The lawyers strove 
to articulate rules with which they could bind the judges. 
Accordingly, Notes on the State of Virginia spelled out as a rule—that 
judges had no power to set aside a jury verdict in a case of constitutional 
magnitude—what previously had only been a tendency to respect jury 
freedom in cases of public significance.  Inevitably, as the power of 
lawyers and their rules increased, that of lay justices in particular and 
courts in general became more and more constrained. 
B. The Collapse of the Land Bargain 
As noted above, land distribution policy was a highly contested 
political issue in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
Virginia.763  By 1710, however, the great planters had won the contest, 
and the crown had acquiesced in the practice of granting virgin lands 
almost entirely to leading planters.  The planters then developed 
extensive land speculation schemes, on which they became quite 
dependent as they strove to maintain the economic status quo.764 
Indeed, land speculation became so important to maintaining the 
status quo that leading Virginians became unduly sensitive to any threats 
to it.  Thus, when in 1752 Governor Robert Dinwiddie, in pursuit of his 
instructions, demanded the payment of a fee for sealing patents granting 
                                                 
762 Id. 
763 See supra Part IV.B (discussing land distribution policies in colonial Virginia in depth). 
764 See HOLTON, supra note 168, at xiii–xvii, 3–38 (discussing the efforts of Virginia’s elite 
gentlemen in maintaining wealth and power). 
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land his demand raised a storm.765  Although such fees were common in 
other colonies, they had not been paid in Virginia for several decades.766 
The fee demanded by Dinwiddie was not a trivial one—roughly the 
purchase price of a cow.767  Such a fee would have had its greatest impact 
on people seeking small grants and on speculators seeking a large 
number of grants—speculators who often were members either of the 
Governor’s Council or of the House of Burgesses.768  However, 
opponents of the fee did not protest against it on economic grounds.  
Instead, they turned to a young lawyer for legal and constitutional 
argument when the House of Burgesses appointed Peyton Randolph, 
who had been educated at the Inns of Court and was only in his early 
thirties, to travel to England for a substantial fee of £2500 and argue their 
cause before the Privy Council.769  Dinwiddie promptly removed 
Randolph from his post as Attorney General and appointed George 
Wythe in his stead.770 
In essence, the Burgesses’ argument before the Privy Council made 
two points:  (1) that by agreeing earlier to issue land patents without 
charging any fee the crown had established a precedent from which it 
could not now depart; and (2) the fee amounted to a tax and that no tax 
could be levied in Virginia without the consent of the House of 
Burgesses.771  In 1754 the Council rejected both arguments and upheld 
Dinwiddie’s right to collect the fee.772  However, it made some 
concessions to the Burgesses:  it exempted from the fee patents that had 
been filed before Dinwiddie’s announcement of the fee, grants of fewer 
than 100 acres, and grants of land west of the Alleghany Mountains, with 
the result that few grants remained that were covered by the fee.773  
Virginians accordingly celebrated what they counted as a victory; they 
also were pleased when the Privy Council directed Dinwiddie to restore 
                                                 
765 BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 256–57. 
766 See id. (providing brief general discussions of the conflict over Governor Dinwiddie’s 
proposed fees); see also TYLER, supra note 741, at 58–60 (discussing briefly petitions and appeals 
brought in regards to the tax). 
767 BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 256. 
768 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 621, at 220–21 (discussing the role of the pistle fee dispute in 
the revolution). 
769 See Jack P. Greene, The Case of the Pistole Fee:  The Report of a Hearing on the Pistole Fee 
Dispute Before the Privy Council, June 18, 1754, 66 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 399, 399, 402 
(1958) (providing brief background information on the dispute and discussing Randolph’s 
appointment by the House of Burgesses); see also JONES, supra note 498, at 179 (providing 
biographical information on Randolph as a member of the Inns of Court). 
770 Greene, supra note 769, at 402. 
771 Id. at 401.  For a transcript of arguments presented on behalf of the Assembly, see id. at 
412–19. 
772 Id. at 405. 
773 BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 257; Greene, supra note 769, at 404. 
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Randolph to the office of Attorney General, and Dinwiddie consented to 
the payment of Randolph’s £2500 fee.774 
The importance of the dispute over Dinwiddie’s demand for a fee 
upon issuing land grants lay less in the substance of the dispute than in 
the habits of mind it created.  The three-year-long conflict between 
Dinwiddie and the Burgesses established important patterns of thought 
that channeled future Virginia resistance to British demands. 
At its root, the dispute was about an economic matter of central 
importance to Virginia’s great planters—their access to new land on 
cheap, favorable terms.  They could not tolerate the possibility that 
crown officials might alter the land bargain worked out at the beginning 
of the century, a bargain on which their economic security depended.  
The planters argued, however, not on economic but on legal and 
constitutional grounds.  Their belief that they had triumphed on those 
grounds acculturated them to turn to lawyers and constitutional 
argument when, within a decade, new conflicts with Great Britain arose. 
The role that law and the constitution played in obstructing 
Dinwiddie’s demands also made the interests of the bar congruent with 
the interests of planters.  The two groups had not necessarily shared 
interests when debt collection had been the main task of Virginia law 
and lawyers; then, lawyers and planters had sometimes been at odds.  
However, once the great planters conceived of lawyers as protectors of 
the constitutional, and thus economic, structure of Virginia society their 
alliance became firm.  Lawyers became important figures in the inner 
circle that dominated Virginia culture. 
The next conflict over land policy—and a more important one than 
Governor Dinwiddie’s demand for a fee for issuing land patents—
emerged in the aftermath of the Seven Years War.  Virginians had 
expected Britain’s victory in the war to open the Ohio Valley to 
settlement and accordingly were sorely disappointed by the 
Proclamation of 1763, which barred all settlement west of the 
Appalachians.775  Nothing better demonstrates how badly the great 
planters needed the western land in which they were speculating than 
the continual efforts they made and the hope they maintained for the 
crown to rescind the proclamation.776  Their ultimate disappointment 
                                                 
774 Greene, supra note 769, at 405. 
775 See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN:  1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
NORTH AMERICA 92 (2006) (explaining the effect of the Proclamation of 1763). 
776 See id. at 60–62, 92–94, 98–99 (2006) (providing a brief history of the proclamation and 
discussing attempts to sell and acquire land in this region); PATRICK GRIFFIN, AMERICAN 
LEVIATHAN:  EMPIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 50, 55–61, 85–94, 134–36 (2007) 
(discussing attempts to acquire land despite the proclamation and the resulting consequences); 
HOLTON, supra note 168, at 3–13, 28–32, 35 (discussing tensions between land speculators, 
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came in 1774, when the British ministry, in a conscious effort to 
discourage western speculation and settlement, drafted the Quebec Act 
so as to incorporate into the Roman Catholic province of Quebec much of 
the land Virginians had hoped to exploit.777 
London’s policy of discouraging western speculation and settlement 
did not lead Virginians directly to revolution,778 but it tended in that 
direction.  The policy made it more difficult for Virginia planters to pay 
debts to British creditors and to abide by long-accepted arrangements, 
such as those sanctioned by the Navigation Acts requiring that all 
Virginia tobacco to be marketed through Great Britain.779  This led 
notable Virginians, such as Arthur Lee and George Washington, to 
suppose that the ministry was “antiamerican” [sic] and had a 
“‘malignant disposition to American[s].’”780  They and the group of legal 
thinkers associated with them then did what litigants and lawyers 
typically do in the context of an interest-group conflict—they developed 
theoretical arguments in support of their economic positions.  In the 
process, they translated, and thereby escalated, their economic 
materialist battle over land, tobacco marketing, and debt into a 
constitutional controversy that called into question longstanding, settled 
assumptions about the relationship of Virginia to Great Britain.781 
When, before the middle of the century, Virginia’s great planters 
understood that they had cut a deal with the crown that gave them land 
in return for their acceptance of mercantalist policies, they could both 
cope with the economic consequences of the deal and see themselves as 
equal participants in a consensual, fair process of governance.  It did not 
matter that they were not represented in Parliament as long as they 
                                                                                                             
Native Americans, and the Privy Council over land out west); PHILYAW, supra note 656, at 46–
64 (discussing the attempts of Virginia’s “land barons” to acquire “Land of the Western 
Waters” in the midst of the proclamation).  Perhaps the most extreme example of these efforts 
was a large-scale military adventure by Virginians against Ohio Valley Native Americans that 
has come to be known as Lord Dunmore’s War.  Patrick Griffin tends to treat the adventure as 
largely orchestrated by Dunmore for his own political purposes. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 97–123.  
Woody Holton, on the other hand, sees Virginia speculators rather than Governor Dunmore as 
the driving force.  See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 33–35. 
777 GRIFFIN, supra note 776, at 102; HOLTON, supra note 168, at 33; see PHILYAW, supra note 656, 
at 62–64 (discussing efforts to speculate land out west despite legislative hindrances in the 
1760s and 1770s). 
778 See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 36 (arguing that the abolition of western land speculation 
was not a “paramount concern” in the revolution). 
779 See id. at 3–4, 46–66 (discussing Jefferson’s and Washington’s difficulties in maintaining 
their land agreements as well as tensions arising due to the Navigation Acts). 
780 Id. at 9, 32.  For statements of Edmund Pendleton and Thomas Jefferson, see id. at 35–36 & 
36 n.54. 
781 See, e.g., YIRUSH, supra note 742, at 158–79 (discussing the pistole fee dispute and the 
Parson’s Cause as disputes that tested constitutional principles). 
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participated in other ways as free men in the lawmaking process and 
could live with the material output of that process.  However, when 
crown and Parliament claimed supreme power and by proclamation and 
legislation changed fundamental ground rules that had been in place for 
decades Virginians feared both for their economic well-being and for the 
loss of their freedom and power.782  Thus, their economic and 
constitutional interests were congruent. 
The first impact of this congruence was to transform what might 
have been a trivial political conflict in Virginia—the conflict over the 
Stamp Act—into a supreme constitutional controversy.  Patrick Henry 
was again at the center of the controversy in Virginia with his 
introduction in the House of Burgesses of five resolutions against the 
Stamp Act, the last of which declared that the act “ha[d] a manifest 
tendency to destroy British as well as American freedom.”783  This last 
resolution passed by only one vote, and that vote was reversed on the 
following day.784  However, the debate among the Burgesses gave play to 
radical ideas and when the stamp distributor for Virginia arrived in the 
colony he was met by a mob and forced to resign his office.785 
As a result, no stamps were available for sale, and business could not 
proceed as usual.  Lawyers had to decide what to do.  Thus, the 
legislature, following the Stamp Act’s repeal, extended the period for 
recording deeds and other documents that had not been recorded in the 
absence of stamps.786  Similarly, the courts had to decide how to proceed 
in the absence of the stamps required on judicial documents.  Some 
closed down and declined to transact any business requiring stamps, 
while others continued to do business on the ground that no stamps 
were available and that it was essential they remain open.  Most 
interesting was Northampton County Court, which responded as 
follows to an inquiry from its nonjudicial officers whether they would 
incur any penalties for keeping the court open without using stamped 
paper: 
[T]he said court unanimously declared it to be their 
[o]pinion that the said [a]ct did not bind, affect, or 
concern the inhabitants of this [c]olony, inasmuch as 
they conceive the same to be unconstitutional, and that 
                                                 
782 See T. H. BREEN, TOBACCO CULTURE:  THE MENTALITY OF THE GREAT TIDEWATER PLANTERS 
ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 124–59, 196–203 (2001) (discussing these fears as relating to the 
increasing debts owed by Tidewater tobacco planters). 
783 BEEMAN, supra note 747, at 36. 
784 Id. at 38–39. 
785 Id. at 43. 
786 8 HENING, supra note 465, at 199–200. 
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the said several officers may proceed in the execution of 
their respective [o]ffices, without incurring any [p]enalty 
by means thereof.787 
With this somewhat-modern, judicial declaration of unconstitutionality, 
which was entered formally into the record apparently for the purpose 
of protecting officials from liability, at least some Virginia legal actors 
began to move along with actors in other colonies in directions that 
ultimately would result in a new distinctively American common law of 
constitutionalism. 
The movement occurred in fits and starts, however, and for over a 
decade the direction of movement was often unclear.  In 1769, for 
example, many Virginians joined other colonists in a boycott of imported 
British goods that aimed to pressure British merchants to urge 
Parliament to repeal the Townsend duties, but they refused to put 
further pressure on the merchants by withholding exports of tobacco, 
which was then commanding high prices.788  In this instance, the 
ideological interests of those advancing constitutional arguments and the 
material interests of the great planters were not congruent, and the 
limited boycott had only a limited effect.789 
As the price of tobacco fell during the next five years, the economic 
interest of planters became more congruent with the presentation of 
strong constitutional arguments.  Thus, when Parliament in 1774 passed 
the Quebec Act and the other Intolerable Acts, Virginia joined a boycott 
that included a ban on tobacco exports, which was then commanding an 
extremely low price.790  Non-exportation, however, created a problem.  
Without income from the sale of their tobacco, Virginia planters had no 
money with which to pay debts to British creditors.  Thus, non-
exportation required the enactment of legislation to stop debt collection, 
which in turn would further pressure Parliament to repeal the 
Intolerable Acts.791  Such legislation, though, appeared certain to be met 
with a gubernatorial veto and thus seemed incapable of being passed. 
However Lord Dunmore, the royal Governor, came to the rescue.  
Under Virginia law, various fees paid to court officers were set by 
                                                 
787 In re. Clerk and Other Officers (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 11, 1766), microformed on 
00327485162124 (Library of Va.); accord TYLER, supra note 741, at 85–86. 
788 HOLTON, supra note 168, at 85, 92–94. 
789 See id. at 85–95 (discussing the colonists’ efforts to boycott importation and exportation of 
goods). 
790 See id. at 100–11 (discussing the boycott of 1774). 
791 See DEWEY, supra note 512, at 99 (discussing legislative pressure to stop debt collection); see 
also HOLTON, supra note 168, at 110–18 (discussing the consequences of the boycott on tobacoo 
exportation). 
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statute, and the statute setting those fees had expired in April 1774.  
Renewal of the fee bill thus was on the legislature’s agenda at its May 
1774 session, but before the legislature acted Governor Dunmore 
dissolved the House of Burgesses when it approved a resolution 
condemning Parliament’s closure of the Port of Boston.792  Historians 
dispute whether the Burgesses intentionally postponed consideration of 
the fee bill in the expectation that they would be dissolved or whether 
failure to enact the bill before dissolution was a mere accident.793 
Whatever the intention of the legislature, the law, lawyers, and 
courts, in alliance with the economic interests of the planters, now 
entered the picture.  At a rump session of the Burgesses in Raleigh 
Tavern the day after dissolution, the issue arose how the courts should 
deal with the failure to enact the fee bill.794  Some thought they should 
stay open and establish fees by themselves, while others thought that in 
the absence of statutory fees, the courts were required to close.795  An 
intermediate position was that courts should remain open for criminal 
prosecutions, administration of estates, and recording of documents, but 
should not hear debt cases or civil suits more generally.796 
Demonstrating their independence of the General Court now that 
the land bargain had completely collapsed, the county justices did what 
most of the former Burgesses wanted:  in most counties, they remained 
open but ceased to hear all but occasional debt and civil cases.797  Thus, 
in two counties for which records are printed—Caroline in the tidewater 
and Fauquier in the piedmont798—judicial business declined markedly.  
Caroline County records in the year from June 1773 to May 1774 are 183 
pages in length and contain over 1600 entries,799 while Fauquier records 
                                                 
792 HOLTON, supra note 168, at 117–18. 
793 Compare HOLTON, supra note 168, at 117–18 (asserting that the Burgesses knew that the 
Governor was going to dissolve the General Assembly and thus postponed consideration of the 
fee bill), with DEWEY, supra note 512, at 100–01 (contending that the Burgesses thought they had 
another month of business when the Governor unexpectedly dissolved the Assembly). 
794 DEWEY, supra note 512, at 101. 
795 Id. at 101–02. 
796 Id. at 102. 
797 Id. at 97 tbl.6, 102. 
798 The Antient Press published printed records of Caroline County in 1994 and of Fauquier 
County in 1996.  See, e.g., CAROLINE 1773, supra note 589; CAROLINE 1773–1774, supra note 331; 
FAUQUIER 1772–1773, supra note 676; VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK 
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1773–1775 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter 
FAUQUIER 1773–1775]; VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA 1775–1779 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1775–
1779]; VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1774–1778 
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1774–1778]. 
799 See CAROLINE 1773, supra note 589, at 45–99 (reporting cases from June 1773 until July 
1773); CAROLINE 1773–1774, supra note 331, at 1–100 (reporting cases from August 1773 
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from June 1773 to April 1774 are 116 pages long with over 900 entries.800  
From June 1774 to May 1775, in contrast, Caroline records are only 
twenty-three pages in length with fewer than 300 entries,801 while 
Fauquier records are some twenty-seven pages, also with fewer than 300 
entries.802  The disappearance of debt and other civil litigation, in short, 
reduced county court business to somewhere between thirteen percent 
and thirty-three percent of what it had been. 
The local judiciary, through legal interpretation rather than a 
legislative act, thereby put maximum pressure on Parliament to repeal 
the Intolerable Acts.  There was nothing that the Governor and the 
General Court could do in response, although the General Court itself, 
over which the Governor presided, sought to remain open.  However, it 
too was forced to suspend its sessions when the small group of attorneys 
who practiced before it organized a boycott, which litigants and 
witnesses later joined.803 
The turn of Virginians to lawyers in the summer of 1774, following 
habits of mind that had grown up over the previous quarter century, 
thus effectively demonstrated their independence of royal authority and 
of the colony’s central government.  Local courts, with their self-
perpetuating membership, went about business as usual, except that 
they declined to hear the one category of cases—those involving debt 
collection—that central authorities most wanted them to hear.  However, 
although they acted independently, most Virginians were by no means 
yet ready to declare that independence formally even as tensions 
continued to mount through the autumn and winter of 1774–1775.804 
Then, in April 1775, Governor Dunmore took two steps that pushed 
Virginians closer to open rebellion.  On April 21, apparently out of fear 
that he and other senior officials were threatened with bodily harm, 
Dunmore ordered the colony’s supply of gunpowder removed from the 
Williamsburg Powder Magazine and placed on board a royal naval 
                                                                                                             
until March 1774); CAROLINE 1774–1778, supra note 798, at 1–29 (reporting cases from 
March 1774 until May 1774). 
800 See FAUQUIER 1772–1773, supra note 676, at 75–102 (reporting cases from June 1773 until 
August 1773); FAUQUIER 1773–1775, supra note 798, at 1–89 (reporting cases from August 
1773 until April 1774). 
801 See CAROLINE 1774–1778, supra note 798, at 29–52 (reporting cases from June 1774 until 
May 1775). 
802 See FAUQUIER 1773–1775, supra note 798, at 89–107 (reporting cases from June 1774 
until January 1775); FAUQUIER 1775–1779, supra note 798, at 1–9 (reporting cases from February 
1775 until May 1775. 
803 DEWEY, supra note 512, at 5. 
804 See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 136 (“It was a long way from the boycott of 1774 to the 
Revolution of 1776.”). 
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vessel.805  The next day he quietly warned the speaker of the House of 
Burgesses that if any senior British official was harmed, he would 
proclaim freedom for slaves.806  Several weeks later, Dunmore himself 
fled Williamsburg and began raising an army to defend Britain's 
interests.807  At first, he welcomed slaves who joined his forces by 
promising them freedom, and later in November 1775 he proclaimed 
publicly that he would free any slaves that joined.808 
The threat of a slave revolt pushed Virginians nearly unanimously in 
the direction of independence.809  Beginning in the spring of 1776, courts 
began to appoint officials such as sheriffs “pursuant to an ordinance of 
convention” rather than on a commission from the royal governor.810  
Over the next several months, it became increasingly clear that a formal 
declaration of independence, together with the formal establishment of a 
new government, were necessary to maintain internal order and obtain 
foreign support essential to defeat Great Britain.811  Accordingly, on May 
15, 1776, the Virginia convention directed its delegates in Congress to 
propose independence, and on May 16, the Union Jack was hauled down 
from the Williamsburg capitol and replaced with a continental flag.812  
On June 29, a new constitution was proclaimed, and Patrick Henry was 
elected Governor.813  The royal colony of Virginia thereby came to an 
end, and the new Commonwealth of Virginia came into place.814 
  
                                                 
805 Id. at 143–44. 
806 Id. at 144–45. 
807 Id. at 133. 
808 Id. at 148–49. 
809 See id. 149, 158–61 (discussing colonists’ reactions to Dunmore’s actions). 
810 Appointment of Dally (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1776), microformed on 
00327485162124 (Library of Va.); accord Appointment of Fleming (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Apr. 
16, 1776), microformed on 00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). 
811 See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 171–75, 183–205 (providing a detailed discussion on efforts 
to end the war). 
812 Id. at 204. 
813 Id. 
814 See id. (discussing the establishment of the Commonwealth of Virginia). 
Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
